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1. Sect ion  8.1 provides:
(a)  An  accelerat ion pr ovision is a t erm  in a  mort gage, or in  th e
obliga tion  it secures, th at em powers the m o r t ga g ee  upon  de fau l t  by  the
mor tga gor  to declare the full mortgage obligation immediat ely due and
payable. An accelera tion be comes effective on t he da te sp ecified in a w r it t en
notice  by th e mor tga gee to t he m ortga gor deliver ed aft er de fault .
(b) Pr ior  to t he  da te  an  accelera tion b ecom es e ffecti ve, t he  mor tga gor
may cu re the  defau l t  and r e ins t at e  t he m ort gag e obli gat ion b y pa yin g or
t ender ing to  the  mor tgagee  the amount  t h a t  is th en owin g on th e mor tga ge
obliga tion  or p er forming an y other duty th e mortgagor is obligated to
pe r fo rm under th e terms of the mortgage documents.
(c) Afte r a n a ccele ra ti on  ha s t ak en  pla ce a nd  su bje ct t o Su bs ect ion  (d),
a  mort gagor m ay pr event  foreclosure  only by paying o r  t ende r ing  to the
mortgagee  th e fu ll a cceler at ed m ort gag e obli gat ion.
(d) A mor tg ag or m ay  defe at  acce le r ation a nd r einst at e th e mor tga ge
obliga tion  by paying o r  t ende r ing  to t he  mor tgagee  the amoun t due  and
owing a t  t he  t ime  of  tender  i n  t he absen ce of acceleration a nd by
pe r fo rming any  othe r  du ty  in  de fau l t  t he mor tga gor  is obl iga te d t o per form
in  th e a bs en ce of a ccele ra ti on  if:
(1) such  an  act ion  i s au thor i zed  by  s ta tu te or  t he  t e rms o f t he
mort gage  docu me nt s; or
(2) th e m ort gag ee h as  wa ived  its  rig ht  to a cceler at e; or
(3) the mor tg ag ee h as  en ga ged  in  fra ud , ba d fa it h,  or ot he r con du ct
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Enforcement  of Acce le ra t ion  Provis ions  and the
Rhet oric of Good Fa ith
R. Wilson Freyermu th *
I. IN T R O D U C T I O N
 Today, vir tua lly  a ll m or tga ges  conta in  accele ra t ion  clause s
permi t t ing the mortgagee to accelerate the mortgage indebted-
ness up on defa ult  by th e mor tga gor as  define d in t he mor tgage
loan  documenta t ion . Section 8.1 of the n ew Res ta tement (Th i rd)
of Proper ty : Mortgages [here ina ft e r  Mortgages  Res ta tement]1
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making acceleration unconscionable.
RE S T AT E M E N T (THIRD ) O F  P ROPERTY : MO R TG A GE S  § 8.1 (1997) [herein aft e r  MO R TG A GE S
RE S T AT E M E N T].
2. S ee id. § 8.1 cmt . a.
3. Id . § 8.1 (c).
4. Id . § 8.1 (d)(3).
endorses  the view tha t  thes e m or tga ge a ccele ra t ion  pr ovis ion s
a re gener ally en forceable a fter  defau lt in  accorda nce wit h t heir
terms. 2 Following default and accelerat ion ,  the mor tgagor  may
preven t  foreclos ure on ly by r ed eemin g t he p rope r ty fr om the
mor tgage debt , i.e., “only b y p a ying or  t ende r ing to the  mor t -
gagee th e full a ccelera te d m ort gage obliga tion .”3 Section
8.1 (d)(3), however , p la ces  cer ta in  const ra in t s u pon  the
mort gagee’s right  to accelera te, per m i t ting the  mor tgagor  to
re ins t a t e (a ft e r  cu r ing any exi st ing  de fau lt s ) i f “the  mor tga g ee
has en ga ged  in  fraud,  ba d fa i t h , or  other  conduct  making
accelera tion  uncons cionab le.”4 Th is  st anda rd h as a  sign ifica n t
judicia l pe digr ee  in  mor tga ge law d ecis ion s,  bu t  it s u se  of th e
elu sive t e rm “bad fa i th”—a te rm often  unders tood  in  the
conte xt  of its  mor e hon ora ble t win, “good fait h”—crea tes  the
poten t ia l for  unce r t a in ty in th e eva lua t ion  of d ispu tes  over  the
enforcement of acceleration provisions.
The rh et oric of good fait h h as  pla yed a  sign ificant  role in
judicia l opin ion s a dd res sing ch a lle nges  to cr e dit or  de cis ion s t o
exercise acce le ra t ion  cla use s followin g t he occu r ren ce of a
defau lt  by t he bor r ower. Most of th ese challenges in volve a
claim  by the  bor rower  e ithe r  t ha t  t he le nde r ’s s ecu r it y or
p rospect s for  repayment  a re  not  t hre at en ed (i.e., t ha t t he
defau lt  poses n o actu al h ar m t o th e lend er m erit ing
accelera tion  of the  debt ) or  tha t  the  lender ’s  deci sion  i s
p retextua l or  comes as an  unfair surprise. For example,
consider  th e following  hypothe t ica l : Randolph  runs  a  small
p lumbing supply business, financed via a  $750,000 r evolving
line of credit (bearing an interest  ra te  of 10%) from Local  Bank.
Loca l Ban k holds a  perfected s ecu r ity in ter est  in a ll of
Randolph’s i nven tory , accoun t s , and  in t angib les as well as a
recorded mortgage upon Randolph’s business premises. Under
the terms of the loan documents, Randolph must  provide
au dited  financia l s t a t ement s  t o Local Ban k each yea r by
Janua ry 14.  Under  the  te rms of the loan documen ts, failur e by
Randolph  to pe rform  an y obligat ion  (wh et he r m onet ar y or
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nonmone ta ry) const itu tes  a defau lt a nd en tit les Local Bank  to
demand immedia te  payment  of the  en t i re ou t s tand ing  ba l ance
of the lin e of cred it.
Now conside r  the following scen ar ios, ea ch in volving a
var iat ion on t he foregoin g hypot het ical.
Exa m pl e On e (Bor row er Insolv ency). As of J anua ry  15 , 1998
(one day lat e), Ran dolph  ha s n ot pr ovided t he a ud ited  fina ncia l
stat ements.  Citing Ran dolph’s failure t o provide the financia l
s t a t emen t s on a t imely ba sis, Local Ba nk  dem an ds im med iat e
repayment  of th e ent ire credit line.  Ha d Ran dolph provided the
fina ncia l sta tem ent s, th ey would have sh own him t o be
insolvent.
Exam ple T wo (Ba nk’s M is ta ken Percep tion of Insecu ri ty ). On
Janua ry 20, 1998 (six days late), Randolph p rov ides  Loca l  Bank
with  au dited  financia l s t a tements . The s t a t emen t s demons t r a t e
tha t  Ra ndolph  has a  net  wor th  exce ed in g t he ou t stand ing
ba lance of th e credit line, and operat ing cash flows that  are
more th an  su fficien t t o cover  mon th ly am ort iza t ion  of tha t
ou t s tand ing bala nce. F ur th erm ore, t he fin ancia l  st a t emen t s
in dica te th at  th e valu e of Local Ba nk ’s collat e r al exceeds $1
million . Nevert heless, Sm ith (th e Local Ban k loan officer
res pons ible for  Randolph’s  loan) i s concerned  by  rumors  tha t
Home Depot will open a new s uper st ore in  th e ar ea. S mit h
believes th at  a new H ome Depot would erode Randolph’s
cus tomer bas e an d r end er h is operations unprofitable. In
re alit y, however, Home Depot h as decided n ot to open a n ew
s tore in  the  a rea ; the rumors a re t he wishfu l t h in kin g of a  loca l
r ea l es ta te d eve loper . As a  conse qu en ce of Smit h’s con cer n s,
Loca l Bank demands immediat e r epa ymen t of th e en tir e cred it
line, citing Ra nd olph’s failu re t o provide t he fin an cial
s t a t emen t s i n a  t imely fashion  as r equ ir ed  by t he loa n
agreemen t .
Exam ple Three (Bank  Seeks Increased  In terest  R at e). On
Janua ry 20,  199 8 (s ix d ays  la t e), Ran dolph provides th e au dited
fina ncia l stat ements. The statemen ts demonstra t e  tha t
Ra ndolph  has a  net  wor th  exce ed in g t he ou t st anding ba la nce of
the credit line, an d operat ing cash flows tha t a re m ore th an
sufficien t  to cover  month ly amor t i za t ion  of tha t  ou t s tand ing
balan ce. Fu rt her more, th e financia l s t a tements  indica te  tha t
the va lu e of Local Ba nk’s colla ter a l exceeds  $1 mill ion .
Nevertheless, Sm it h  (the Local Ba nk loa n  officer  res pon sible  for
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Randolph’s loan ) informs Ran dolph tha t Local Bank will
demand im m e diate r epaym ent  of th e ent ire credit line, ba sed
upon Randolph’s failure t o provide the finan cial stat emen ts  in a
tim ely fash ion, unless Ra ndolph a grees  to increase the con t ract
interest  ra te t o 12.5%. When Ra nd ol ph  r efuses, Local Ban k
demands  im med ia te r ep aym en t  of t he ou t st anding ba la nce of
the credit  line, citin g Ran dolph ’s failu re t o provide t he fin an cial
s t a t emen t s in a timely fashion as required by t he loa n
agreemen t .
Exam ple Fou r (B an k  Mak es Ch an ge in  Lendin g Pol icy).  In
December  1997, Local Bank  is acquired  by ind us tr y gian t
MEGABank, which reta ins Local Bank’s per sonn el in t heir
exis t ing pos it ion s.  ME GABank exe cut ives i ss ue a  pol icy
dire ctive informing Sm ith (th e loan officer r esponsible for
Randolph’s loan) and other former Local Bank per s on ne l tha t
MEGABank policy str ongly discourages commercial loans of
less th an $1 m illion. Fu rt her , the policy directive ur ges th at
bank per sonn el sh ould exer cise “all mea ns  neces sa ry t o call
exist ing loans” smaller  than  tha t  th reshold,  and tha t  the ir
s u ccess in  doing so wou ld  be  factored  in to their  pe r formance
eva lu a t ion s for  pu rposes  of s a la ry,  bonus , and  promot ion
decisions. On J anu ary 20, 1998 (six days late), Randolph
provides th e au dited fina ncial sta tem ent s. The st at emen ts
demons t r a t e th at  Ran dolph  ha s a  net  wort h excee din g th e
ou ts tand ing  ba lance  of the  credi t  line, and  operatin g cash  flows
tha t  a re m ore t han  su fficie n t  to cover  month ly a mor t iza t ion  of
t h a t  ou t s t a n d in g  ba l a n ce . F u r t h e r m or e , t h e  fi n ancial
s t a t emen t s i nd ica t e  t hat  th e  va lue  of Loca l  Bank’s  col la te ra l
exceeds $1 million. Citing Ra ndolph’s failure t o pr ovide  the
fina ncia l sta tem ent s in a  timely fash ion, MEGABank d ema nds
imm edia te  repayment of the outst a ndin g bala nce of th e cred it
line.
Exam ple Five (Th e Loan Officer’s Anim us). On J an ua ry 20,
1998 (six days late), Randol ph  pr ovides t he a ud ited  fina ncia l
stat ements.  The s t a t emen t s demons t r at e  that  Randolph has a
net  wor th  exceed in g t he ou t st anding ba la nce of t he cr edit line,
and opera t ing cash  flows tha t  a r e mor e  t h an su fficient  to cover
m on t h l y a m or t i za t i on  o f t h a t  o u t s t a n d i n g  ba l a n ce.
Fu rt her more, the financial statem ents ind ica te  tha t  the va lue
of Local Ban k’s collater al  exce ed s $ 1 m ill ion . On  beha lf of Loca l
Bank , Sm it h  (the Local Ba nk loa n  officer  res pon sible  for
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Randolph’s loan) dema nds  immed iate r epaym ent  of the
ou t stan ding bala nce of th e cred it lin e, citin g Ran dolph ’s failu re
to pr ovide t he  fina ncia l st at em en ts  in a  tim ely fa s h ion  as
requ ired  by th e loa n  agreem ent. In  reality, Smit h’s decision was
motivat ed by per sona l an imus r e su l ti ng from a  deci sion  in  la t e
1997 by Randolph’s son (who was married to Smith’s da u gh te r ,
J ane) t o lea ve J ane a nd t heir  child ren  for  a  you nger  wom an.
If Ran dolph challenges t he a bility of the Ba n k  t o call in h is
credit  lin e, in  wh ich  exa mples  (if a ny) should  the cou r t  su st a in
h i s challenge? Section 8.1 suggests th at  th e Ba nk ’s a ccelerat ion
pr ovision is gen er ally en forceable , and in ea ch exa mp le
Ran dolph  ha s violat ed a t erm  of th e loan agr eemen t, th ereby
ap pa ren tly  tr iggerin g th e Ba nk ’s r eser ved cont ra ctu al r ight  t o
demand full an d im med iat e re pa ymen t of th e cred it lin e. But
would  th e Ban k’s decision in a ny of th e examp les const i t ut e
“bad fa i th” with in  the mean ing  of se ction 8.1(d)(3), thereby
defea tin g th e Ba nk ’s r eser ved cont ra ctu al r ight ?
Example One, of cour se, presen ts  no analyt ical  problem. Not
only does Rand olph’s failure t o provide the finan cial stat emen ts
violate  a  t e rm of the  loan  agr eemen t , bu t  Ra ndolph ’s insolven cy
places th e Ban k’s decision t o call th e loan  an d en force its
r e medies beyond r eas ona ble cha llenge. Th e Ba nk ’s decision
would  comply wit h it s du ty of good  fa i th  pe r formance  under  any
concep t ion  of tha t  du ty. The other  four  examp les, however,
p resent  the poss ibi lit y of sign ifican t  ana lyt i ca l  di sagreement
because  the  Bank’s p rospect s  for  repayment  do not appea r t o be
th rea ten ed an d th e Ban k’s secured  posit ion is  solid. In  Exa mp le
Two, the  Bank officer  honest ly believes tha t t he Ba nk ’s
p rospect s for r epaym ent  ar e th rea ten ed, but  his belief appear s
to be mi st a k e n  a nd per ha ps even  negligent . If so, is th e Ban k’s
de cis ion  made in “bad faith”? In  E x a mples  Three  and Four  the
Bank use s t he viola t ion  a s  a  bas is for act ing t o prot ect it s
genera l econ omic in ter es t s—t o ob ta in  a  h ighe r  in t e res t  r a t e (in
Example Thr ee) or t o extract it self from t he r elationsh ip based
upon a ch an ge in b an k p olicy (in Example Four). Are these
de cis ion s bad fait h pr etextu al su rpr ises or foreseea ble good
fait h  exe rcises  of prudent  business judgmen t? In E xamp le Five,
the Ban k’s decision is m otivated n ot by any bus iness concerns,
bu t by th e Ba nk  officer’s per sona l an im u s  t oward Ran dolph. Is
t h i s de cis ion  a  ba d fa it h  pr et ext ua l surpr ise, or  a  foreseeable
decision a ut hor ized by a n a rm s-lengt h ba rga in?
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5. S ee infra  note s 12-22 an d accompa nyin g text .
6. S ee infra  note s 23-26 an d accompa nyin g text .
7. S ee infra  note s 29-93 an d accompa nyin g text .
8. S ee infra  note s 94-153 an d accompa nyin g text .
This  Art icle explore s t he  exte nt  to wh ich cour ts  ha ve
str uggled to give meaning to “good faith” as a cons t ra in t  upon  a
cred it or ’s en forcemen t  of i t s con t ractua l  r emedies . Al though  the
Mort gages R estat em ent  seeks to in t roduce  ce r ta in ty  and
pr edicta bility  i nto mor tgage la w by advocat ing th e free
enforcement  of acceler at ion clau ses, it s u se of the  elusive  “bad
fa i th” st an da rd  in s ection  8.1(d)(3) will compr omise  its  abil ity t o
ach ieve tha t  ce r ta in ty  and pr edicta bility. In  Pa rt  II t he Ar ticle
eva lua te s sect ion  8 .1  and i ts  sta ted  objective of foster ing
ce r t a in ty and predict a b ility in  th e en forceme nt  of mort gage
remedies.5 As Par t II  expla ins , th e des ire  for efficiency ha s
caused some t o define th e ter m “good faith ” by reference to
fr eed om-of-cont ract  rhet or ic; u nde r  th is  view, a  cred it or ’s
de cis ion  to a ccelerat e is in  “good fait h” if (a s  in  t he  sample
hypotheticals) th e borrower h as br eached  an  object ive  ter m of
the mor tgage  and the  mor tgage expr ess ly re ser ved t he  righ t t o
acce le ra te upon  tha t  b reach .6
As described in Par t III, however, th i s freedom-of-con t ract
view is  not  consi st en t  wit h  the d u ty of good  fa i t h  per formance
and enforcement as th at dut y has evolved thr ough  it s
incorpora t ion  in to the  R estat em ent (S econd) of Contracts and
the Uniform Commercial Code. Instead, as Part III explains,
the evolv in g du ty of good fa ith  compels  a  more  sea rch ing
inqu iry—one tha t  focuse s n ot  only u pon  wh et her  the cr edit or
hon est ly be lie ves  tha t  the con t ract  a u t h or izes  i t s act ion ,  bu t
also upon whethe r  t he  credi tor ’s action un der t he circums ta nces
compor t s with  the r ea son able , ye t  unexp res se d,  exp ect a t ion s of
th e pa rt ies a t t he t ime t hey en ter ed in to t heir  bar gain .7
Par t  IV explores  the im pa ct  of th e r het or ic of good fa ith  on
judicia l de cis ion s involvi ng ch allenges  to cred itor  accele ra t ion
decisions. Pa rt  IV focus es p ar ticu lar ly on t he  te nd en cy of som e
cou r t s  t o u se “impa ir m e n t  of s ecu r it y ”—s om e t im es
im pr ope r ly—a s a  means  to inform the par t i es ’ expecta t ions
about  the  lender ’s power to accelerat e th e ma tu rity of a debt. 8
In  P ar t  V the a r t icle  cont rast s t he enforcem en t  of accele ra t ion
prov is ions with  the en forcemen t  of l and  use  r es t rict ion s in  the
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9. S ee infra  note s 154-84 an d accompa nyin g text .
10. S ee infra  note s 185-94 an d accompa nyin g text .
11. S ee infra  note s 195-210 an d accompa nyin g text .
12. S ee Jackson  v . S t ate Ba nk , 488 N.W.2d 151 , 156 (Iowa 1992) (sta tin g th at
a  mor tga gee  can not  re fus e t o ad van ce fu nd s ba sed  up on  insecur ity clau se in m ortga ge
no te un les s m ort ga gee  in  good fa it h b elie ves  it s s ecu ri ty  or p ros pect  of rep aym ent  is
im pa ir ed ); MO R TG A GE S RE S T AT E M E N T, supra  not e 1, § 8 .1 r epor ters’ note (“Where a
mort gage  note  actu ally conta ins [an  insecu rit y clause ], the good-fait h  r equir emen t is
ap pli cab le. ”); U.C.C. § 1-208 (1995) (“A term  providing that one pa rty or his su ccessor
in  int ere st m ay a ccelera te p aym ent  or per forma nce . . . ‘at  will’ o r ‘w h en  h e  de e m s
him self ins ecu re ’ or in  wor ds of s im ila r im por t s ha ll be  constru ed to mea n  tha t  he
sh all  have power to do so only if he in good faith believes that  the p r o sp e ct  of
paymen t or  pe rfo rm an ce is  im pa ir ed .”).
law  of ser vitu des, in  which  court s h ave s tr uggled  with
ques t ions about  th e en forcea bil it y of ser vit ude s in  the a bs en ce
of ha rm.9 Part  V discusses the resolution of this issu e in  the
proposed R estat em ent (T h ird) of Prop ert y: S erv it udes, wh i ch
adop t s a “rat ionality” sta nda rd for th e enforcement of land use
restrictions.10 Pa rt  VI th e Art icle compares  the “ra t iona li t y” and
“ba d fa ith” standards a nd offers some concluding observations,
bot h  abou t t he  re solut ion of th e hyp oth et icals in tr oduced  above
and the possible benefits th a t  m a y  flow from the  unce r t a in ty
occasioned by section 8.1’s “bad faith” standa rd.11
II. SE C T IO N  8.1  A N D  E F F I C IE N C Y I N  MO R TG AG E  RE M E D IE S
 Section  8.1 spe cifically  gover ns a ccele r a t ion  de cis ion s
pursuan t to breaches of “objective” defa ult  pr ovisions (e.g.,
fa ilur e to pay insta llments in a timely fashion, failure to pay
taxes, failur e to pr ovide ins ur an ce), the violat ion  of which  can
be de monst ra ted  by r efe ren ce t o object ively determinable facts.
In  con t r as t , a  creditor somet imes m ay exercise th e power to
acce le ra t e pu r suan t  t o a “su bjective” defa ult  pr ovision (e.g.,
accelera tion  bas ed u pon t he m ort gagee’s decision to “deem it self
in se cure”). With  regard  to th is  la t ter  group  of acceler at ion
decisions, the s t anda rd for  en forcem en t  is  rela t ive ly clea r ; bot h
mor tgage l aw and  the Uniform Commercia l Code provide tha t  a
credit or  may not accelerate pursua nt t o an insecurity clause
u n l ess th e cred itor  hon est ly believes  th at  its  secu rit y or
prospect of repayment is actually threatened.12
One migh t  a rgue tha t  a l l accelerat ion decisions sh ould be
govern ed by tha t  s ame s t andar d,  rega rdles s of t he t ype of
defau lt  involved . After  all, t he  mor tga ge t ransact ion  (a t  its core)
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13. S ee MO R T G A G E S  RE S T AT E M E N T, supra  no te  1, § 1 .1 cm t.  (“Th e fu nct ion  of a
mort gage  is t o em ploy  an  in te re st  in  re al  es ta te  as  se cur i t y f or  th e pe rfor ma nce  of
som e obli ga ti on .”).
14. Id . § 8.1  cmt . a . Th e comment s also explain that section 8.1 permits the
genera l enforcem ent  of “cross-defau lt” provisions, i.e., pr ovisions th at  perm it
acce ler at ion  of one mort gage de bt in  th e even t t ha t a  different  loan goes in to default .
S ee id .
serves  to provide secur it y for  the r ep aym en t  or  pe r formance of
the bor rower ’s m or tga ge ob liga t ion .13 I n  t h is  r egard, bot h
“objective” an d “subjective” default p rovisions a re m otivated by
the mor tga gee ’s d es ir e t o pr otect  it se lf a ga in st  condi t ion s t ha t
could th rea ten  the m or tga gee ’s s ecu r it y or  it s p rosp ect s for
r epaymen t . As  a  resu lt ,  one  migh t  a r t icu la te the  view  t h a t  a
breach  of an objective defa ult  pr ovision  shou ld not  ju s t ify
accelera tion  by the  mor tgagee where tha t  b reach  does  not
th rea ten  the m or tga gee ’s s ecu r it y or  it s p rosp ect s for
repa yment , especially if the defau lt is nonm oneta ry in n at ur e.
At  fir st  gla nce, s ect ion  8.1 of the Mortgages  Res ta tement
reject s this view. The comment s to section 8.1 distinguish the
viola t ion  of an object ive defa ult  covena nt  from a  su bjective
defau l t (su ch  as  the commiss ion  of common law was te or  the
mort gagee’s exercise  of an in secu r i ty clause ) and  sugges t  tha t
the mor tgagee need n ot  demonst ra te im pa ir men t  of th e
mort gagee’s s ecu r ity in order  t o jus tify a ccelera tion  followin g an
objective defau lt:
T h e m o r t g a ge e ’s  a cc el er a t i on  b a s e d  on  t h e  m o r t ga g or ’s
com m iss ion  of comm on-la w  w a s t e  is  p e r m is s ib le  on l y w h e n  t h e
w a s t e impa i r s  t he  m or tgagee ’s  s ecu r i ty  .  . .  . On  th e  o the r
h a n d ,  w h er e t h e m ort ga gee ’s a cceler at ion  st em s fr om  th e
m o r t ga g or ’s  viola tion  of sp ecific cove n an ts , im pa irm en t of
s e cu r i t y need  n ot  b e s h ow n . Thu s,  for  exa mp le,  i f th e m ortga ge
requ i r e s  th e m ort ga gor  to ca re  for  a n  im pr ovem en t in  a cer ta in
m a n n e r , t o in s u re  t he  p r emises ,  o r  t o  pay  r ea l  e s t a t e  t a xes ,
d e fa u lt s  on  th es e cove n an ts  ar e t h e p rop er  ba sis  for
acce ler at ion  eve n  th ou gh  th ey a lso con st itu te  wa st e . .  . a n d  d o
not  im pair  [ the m ortga gee’s]  securi ty . 14
Fu rt her more, section 8.1 mak es no distin ctions between
mone ta ry object ive  de fau lt s a nd n onmonet ar y objective
defaults.  As  the comments  sugges t , “acce lera t ion  i s not  on ly
perm itted  for  fa i lu re  to pay the  mor tgage  debt  p rompt ly , bu t
also for defaults in mortgage covenants to pay  t a xes, t o
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15. Id .
16. Id . cmt . e; see also i d . r epor ters’ note (“This s ection, in  adopt ing t he
t rad i t iona l approach, reflects the view tha t, in the a bsence of fault o n  the  par t  o f t he
mortgagee,  relief from a ccelerat ion is bet ter  dealt  with  by  ‘a r r ea rages ’ s t a tu t es  or  t he
lan gua ge of the mortgage documents. This sect ion ser ves  an  im por ta nt  policy g oal of
p redict ab il it y in  mo rt ga ge r em ed ies .”).
17. S ee i d . § 8.1(d )(1). Most  conve nt iona l re sid en tia l m ort gag e docu me nt at ion
con ta ins a con tr act ua l re ins ta te me nt  pr ovisi on . S ee, e.g., 2 GR A N T S. NE L S O N  & DALE
A. WHIT MAN , REAL E S TA TE  F I N AN C E  LAW § 14.3, at 325 (3d ed. 1993) (showing  form :
Federa l Na ti on al  Mor tg ag e As sociat ion– Fe der al H ome  Loa n M ort gag e Cor por at ion
(FN MA-FH LMC )–Un iform  Mortgage–Deed of Trus t  Cove na nt s– Sin gle  Fa mi ly, ¶  18).
In  addition, a nu mber of states h ave enacted legislation providing certa i n  mor tgagor s
with  s ta tu t o r y r e in sta tem ent  privile ges. S ee, e.g., CAL . CIV. CODE  § 292 4c (We st  199 3);
COLO . RE V. STAT . § 38-38-104(2.5) (1997) (certain  nonm onetar y defaults only); 735 IL L .
CO M P . STAT . AN N . 5/15-1 602 (W est  1992 ); MI N N . STAT . AN N . § 580.30 (West 1988); 41
P A. CO N S. STAT . AN N . § 404 (W est  1992 ); UTAH  CO D E  AN N . § 57-1 -31(1) (1994). In
add it ion , Chapt ers 11,  12, and 13  of the Ba nk ru ptcy Code pr ovide debt ors in
poss ess ion  of m o r t gage d pr oper ty w ith  th e opp ort un ity  to u se t he  pla n of
re org an iza tion  a s  a  means to deaccelera te a nd r einst at e a de fault ed m ortga ge
obliga tion . S ee CH A R LE S J O R D AN  TABB, TH E  LA W  OF  BANKRUPTCY § 11.3, a t  768,
§ 12. 3, a t 9 00,  § 13. 2, a t 9 59-6 1 (19 97).
main ta in  ins ur an ce, to keep  buildings in tact ,  to main ta in  an
adequa te fin ancia l cond ition ,  to avoid the  commiss ion  of wast e ,
and th e like .”15 Th es e com men ts a pp ea r  to em br ace a  st rong
“freed om-of-cont ract” view t ha t  accele ra t ion s b ase d u pon
objective defau lts  sh ould be ju dged in  accordance  wi th  the
t e rms of the  contr act  an d t he  objective fact s (i.e., d id  the
mor tgagor  sell the land, or  fa i l t o p rov ide a  financia l s t a t emen t ,
or  fail to pay real estate  t axes  in  viola t ion  of th e a gr eemen t?),
without  regard  to exte rnal issues  such  as  impa irment  of the
mort gagee’s security or the mortgagor’s personal circumstances.
The comments  just ify th is view b y refer en ce to efficiency,
not in g tha t s ection 8.1 s hou ld pr ovide pr edicta bility in  th e
enforcement  of mor t g a ge rem edies  an d a void “difficult a nd
t ime-consuming jud icia l inqu i r ies  in to such  mat te r s as  the
degree  of mort gagor’s negligence, the r el a tive ha rdsh ip  tha t
acceler at ion im poses , an d oth er  su bjective concer ns .”16
In  section 8.1(d), however, th e Mortgages Restatem en t
re cognizes  ce r t a in  limit a t ions  upon  the  mor tgagee’s  r ight  t o
acce le ra t e th e mort gage debt . Section 8.1(d) permits th e
mor tgagor  to defeat  a cce le ra t ion  and  reinsta te  the mor tgage
obligat ion  (by curin g an y pr e-accelera tion  defau lts ) if
re ins ta tement i s au thor ized by s ta tu te or  t he  mor tgage
documenta t ion ,17 or  i f t he  mor tgagee has  wa ived i t s r i gh t  t o
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18. S ee MO R TG A GE S RE S T AT E M E N T, supra note 1,  § 8.1(d)(2). Most t ypically,
cour t s have found wa i ve r  b a sed up on a m ortga gee’s consist ent  pat ter n of acceptin g
la t e paym ent s. S ee, e.g.,  Mil ler  v . Uhr ick, 706 P.2 d 73 9 (Ari z. Ct . App.  1985 ); Ross elot
v. Heim brock, 56 1 N.E .2d 555 (Ohio Ct . App. 1988); Fair field Fin. G roup , Inc. v.
Ga wer c, 814  S.W .2d  204  (Te x. Ap p. 1 991 ).
19. MO R TG A GE S RE S T AT E M E N T, supra  no te  1, § 8 .1(d )(3).
20. The comment s  p r ovide  tw o exa mp les , Ill us tr at ion s 16  an d 17 , in  wh ich  th e
mortgagee  a t t empts  t o acce le ra t e  shor t ly aft er  pr ovidin g th e m ort gag or w ith  ora l
assur ances  th at  no acceler at ion wou ld occur. See id . c m t . e, illus. 16 (payment due
by Mon da y, bu t m ort gag ee a ssu re s m ort gag or t ha t n o accelerat ion will ta ke pla ce if
mor tga gor  pa ys b y F ri da y at  5:00p m); i d . cmt. e, illu s. 17 (mortgagor loses job and
canno t pa y m ort gag e in st all me nt , bu t r equ est s t im e t o s e ll  la n d; mort gagee or ally
assures  mort gagor t ha t it  will wait  for “a couple of month s” before tak ing a ny a ct i on ).
In  e a ch  c a se, the comments suggest th at “estoppel, fraud, or bad faith provide
appropr ia t e theo r ie s for  de fea t in g a cce le ra t ion .” Id . cmt. e.
21. Id . cmt. e.
acce le ra t e eith er in  wr it in g or  by imp licat ion as  a r esu lt of its
conduct .18 In  ad dit ion ,  sect ion  8.1 (d)(3 ) pe rmit s t he m or tga gor
to rein st at e th e debt  (again , aft e r  cur ing any  defau l t s) i f “the
m or t gagee has e nga ged  in  fraud,  ba d fa it h , or  other  cond u ct
ma kin g acceler at ion u ncons cionab le.”19
Section 8.1 does not  pr ovid e a  pos it ive  de fin it ion  of t he  t erm
“ba d fait h”; thus , the  exact  exten t  to which  subsect ion  (d )(3 )
cons t ra ins th e mort gagee’s accelerat ion decision is u nclear. Th e
comment s pr ovide some lim ited  guida nce, dis tin guis hin g
between  act iv e m isconduct by the m ortgagee prior to its
acceleration decision (e.g ., a  st a tem en t  tha t  it  wil l n ot  en force
its  rem edies, or will do so only after  a cert ain p eriod of time)
and th e m ortgagor’s per son al  circum st an ces (e.g., the har dsh ip
tha t  accele ra t ion  wou ld  im pos e, or  the m or tgagor’s ab ility t o
pay). Accordin g to t he  comme nt s, t he former  migh t  preven t  the
mor tga gee from  acceler at ing lega lly,20 bu t  not  t he  la t t e r :
W h ile  mor tga gee  miscondu c t  o f t he  type  d escr ibed  in
S u b s ect ion  (d) is  a n  a pp r opr ia te  ba sis  for  re lie f fro m
a cce le r a tion , m o r t ga g or ’s  neg l igence , m i st a k e, or  im p r ov id e n ce
a r e  no t .  Th i s  i s  t he  case  even  wher e  the  d efau l t  i s  caused  by
cir cu m s tan ces bey on d m ort ga gor ’s con tr ol  a n d  w h e r e
a cc e le r a t i on  will ca us e ext re m e h ar dsh ip. . . . Un der  th is
R e s t a t em e n t ,  a  m o rt ga g ee  w h o i s  gu i l t y  of  no  misconduc t  i s  ex
ante  per mit ted t o  re ly  on i ts  contr act  a ccelera t ion r ight
w it h ou t  b e in g  s u b je ct  t o th e va ga rie s of m ort ga gor’s fina ncia l
an d p er son al  sit u at ion  . . . .21
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22. 171 N.E. 884 (N.Y. 1930). In Graf, the m ortga gor (a corpora tion) fell int o
defau lt  becau se th e corpora tion’s bookkeeper  ma de an  ar ith met ica l  er ro r  in  p repa r ing
the che ck fo r th e mort gage insta llment . The bookkeeper discovered t he m istak e, but
could not cure it immediately because the corporation’s presiden t  had s ince l ef t t he
coun t ry on business. The m ortgagee accelerated th e debt, deman ded  paymen t  of  the
en t ir e balance (approximately $300,000), and refused t o reinstat e the m ortgage when
the mor tga gor  te nd er ed t he  corr ect  pa st  du e in st al lm en t.  Wh en  pa ym en t of t he
accelerated  balance did not occur, the mortgagee instituted foreclosure proceedings.
In  its decision, a 4-3 majority of the New Yo r k C ou r t  o f Appea ls  upheld the
acce le ra t ion , enforcing t he ba rga ined-for acceler at ion claus e an d su ggestin g th at  while
the mortgagee’s cond uct  was  “un gen er ous ,” it d id n ot in volve “fr au d, ba d fa ith  or
uncon scionable  conduct ” by the m ortga gee so as  to just ify the cour t’s equita ble
in t erven tion  on th e mor tga gor’s beha lf. Id . at 885. In dissent , Just ice Cardozo argued
tha t  the enforcement of acceleration provisions was subject to equitable limitations,
and th at  acce ler at ion  wa s n ot j us ti fied given th e trivial nat ure of the borrower’s
mista ke, th e bo rr owe r’s a bil it y t o pa y, t he  mo rt ga gee ’s awa re ne ss  of th e mist ak e, a nd
the ha rm  th at  th e borr ower wou ld suffer if n o relief wer e gra nt ed (by the t ime o f t he
Cou rt  of Appeals decision, of course, the country h ad ent ere d  t h e Depres sion  and  the
mor tga gor  likely ha d no h ope of obtainin g financing to satisfy the a ccelerat ed
mort gage  debt ). See id.  at  889  (Ca rd ozo, C .J ., d iss en ti ng ).
Illu st ra tion  19 is bas ed pr ecisely upon  th e facts in  Graf,  and P ro fes so r  Gran t
Nels on  (who was t he pr incipal d ra fter of section  8.1) has  sugges ted t ha t h is objective
in  section 8.1(d)(3) was to r eject Cardozo’s view tha t cour ts s hould  use e quit able
powers to rescue the b orr ower  from  th e con seq ue nce s of it s own  ne glige nce  or
mista ke. 
23. S ee, e.g., In re Nan tah ala Village, Inc., 976 F.2d 876, 881-82 (4th Cir. 1992);
Ter r y A. Lamber t Plu mbing, Inc. v. Western  Sec. Bank, 934 F.2d 976, 982-83 (8th
The comments  rein force  th is  poin t , us ing  an  example  based
upon the fa cts of t he la ndm ark N ew York  Cou r t  of Appea l s
decision in  Graf v.  Hope B uild in g Cor por at ion .22 The comment s
ex-pres sly reject  th e view expr esse d by J us tice Car dozo
(dissen tin g in Graf ) th at  equ ity ju st ifies reli eving th e borrower
from th e consequ ence of a t rivial monet ar y default t riggered by
th e borrower’s own mist ak e.
What the commen ts d o not  make cle a r  is  wh et her  se ct ion
8.1 dist ingu ish es be tw een  (on th e one h an d) act ive m iscondu ct
by th e mor tga gee pr ior t o th e acceler at ion decision and (on the
other hand) the ma king of the decis ion  it se lf in  reli ance u pon
an  objective de fau lt p rovision . I n  ot h e r  words , can  a  deci sion  to
acce le ra t e a  mor tgage deb t, based upon  the  occur rence  of an
objective defa u lt  as s pe cified b y t he t er ms of t he loa n
document s, eve r  const it u te “ba d fa it h”? Many cou r t s  have
concluded  tha t  th e  a nsw er  is  “no,” a nd t ha t  the cr ed it or ’s
reli ance upon  the  te rms of t he  loan  documents i s su ffi cien t  to
defea t a  cla im of bad fa i th .23 Cou r t s an d comm ent at ors often
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Cir . 1991); Kham  & Nat e’s Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Ba nk, 9 08 F .2d  1351,  1357  (7 th
Cir . 1990 ); Van  Arn em  Co. v. M an ufa ctu re rs  Ha nove r L ea sin g Cor p., 776 F. Supp.
1220, 1223 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Idaho First Nat ’l Bank v. David Steed & Ass ocs., Inc.,
825 P.2d 79, 83 (Idaho 1992); Brown v. Weeres Indus ., Inc., 375 N.W .2d 64, 67 (Minn .
C t . App. 1985); Bennco Liquidating Co. v. Ameritr ust  Co., 621 N.E.2d 760, 762-63
(Ohio Ct . App . 19 93).
24. 908 F. 2d  135 1 (7t h C ir . 19 90).
advance efficien cy concer ns  to ju st ify th is v iew  and u se  st rong
freedom -of-cont ract  rh etor ic to inform  th e me an ing of good fait h
in  cont ract  en force men t . On e of t h e  m ore eloquent defenses of
th i s view com es  from th e Seven th  Circu it’s decision  in Kham  &
Nate’s S hoes N o. 2, Inc. v. Fir st  Bank,24 in w hich  J ud ge
Eas terb rook just ifies an  extr eme ly na rr ow view of “good fait h”
by reference to the need for certainty and p red icta bility in
con t ract ing:
F ir m s tha t  ha ve  neg ot ia te d con tr a cts  a re  en tit led  to e n force
them  t o  t h e l et t e r , e v en  t o t h e  gr e a t discom fort  of th eir  tr ad ing
pa r t ne r s ,  wit h ou t b ein g m u lct e d  for  la ck  of “g ood  fa it h ”.
Althou gh  cour ts  ofte n  re fer  to t h e obl iga tion  of good  fa i th  t h a t
e x is t s in e ver y cont ra ctu al r ela t ion , t h i s  is  n o t  a n  i n v it a t i on  t o
t h e cour t  t o  dec ide  whe t he r  one  pa r ty  ough t  t o  have  exe rc i sed
pr iv i leges exp re ss ly r es er ved  in  th e d ocu m e n t .  “Good  fait h” is
a  compa c t  r e fe rence  to an  i m p li ed  u n d e r t a k i n g  n ot  t o  ta k e
op p or t u n i st ic advan tage  in  a  w ay  th a t  cou ld  no t  have  been
con tem pla t ed  a t  t h e t im e  of d r a ft in g , a n d  w h ich  t h e r efor e  w a s
n ot  r e so lved  exp l i ci t l y  by the  pa r t i e s . W h en  t h e  co n t r a ct  i s
s il en t , pr in ciple s of good  fait h —su ch a s t h e U CC ’s s ta n da rd  of
h o n e st y in fa ct . . .—fill th e ga p. T h ey d o n ot b lock u se  of t e r m s
t h a t  a c t u a l ly  a p p e a r  in  t h e  c on t r a c t .
W e do n ot d ou bt  th e for ce of th e p rov e r b t h a t  t he  l e t t e r
k ille t h , wh ile th e sp irit  givet h life. L ite ra l im p le m e n ta t ion  of
un adorned  l angua ge  may  des t roy  the  e s sence  of t he  ven tu r e .
Few  pe ople  pa ss  ou t of ch ildh ood  w it h ou t  lea rn in g fa ble s a bou t
gen ie s , w h ose w icked ly lite ra l int er pr et at ion of th eir
“ma s te r s ’” wi shes  a lways  l eads  to  ca l ami ty .  Ye t  knowledge
t h a t  lite r a l e n fo r ce m e n t  m e a n s  s o m e  m is m a t c h  b et w e e n  t h e
pa r t i e s ’ expec ta t ion  and  t he  ou tcome  d oe s n ot  im p l y a  g en e r a l
d u t y  of “k in d n e ss ” i n  pe r for m a n c e, or  of ju d ici a l ov er s i gh t  i n t o
whe th e r  a p ar ty  h ad  “good ca u se ” to a ct a s it  did . Pa r t ies  to a
con t r a ct  ar e n ot e ach  oth er s’ fidu ciar ies ; th ey a re  n ot b ou n d  t o
t r e a t cus tomers  w i t h th e sa m e cons ider at ion r ese rv ed for  th eir
fam ilies . A n y  a t t e m pt  to a dd  an  over la y of “just  cau se ” . . . to
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25. Id . at  1357 (citat ions omit ted). Not ably, th e Seve n th  C ircu it  based  it s
int er pr et at ion  of “good faith ” upon the existin g langua ge of UCC section 1-203 which ,
as discuss ed in P ar t III , origina lly me an t on ly “hon est y in  fact ,” i.e., d oes t he  act or
sincerely believe tha t i ts  cond uct  is a ut hor ized  by t he  la w? See infra no t es  47-61  and
accom pan ying text . As Pa rt  III e xplain s, th rou gh t he U CC re vision p rocess , th e
pr incipa l architects of the UCC ha ve abandoned  this  n ar row concept ion of good faith
in  favor of a duty informed b y the observance of reasonable commercial standards.
S ee infra  note s 77-93 an d accompa nyin g text .
26. S ee Kh am  & N at e’s S hoes , 908 F.2d a t 1357. E xactly h ow the  Ban k would
fare un der  Ea st er br ook’s view  is u ncle ar  in E xam ple  Fi ve, in  wh ich t he  Ba nk ’s a ction
is mot ivat ed by t he loa n officer’s person al a nim us. E aste rbr ook’s  rhe tor i c sugges t s
tha t  Ra nd olph ’s a ccept an ce of a p rov ision  au th ori z in g  a cceleration if he failed to
provide finan cial sta tem ent s ma kes a ll other  circu m s t a n ces irr elevan t; un der t his
view, th e Ban k’s action would w ith sta nd ch allen ge by Randolph. However, it seems
dub ious to suggest th at Ran dolph, at the t ime he ent ered in to the  loan  ag reemen t ,
would  ha ve con te mp la te d t ha t t he  Ba nk  wou ld a ct i n s uch  an  a rb itr ar y an d ca pr iciou s
fashion,  an d cou rt s h av e oft en  ap pli ed  th e d ut y of good  fai th  in  a fa sh i on  t h a t
p rotect s th e borr ower a gain st s uch  pre text ua l condu ct. See infra n o t es  142-53 and
accompany ing t ext .
t h e exer cise of cont ra ctu al p rivile ges  wou ld r edu ce com m er cial
cer ta in ty  an d b re ed  cost ly lit iga tion .25
The judicial efficiencies gained from t his view of bad  fait h
ar e ea sily seen  by consider ing th e int rodu ctory h ypoth etica ls in
Pa r t  I an d evaluat ing how a  cou r t  would view Randolph’s
challenges  to the  Bank’s  deci sion  to call in  h is  li ne of cr edi t .
Example On e (in wh ich Ra nd olph is  ins olvent ), of cours e, poses
no an alyt ical difficult y un der  any  concept ion  of bad fa i th ;
Randolph  has  viol a ted the  t erms of th e loan  agr eem ent  an d h is
insolvency poses  a  th rea t  to the  Bank’s  p rospect s  of repayment .
Likewise, th e B a n k ’s decision s in  Exa mp les Tw o, Thr ee, a nd
Four would not involve “bad faith ” und er th e Eas ter brook view.
Randolph  may argue th at he n ever expected t h a t  t h e Bank
would  call h is loan  bas ed u pon a  te chn ical, s ix-day de fau lt,
espe cially i f t ha t  act ion  was  imp ru den t (a s in  Exa mp le Two, in
which  the Bank mis taken ly p er ceives  it s s ecu r it y  is
t h r eatened); motivated by a desire to obtain a h igher interest
r a t e (as  in  E x ample Th ree); or motivat ed by a cha nge in Ba nk
lending policies (as in Exa mple F our). Under  th is view,
however, th e litera l  terms of the  contract  author ize  the  Bank’s
act ion , and  th e “mism at ch” betwee n  Randolph’s  expecta t ions
an d t he  Ban k’s in te nt ions is  irr eleva nt .26
Whether cour ts will i n te r pret  section  8.1 in eq ua lly
sweep ing fash ion , h owever , is  conject ure. Al though t he
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27. RE S T AT E M E N T (SECON D ) O F  CONTRACTS  § 205 (1979) [hereina fter CONTRACTS
RE S T AT E M E N T]; see infra  note s 77-83 an d accompa nyin g text .
28. S ee infra  note s 85, 91 a nd a ccompan ying te xt.
29. The enfor ceme nt  of ne goti ab le p rom iss ory  not es s ecu re d by r ea lty  an d/or
comment s to section 8.1 incorporat e some relatively strong
freedom -of-cont ract  rhet or ic, t hey p rovid e n o exa mples  or
illust ra t ion s involvin g a “bad faith” challenge to a m ortgagee’s
de cis ion  to acce le ra te based upon  a  nonmonetary objective
defau lt  p rov is ion , nor  t o a  decision in volving a  clea r  “mismatch”
between  th e expectat ions of th e mort gagor an d th e mor t gagee.
Fu rt her more, even  a ssuming tha t  section 8.1 advances a
freedom -of-cont ract  view a ki n  to tha t  of Ea ster br ook,  se ct ion
8.1’s use of the  t erm “bad fa i th”—informed a s  tha t  t erm is  by
th e rh etor ic ass ociated  with  its  twin “good faith ”—crea tes  some
unce r t a in ty about  how broadly cou r t s w ill  in ter pr et  se ct ion
8.1 (d)(3). Given th e  h ist orical or igins  of the  te rm  “good faith ,”
tha t  term can be, and often ha s been, underst ood by courts to
invit e ex post re view of th e r ea sona ble exp ect a t ion s of
con t ract ing pa r t ies and ex post judgmen t  t ha t  one  pa r ty’s
enforcement  of t h e contr act did not comport with those
reasonable expectat ions.
Fu rt her more, this broader conception of good fa i th
per formance ha s obta ined  significan t in fluen ce th rou gh it s
ad option  in  the R estat em ent (S econd) of Contracts,27 an d will
gain  mor e influ ence as it  cont inues  to be promu lgated
t hroughout  th e Uniform Comm ercial Code.28 As  a  r esu lt ,  it
s eems likely t ha t s ome cour ts  will use th e br oad r het or ic of
good fait h a s a  mea ns  to eva lua te t he objective reasonableness
of a  con t ract ing pa r t y’s enforcem ent  decisions  in m ar gina l
case s—a  res ult  th at  ma y work  at  odds wit h the st at ed
objectives of section 8.1 . To expla in w hy, P art  III  of th is Art icle
ret ra ces the h is t or ica l  or igins of the  t erm “good  fa i th” and  the
evolu t ion  of t he  du ty of good fa it h  pe r formance and  enforcement
in American commercial law.
III. “GO O D  F A I T H”—UN D E R S T A N D I N G  IT S  OR I GI N S,
DE V E LO P M E N T, A N D  P A R AM E T E R S
 Toda y, it  is generally accepted that  a du ty of good  fait h
govern s th e performa nce and enforcement  of promiss ory notes
and credit  agreements secured  by real or personal pr oper ty. 29 Neve r
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per sona lty is govern ed by th e provision s of the U CC, which  fr o m  it s in it i a l
pr omu lga tion  has pr ovided tha t “[e]very contra ct or duty within [th e UCC] imposes
an  o bl ig a t ion  of good  fai th  in  it s p er for ma nce  or  en for cem en t. ” U.C .C.  § 1-20 3 (19 95).
The enforcement  of  nonnegot iable notes  is governed by the common law of contra cts,
under  wh ich  c ou r t s  have (as suggested infra  note s 77-83 an d accompa nyin g text )
implied a d ut y of good  fai th  an d fa ir  de al in g a s m an ifested in  the  p rov is ions o f t he
CONTRACTS  RE S T AT E M E N T, supra  note 27.
30. S ee Sau l Litvin off, Good Faith, 71 TU L . L. RE V. 1645, 1649 (1997) (“I t  has
been sa id  tha t , i n  t he lega l con te xt , good  fait h h as  bot h a  ps ych ologica l a nd  an  et hi cal
com pon en t. ”).
31. S ee WILLI AM  WARWICK BUCKL A N D, A TE X T-BO O K  OF  RO M AN  LAW  413-15 (2d
ed. 195 0).
32. S ee F REDERICK  H. LAWSON, A CO M M O N  LAWYER LO O K S A T T H E  CIVIL LAW  93-
94, 121 -22,  126 , 13 7 (19 55).
33. S ee id . at  120-2 1; see also, e.g., E. Allan  Fa rn swort h, Good Faith
Perf orm an ce and Com mercial Reason abl enes s U nd er th e Un iform  Com m ercia l Cod e,
30 U. CH I . L. RE V. 666, 669 (1963); Jill Pride Anders on, Comment ,  Lender Liability
theless, court s h ave  st ru ggled m ight ily to give p ract i ca l
subs tance to t his  gener al d ut y. Does good faith  const itu te
mer ely a st at e of mind  (i.e.,  the sincer e subject ive  bel ief t ha t
one is  act in g in  accord ance wi th  the la w, r ega rdles s of t he
corr ectness  of t h a t  belief)? Or does it r equire a dher ence to
exte rna l s t andards of mora l behavior (i.e., actions consist ent
with  behavior  one m igh t  exp ect  fr om  similar ly situa ted
commer cial par t ies)?3 0  To provide a fra mew or k  for
unders tand ing why s ection  8.1 may not  p roduce  the ce r t a in ty
and pr edict ab ility it seek s  to ach ieve,  Par t  I I I t r aces  the
h i stor ica l or igins of t he “good fa it h” concept , it s in t rodu ct ion
in to Amer ican  law, it s incorpor a t ion  in to the U nifor m
Comm ercia l Cod e (UCC), an d it s “rest ora tion ” in t he
Restatem ent (Second) of Contracts an d revised  UCC.
A. The Origins of Good Faith–Roman and Continental
Antecedents
 In  the Roman law of obligations, the term s bon a f id es a nd
stricti juris  served  to de sign a te t he t wo p r im ary ca tegor ies  of
obligations. The stricti juris  obligation des ignat ed th e formal
agreemen t , typ ically ma de in  rit ua l st ipu la t ion ;3 1 t hese  formal
agreemen t s inclu ded  agr eem en ts  involvin g the loa n of money,
t h e gua ra nt ee, a nd  cert ain  kin ds of secu rit y.32 In  con t ras t , the
bon a f ides obliga t ion  de sign a ted  the n onr itu a lis t ic, in formal
consensua l con t ract s  tha t  covered mos t  Roman com m ercia l
act ivity. 33 Th e d iffer en t  judicia l t r ea tmen t  of the s t ipu la t ion
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for  Breach of the Obligation of Good Faith Perform an ce, 36 EMORY L.J . 917, 919 n.10
(198 7).
34. S ee LAWSON, supra  note 32, at  124.
35. Id . at  124 -25 (ci ta ti on s om it te d).
36. S ee Litvin off, supra  note 30, at 1652 (“[T]he [bon a fi des ]  st anda rd h a d  t he
ab il it y to cr ea te  an  oblig at ion  th at  bou nd  a con tr act i n g p a r t y t o what ever could be
expected  of a per son wh o acted  in su ch a ca se wit h pr obity a nd r ectit ude , an
obliga tion  th at  th us ca me in to exist ence r egar dless of an y forma lity at  its  incep t ion .
The Roman  bon a fi des  allowed the Roman judge great discr e t io n  in h is d et er mi na tion
of that wh ich parties to an informal contra ct,  acting as boni viri, or hones t  men ,
could exp ect  from e ach  oth er  . . . . ” (footn ote  om it te d)).
37. S ee CODE  CIVIL [C. CIV.] ar t.  113 4 (F r. ).
and th e consen sua l cont ra cts reflect ed the  normat ive  force  tha t
Rom an law as cribed to the conce pt  of bon a f id es. Cour ts  st rict ly
in te rpre t ed th e r itu al s tip ula tion  to lim it t he  pa rt ies’ re spe ctive
obliga t ion s to those  exp res sly st a ted  by t he par t ies ; the judge
ret ained  no d is cr etion in fash ioning relief.34 In  dete rmin ing
disput es a r is ing ou t  of t he  consensua l agreemen t s , however ,
Rom an judge s foun d sign ificant  flexibility in t he concep t  of
bon a f id es:
I n  t h e  act ion s  on  t h e  con s ensu a l  con t r ac t s ,  on  th e  o the r
h a n d ,  th e ju dge  . . . was  dir ecte d t o ord er  th e de fen da nt , if
un successful,  t o  p a y  t h e  p la i n t i ff  w h a t e v e r  h e  fo u n d  t o  b e d u e
ex  f i d e b o n a , t ha t  i s  t o  s ay ,  in  acco rdance  w i t h  t he
r e q u ir e m e n t s  of good fait h ; a n d  t h is ca st  on  th e ju dg e . . . t h e
burd en  of de cidin g wh at  th e de fen da nt  oug ht  in g ood fait h t o
h a v e d o n e , i n  ot h e r  w o r d s  w h a t  k i n d  of p e rfor m a n ce  t h e
con t r a ct  called  for. Th is m ea nt  th at , in  con t r a st  t o t h e
st ipu la tion , w h e r e  a ll  t h e  te r m s  h a d  t o  be  e xp r e s se d , t h e
pa r t i e s would be  boun d n ot  only by th e ter ms  th ey ha d
a ct u a ll y a g r ee d  t o,  b u t  by  a ll  th e  t e rm s  th at  wer e n at ur ally
i m p li ed  i n  t h e ir  a g r e e m e n t .35
Thus, un der  Roma n la w, bon a f id es wa s n ot  mer ely  a  “tool for
int er pr et at ion,” but  a ba sis for im posin g up on contr act ing
par ties  obligations that  were beyond the express terms of their
agreemen t  yet cons ist ent  with  th eir u nexp res sed, r eas ona ble
expectations.36
Th e in flu en ce of t he Roman bon a f id es and  it s i ncorpora t ion
of exter na l st an da rd s of rea sona ble beh avior s ignifican tly
influenced the d eve lopm e n t of commer cia l la w t hrough out
con t inen ta l Europe. In France, the first modern civil code
requ ired  tha t  all con t ract s  be  pe r formed  in  good fa i th ,37
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38. S ee Litvin off, supra  note  30, at  1653 (“By virtue of th at  crucia l rejection , in
French  law all contr acts, since the ena ctment  of the Cod e civil , have bound  the
part ies to all t hose a tt endin g obligat ions t h a t , a l t ho ug h  n ot  m a d e e xp r es s  by  t h em ,
a re pres cribed by equité, u sa ge, or  th e la w, a cco r di n g t o  th e na tu re of th eir con tr act.”
(citing 3 TO U L LI E R, LE  DROIT CIVIL F RANÇAIS 391-9 2 (183 3))); see also LAWSON, supra
no te 32, at  150 & n.16 (“Fre nch a ut hors  simp ly say t ha t t he dis tin ction has not been
received in to t he ir  la w.”).
39. S ee CODE  C I VI L  SU I S SE  [CC] ar t.  2, ¶  1 (S wit z.).
40. Id . ¶  2 .
41. Lit vin off, supra  note 30, at  1661.
42. CIVIL CODE  O F  T H E  N ETHERLANDS  ar t. 6 ; see also Litvin off, supra  note 30,
a t  1655.
43. S ee § 157 BU R G E RL I CH E S  GE S E T ZB U C H  [BGB] (F. R.G .) (st at in g t ha t con tr act s
sha ll be int erpr eted  according t o the  requ irem ent s of good fait h, ord ina ry u sage be ing
taken  int o cons ide ra tion ); i d . §  242  (s ta t ing tha t  t h e  d eb t or  i s bound  to pe r fo rm
accordin g t o  th e req uir emen ts of good faith, or dina ry u sage b eing t ake n in to
con sid er at ion .); see also 1 KONRAD  ZW E IGERT & H E I N  KÖTZ, AN  INTRODUCTION  TO
CO M P A R A T IVE  LAW  155-56 (Tony Weir tra ns., 2d ed. 1987) (noting that  the Ger man
code, as interpreted by courts, has em phasized “mutu ality of social responsib il it y” and
led to the “ ‘mor aliza tion ’ of cont ra ctua l rela tion s”); Litvinoff, supra  note 30, at  1654.
re ject ing the  formal  Roman law d is t inct ion  between  stricti juris
and bon a f id es contr acts.38 Like wise, t he  Swis s Civil Code
provides tha t  a l l per sons  a re bound t o exercise their rights an d
per form their obligations in accordance wit h  the r u les  of good
fa i th .39 Furt her, the Swiss code draws a  direct  connect ion
between  good fa ith  an d a bus e of right s, pr oviding t ha t t he la w
does not  p rotect  the “ma nifest a buse” of a r i gh t .40 I n  t h is  r egard
the Sw iss cod e s uggest s t ha t  a  cont ra ct ing par ty acts  in bad
fait h  when  he or sh e uses  a  con t ractua l  r igh t  “as  an  ins t rument
to ob ta in  an  advan tage which  lies be yond t ha t w hich  . . . th e
par ties  con templa ted a t  t he t ime  the con t r act  was en tered
int o.”41  The Dut ch code us es a  compa ra ble t erm , pr escrib ing
tha t  all contracting parties must conduct themselves and t heir
a ffa ir s accordin g to t he  dem an ds of “rea son a nd  equ ity.”42
Fin ally,  th e Germ an  Civil Code pr ovides t he m ost s tr ikin g
exam ple of the d evelopme nt  of good faith  in  comm ercial law.
The Ger ma n Code’s dut y of good fait h (Treu un d Glauben )
i n cor p or a t e s a n  e xt e r n a l s t an d a rd of reasonableness,
pr escr ibing th at  a p ar ty m us t p er form or  enfor ce an  agr eemen t
in  accorda nce with both  th e est abli shed  s tandards  of the
community an d th e confidence bestowed upon h er by th e other
pa r ty.43 Ger ma n cour ts  ha ve ap plied t his  du ty of good fait h wit h
s t r ik in g breadt h, most n otably durin g the post-wa r
recons t ruct ion  pe r iod  as a  ba si s for  rewr it in g fixe d-p r ice
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44. F o r a discussion of these development s, see Werner F . Ebke & Betti n a  M.
S te inhaue r , Th e Doctrine of Good Faith  in Germa n Contract  Law, in  GOOD F A I TH  A N D
F AULT I N  CONTRACT LAW  182 -84 (J ack  Bea ts on  & Da ni el F ri ed ma nn  ed s.,  199 5) a n d
2 ZWEIGERT  & KÖTZ, supra  note 43, at  558-63.
45. S ee Fa rn swort h, supra  note 33, at  670.
46. 5 S IR  WI L L I AM  H O L D S WO R TH , A H I S TO R Y O F  E N G L IS H  LAW  80-81 (1966)
(footnotes om it te d).
con t ractu a l obligations t ha t would oth erwise h ave been
sign ifica n t ly d eva lu ed  by h yper in fla t ion .44
B. “Good  Fa it h” Com es to Am erica
 As P rofess or F ar ns wort h h as  expla ine d, “good fait h” as
originat ed in Rom a n  law  an d de veloped in  contin en ta l legal
sys t ems had  it s  p rimar y  m ean ing in the  con text  of good faith
perform a n ce of agreem ent s; its  pr ima ry s ignifican ce was  in
imp lying t e rms  in to the  agreement cons is tent  with  the
rea sona ble unexpressed expect a t ions  of the  con t ract ing
part ies.45 This conception of good faith performa nce also
in flu en ced t he developm ent  of comm ercia l law in  En glan d;
Holdswor th de scr ibe d t h is  br oad con cep tion  of good faith  as  a
centra l cha ra cteristic of English m ercant ile law:
[T]h e  can on la w w as  ab le to e xer t t his  in flu e n ce  u p on  t h e
deve lopmen t  of com m er cial  la w [b eca u se  of ] t h e  m a n n e r  in
w h ich  the  Ca non  l aw pu t  i n to  l ega l  fo rm th e  r e l ig ious  a n d
m o r a l i d ea s  wh ich, a t t his  per iod, colour ed t he  econom ic
th ou gh t of a ll th e n at ion s of We st er n  E u rop e. . . .
. .  . [T ]h e  ca n o n i st ’s  v ie w  t h a t  fa i t h  s h ou l d  be  k e p t , i n
wha teve r  form  the  p r omise  was  expres sed ,  he lped  for w a r d t h e
deve lopmen t  of form s of com m er cia l con tr a ct .  . .; i t  a s s i s t ed
t h e l eg is l a tu r e  to  dea l  a d e q u a te ly w it h  th e n ew  for m s of fr a u d
a n d  sh ar p p ra ctice  re n de re d p oss ible  by a  m ore  ela bor at e
org an iza tion  of com m er ce; a n d  t h u s  it  co n tr i bu t e d  t o e n fo rce
those  h igh  st a n da r ds  of good  fa it h  a n d fa i r d e a lin g w h ich  a re
the  ve ry  l i f e o f t r a de .46
By the  n ine teen th  cen tury, h owever , t he s cope  of “good
fa i th” began  to na r row as commer cial int ere st s dir ected  judicia l
at ten tion  tow a rd barriers to the free trade of goods and the
marketab il it y of commercia l pape r . As  P rofessor  Fa rnswor th
explained:
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47. Fa rnswor th , supra  no te  33,  at  670  (foot no te s om it te d).
48. “The un ifor m a cts  th at  pr ece de d t he  [UC C] con ta in  up wa rd s of fift y
references to good faith, and n ot once is that ter m u sed in t he se nse  of good faith
p e r fo rmance . A su bject ive t est  of ‘hon est y in  fact ’ is u sed  cons ist en tly  th rou gh out  th e
un i fo rm acts .” Id . at 670-71.
49. S ee i d .
50. S ee Raph ael P owell, Good Faith in Contracts, 9 CU R R E N T LEGAL P ROBS . 16,
25 (195 6) (“[I]n  En glis h l aw  th er e is  no  over ri din g ge ne ra l pos it ive  du ty  of good faith
imposed on  th e p ar ti es  to a  con tr act .” (footn ote  om it te d)).
G ood  fa i t h  p u r ch a s e — n ot  g oo d  fa i t h  p e r fo r m a n c e— w a s  t he
conce rn  of th e d ay , an d t h e cou rt s s et  ab ou t t h e t as k of
defin ing  “good  f a i th” for  t h i s  pu rpose .  The  le a ding  cases
inv olve d  t h e  te st  of “good fa it h ” for a  h old er  in  du e cou r se  of a
ne gotia ble  in s t ru m e n t .  I n  180 1, in  Law son  v .  Wes ton , Lor d
Ken yon  ru l ed  th at  th e h older  ne ed n ot m ak e dilig en t in qu iry
when  h e  t a k e s  t h e  i n s t r u m e n t ,  a n d  .  . .  h e  in t r o d u ce d  th e
subject ive  t e s t  of a ct u a l  go od  fa i th ,  th e  t e st  of “t h e  p u r e h e a r t
a n d  th e em pt y h ea d.” In 1 824 , in Gil l  v .  Cubi t t ,  the  s ubject ive
t e s t  w a s  d isca rded  fo r  an  ob ject ive  t e s t  t ha t  r equ i r ed  the
ho lde r  to e xer cise  th e p ru de n ce a n d ca u tion  of a  re as ona ble
m a n . .  . .  But  by  1836  Gill  v .  C u b i t t  ha d be en  over ru led in
E n g la n d  a n d b y t h e e n d of t h e n in et ee n th  cen tu r y m ost  of th e
Am er ica n  s t a t e s  h a d  a d op t e d  a  s u b je ct i ve  t e st  for good  fait h
pur chase .47
Professor  Fa rn sworth  noted t ha t t his develop men t r esu lted  in
two wides pr ea d a nd m is taken  ass umpt ion s—fi r st , t ha t  good
fait h  mat ter ed  only in  the p urchase  con t e xt ; and  second , tha t
its  mea nin g was  pu rely s ubject ive an d lim ited  to hon est y in
fact .48 As  a  resu lt ,  Fa rnswor th  sugges ted,  the not ion  tha t  the
du ty of good fa it h  pe r formance e st ablish ed a n object ive
s t anda rd of commercia l behavior gradu ally faded from view,49
lead ing a t  l east  one E nglish  sch ola r  to exp res s t he view, a s of
the mid-1950s , tha t  th ere was n o gen er a l posi t ive  du ty of good
faith performance imposed upon contr acting parties.50
C. T he Ad opt ion  of the Un iform  Com m ercial  Cod e
1. Th e codification of good faith  as subjective honesty
 As t he  impetus  for  a sta ndar d commercial  code gain ed
momentum, the  dra ft e r s of the Uniform Commercial Code
at tem pted  to cha lle nge t he p reva iling “miscon cep t ion ” of good
fait h  as  me re  hon est y. Fr om it s origin al p rom ulga t i on, UCC
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51. Compare U.C.C. § 1-2 0 3 ( Dr a ft Ma y 1949), quoted in  Robert S. Summers,
“Good  Fa ith” in General Contract Law and  the Sales Provisions of the Uniform
Comm ercial Cod e, 54 VA. L. RE V. 195, 207 (1968 ), with  U. C.C . § 1-2 03 (1 995 ).
52. U.C.C. § 1-201(18) (Draft May 1949) (emphasis  add ed), quoted  in  Summer s,
supra  note 51, at  207.
53. S ee Litvin off, supra  note 30, at 1649 (“It has been sa id th a t ,  in  a  l ega l
context , good faith ha s both a psychological and an  ethical component. . . . The l a t t er
would  consist in  conducting oneself according to moral stan dards, an d is designated
as good faith-probity, or good  faith-honesty, an d is ger ma ne t o ideas of loyalty a nd
re sp ect  for  th e p led ged  wor d.” (foot no te  om it te d)).
54. As Farn sworth explained:
Good fa ith  per formance has always required the cooperation of one party
where it wa s neces sar y in  or de r  t ha t t he  othe r  migh t  secu re  the
expected benefits of th e  con t ract .  And  the  s tandard  for  de te rmin ing what
cooper at ion  was requ ired has a lways been an objective standar d, based
on  the decency, fairness o r  r ea sona blen ess  of th e com mu nit y an d n ot on
t h e individua l’s own beliefs a s to wh at  migh t be de cent, fa ir or
reasona ble. Bot h com m on sen se an d tr adit ion dicta te a n objective
s t anda rd for good faith per forma nce.
Fa rnswor th , supra  note 33, at  672.
section  1-203 h as  pr ovided t ha t “[e]very con t r a ct  or  du ty
[governed  by th e UCC] im pos es  an  obliga t ion  of good fa i th  in  it s
per formance or en forceme nt .”51 As originally proposed, th e UCC
would ha ve provided a positive definition of th e ter m “good
fa i th” tha t  would have restored the h is tor ica l du ty of good fa it h
per formance as  inform ed by ext ern al object ive  st anda rds  of
con duct . In t he original Ma y 1949 draft of the U CC, section 1-
201 defined “good faith ” as “honesty in fact in  th e conduct  or
t r ansact ion  concerned . Good  fa i th  includes  good  fa i th  toward  al l
pr ior part ies and  observance by a person of the reasonable
com m ercial stand ards of any busin ess or trade in wh ich he is
engaged .”52 Ha d t his  definit ion su rvived  in t he U CC as  fina lly
promulgated, the  relevan t inquir y would have focused  explicitly
upon a  con t r act ing  pa r ty’s  conduct  and  whe ther  i t  a dhe red  to
a c c e p t e d  m or a l  s t a n da r d s  w it h in  t h e  r e l e v a n t
community53—i.e., was  th e pa rt y’s condu ct consist ent  with
conduct  th at  one might  expect from a rea sonable com mer cial
actor under  the circumst ances?54
Alm ost  immed iately, however, th e May 1949 d r aft
encount ered  opposition from comm ercial inter ests  alar med by
the poten t ia l  impact  of such  a  b road  concept ion  of t he  du ty of
good fait h. In  Sept emb er 1 950, t he Com mit te e on  the Pr oposed
Comm ercia l Cod e of t he Am erican  Ba r  Ass ocia t ion  Se ct ion  on
Cor por a t ion , Ba nkin g a nd Busines s L aw r ele ase d a  rep or t
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55. Walter  D. Malcolm , Th e Prop osed  Com m ercia l Cod e, 6 BU S . LAW . 113, 128
(195 1).
56. “Alth ough  we recognize  tha t th ere ar e some court decisions th at h ave added
to ‘honest y in fact’ in th e mea ning of ‘good faith ’ the r equ i r em e n t  t o o bs e r ve  s om e
commer cial s tandards o f conduct ,  never the less  we  bel ieve tha t  t o  the  ave ra ge p er son
and th e ave ra ge law yer, ‘good faith’ signifies p rim ar ily ‘hon est y.’” Id .
57.
Assuming , however, that within t he term  [good faith] there sh ould be added
to ‘hon est y’ some m ea nin g of ‘comm ercial d ecen cy’ the  ph ra se  ‘obse rv an ce
of rea son ab le com me rcia l st an da rd s’ carr ies  wit h it  th e im plica tion  of
usages, customs or practices. If this is tr u e  t h ere  immedia t e ly  a r is e s t he
very diffi cul t p ro ble m o f what  u sages, customs and pra ctices are those
intended  to be included in the sta ndar d. Any lawyer w h o h as ever
att empted  to prove what a usa ge or custom is will im med iat ely re cognize
how litigious such a  stan dard could grow to be.
 Id .
58.
Mor e serious still  is the possibility that “reasonable commercial standards”
could mea n u sage, cu stom s or pr actices e xistin g at  an y par ticula r t ime. Th is
could have the very bad effect of freezing customs and pra ct i ce s  in to
par t i cu la r molds and th ereby destroy th e flexibility absolutely essenti a l  t o
the gradu al evolution of commer cial practices,—a resu lt which  the Code
draftsm en  certainly would never desire.
Id .
59. S ee Robert  Bra uch er, The Legislative History of the Uniform Comm ercial
crit icizing th e pr oposed “good faith ” definit ion. The  Comm it t e e,
concern ed th at  an  “objective” form ulat ion would complicate th e
appropr ia t e res olu t ion  of cas es  in volving good fa it h  pur chase,
suggest ed th at  th e ter m be  limit ed to “honesty  in  fact  in  the
conduct  or  t r a nsa ction concer ne d a nd  th e a bsen ce of trick er y,
deceit  or im pr oper  pu rp ose.”55 The Commi t tee provided th ree
ju st ifica t ion s for its  object ion : (1) t he a ver age p er son
under s tood “good  fa i th” to mean “hon est y;”56 (2) the phrase
“observance of reas ona ble commercia l s t andards” impl ied the
iden tificat ion of usa ges , cu stom s, a nd  pr act ices; howeve r, t he
det erm ina tion  of exactly what usa ges, cust oms, an d pra ctices
con t rol would p rodu ce significa n t  lit iga t ion ;57 and (3 ) lit iga t ion
and judicia l definit ion of “rea sona ble comme rcia l st an da r ds”
could have  the e ffect  of perpet uat ing those standa rds
ind efinit ely, the reby p reven t in g  the evolution an d development
of commer cial p r a ct ices over tim e.58 In a  political compromise,
the d ra fte r s  deleted  the r efe ren ce to “rea sona ble comme rcia l
stan dards” in Art icle 1, ins ert ing th at  broa der  definit ion only in
limited  con te xts  (such  as  Art icle 2 pr ovisions r ega rd ing t he
conduct of merchants).59
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Cod e, 58 CO L U M. L. RE V. 798,  812 (1 958); F ar nswor th ,  supra  note 33, at  673-75;
Su m mers, supra  note 51, at 208-13. In the original official comment s, the dra fters
reemph asized the natu re of this compromise and the contextua l dichotomy it created:
“Good fai t h ” when ever it  is use d in t he Code, m ean s at  least  [honest y in
fact  in t he condu ct or t ra nsa ction concern ed]. In cer ta in Art icles, by specific
p rov is ion , addi t ional r equir emen ts a re m ade a pplicable. To illus tr at e, in t he
Article  on Sales, Section 2-103, good faith is e xpres sly defined  as in cluding
in  the  case  of  a merchan t  observance of reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing in the trade , so that  thr oughout th at Article wherever a
merchan t appears in the case an  inquiry  in to h is ob serv an ce of su ch
s tandards is necessary to determin e his good faith.
U.C.C. § 1-20 1 cm t.  19 (1 962 ) (em ph as is a dd ed ) (cit at ion s om it te d).
60. S ee Litvin off, supra  not e 30, a t 164 9 (“It ha s been  said  th at , in a  lega l
context , good faith h as bot h a  psychological an d an  eth ical component . The former
would  con sis t of a  bel ief t ha t on e is  act in g a ccor din g t o th e la w . .  . .”).
61. S ee supra  no t e 25 and  accompanying t ext .
As even tu ally p rom ulga te d, t he n, t he  origin a l UCC
expressed  its gener al  dut y of good fait h in  a p ur ely su bjective
fash ion , focus ing on ly upon  a  pa r ty’s  s t at e  of mind in  the
ps ych ologica l sense—i.e., does th e par ty sincerely believe (even
if th at  belief is m ista ken ) th at  sh e is a ctin g in a ccord an ce with
the law?60 This  pu re ly su bjective vie w of good fait h fit s n icely
with  th e freedom-of-cont ra ct view of accelerat ion enforcement
ar ticulat ed by E ast er br ook; 61 pr es umably , if t he loa n  documen t s
re ser ve to the  lender  the righ t  to acce le ra te based upon  an
objective default  an d th e objective event of default  ha s ta ken
place, th en t he len der  alm ost cer ta in ly has a  sincer e be lie f tha t
its  decision t o accelera te  complies  wit h t he  law . As su ch, t ha t
decision  would appea r t o satisfy th e good faith  enforcement
s t anda rd of UC C s ect ion  1-203. As discu ss ed  below,  however,
a l though th is  su bject ive  formula t ion  of good faith  sur vives to
the pr es en t  da y in  Art icle  1 of th e UCC, it s impa ct ha s been
steadily er oded t h rough  the U CC r evision pr ocess in  favor  of a
view th at  incorpor at es ext ern al s ta nd ar ds of comm ercia lly
rea son able  behavior .
2. In term ission –the U CC, section 1-20 3, section 1-208 , an d
good  fa it h  in  th e contex t of  accel era ti on
 Much of the confus ion in ju dicial  decisions regarding the
du t y of good  fa i th  as app lied  to the  acce le ra t ion  of a  deb t  has
ar isen  as  a r esu lt  of confusion  rega rd ing t he p roper  rela tion sh ip
between  UCC sections 1-203 an d 1-208. Th ere fore, th is Art icle
will t ake a  br ief d et our  to ela bor a te u pon  the rela t ion sh ip  of
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62. S ee supra  not es 51-61 a nd a ccompan ying t ext. S ince 199 0, howe ver , Ar ticle
3 h a s defined good fait h t o include n ot only h onest y in fact, bu t a lso “the obser van ce
of rea sona ble comme rcial st an dar ds of fair  d e a li n g.” U.C .C.  § 3-10 3(a )(4) (19 90).
Fur the r , the pe nding r evision of Article 9 will likely define good faith so as to
inco rpora te “the observance of reasona ble commer cial s ta nda rds  of fair dea ling.”
U.C.C. § 9-10 2(23 ) (Pr opos ed  Dr aft  199 7).
63. S ee Sum mer s, supra  no t e 51,  a t  210-12 . Summers p a r ticularly noted that
the su bject ive s ta nd ar d wou ld n ot a ppe ar  to r ea ch “form s of ba d fa ith  tha t  do no t
involve dishonesty, let alone negligence—for example, openly abusing the power t o
break off negotia tions , openly t akin g un fair a dvan ta ge of barga inin g power, open ly
ac ting ca pr iciously  or  op en ly  unde rcu t t in g a not her ’s p er for mance .” Id . at 210.
these tw o provision s. On  its  face, s e ct i on  1-203’s d u ty of good
fait h  ap plies  to ever y con t r a ct  govern ed by t he  UCC; t hu s, a
pa r ty must  act  wit h  good fa it h  to en force t he a ccele ra t ion
prov is ions of a  note or  cont ra ct governed by t he U CC.
Nevertheless, i t  is  not clear t ha t t his du ty, when  limited by
section  1-201(19)’s su bjective defin ition of “good fait h,” shou ld
provide a significant  constr a i nt  upon  the  judgment  of an
acce le ra t ing creditor. As noted above, under  the  UCC as
origina lly pr omu lgat ed, t he gener al d ut y of good fait h in
per formance or  en forcem en t  requ ir ed  the cr ed it or  only t o act
with  “hon est y in fact.”62 As  P rofessor  Summers ha s n oted in  his
work on  good  fa i th  pe r formance  and enforceme nt  of sales
con t r act s , t he  sub ject ive st an da rd  sh ould r ule ou t cla ims  tha t  a
pa r ty acted in  bad fait h du e to her  negligence (e.g., such as by
acce le ra t ing based upon  in secu r ity wh en  any r ea son able  pe rson
would  have concluded tha t  the p ar ty’s p osi t ion  wa s s ecu re) or
because  sh e openly a cted in  a fa sh ion  i n cons is tent  with  the
“sp ir i t” of th e b a r ga in  (e.g ., by a ccele ra t in g ba se d u pon  an
objective defau lt u nd er cir cum st an ces out side th e expect a t ion s
of t he  bor rower  a t  t he t ime  of t he  con t r act ).63
a. Objective def a ults. Cons ist en t w ith  th is view, t he
origina l UCC s ubject ive du ty of good fait h sh ould  p resent  no
sign ifica n t  bas is for cha llenge t o an  acce le ra t ion  based upon  an
objective  default p rovision in t he credit  agreem ent . Consider
the int roductory  hypothe t ica l s; i n each , Randolph  commi t ted an
objective defau lt (h is failu re t o provide t he r equ ired  fina ncia l
s t a t emen t s in a timely fashion ),  the  agreemen t  pe rmit t ed
accelera tion  based upon  tha t  defau lt ,  and  the Bank  openly
in vok ed  tha t  de fau lt  pr ovis ion  as  a ba sis for a ccelera tin g. Thus,
in  each exam ple, the Ba nk  would ha ve a sincere belief, based
upon th e langua ge of its writ t en a gree men t, t ha t t he la w
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64. Many decis ions  int er pr et ing  UC C se ction  1-2 03 have expressed th i s s t rong
fre ed om -of-c on t r a c t view of good faith . One of th e most  nota ble exam ples is t he
Min ne sot a  Court  of Appea ls decision in  Brown v. Weeres Indus. , 375 N.W.2d 64
(Minn.  Ct. App. 1 985). In 19 82, W eer es I nd us tr ies , In c. (Wee re s) sold  its  pon toon  boa t
and wa te r b icycle m an ufa ctu ri ng  bu sin ess  to G ord on  Brown  and  Cl in ton  Lee,  who
executed an insta llment note for a portion of the purchase pr ice and wh o granted
Weeres  a s ecu ri ty i nt er est  in a ll a sse ts  of th e bu sin ess . Br own  an d Le e a lso s i gn ed
a  thr ee-year lease for Weeres’s existing plant , along with an option to pur chase th e
p lan t  at  th e con clus ion  of the lea se . The  secur i ty agreement  p rov ided tha t  the
co lla te ra l wou ld r em ain  at  its  exis tin g loca tion  an d wou ld n ot b e r em oved  from  th a t
locat ion  with out  prior  writ ten  consen t of Weer es. S ee i d . at 65. Approximat ely two
yea r s l a t er , however, Brown and Lee decided tha t business  concerns just ified
re loca t ing to  a d if fe ren t  si t e in  the imm ediate ar ea; accordingly, they communicated
to Weeres t he ir  int en tion  not  to r en ew t he  lea se.  Wee re s obje cte d t o an y r eloca tion
and s ta ted  tha t  i t  would  accele ra te the  maturi ty  of t he note if Brown and Lee
removed th e colla te ra l from  its  exis tin g loca tion .
Brown  an d Lee filed  suit , ar gu ing that Weeres’s refusal to consent constituted a
bad fai th effort to compel Brown a nd Lee t o renew t he lease. In  the s uit, Brown a nd
Lee sought a declara tion tha t th ey could relocate the collatera l with out t rigger ing a
defau lt  and  accelera t ion  unde r  the  secu r ity  agreemen t . See id . at  66. T he  tr ial  cour t
grant ed summary judgmen t  fo r  Brown an d Lee, r ea son ing  th at  th ey we re  cur re nt  on
th eir  note payments, sales and inventory levels had increased (improving Weeres’s
secured  position), and the new site was in the immediate vicinity of the old sit e;
ther efore, Wee re s h ad  no  leg it im at e ba sis  to fe el i ns ecu re  ab ou t i ts  pr osp ect s for
r epaymen t , an d acceler at ion wa s imp roper . See id.  at 67.
The Min ne sot a C our t of App ea ls r eve rs ed,  how ever , and  re ma nd ed t he  cas e for
en t ry of su mm ar y ju dgm en t i n fa vor  of Wee re s. T he  cou rt  he ld t ha t t he  te rm s of t he
secu r i ty ag reemen t  did no t  requ ire We eres  to ha ve a r eason able ba sis for with holding
consent , nor  did  th e du ty of g ood fa ith  re qu ir e t ha t W eer es p rov ide  a r ea son able
just ificat ion  for withh olding consent. Because Br own and Lee violated the liter al
t e rms of t he secur ity agreem ent, Weer es ha d the  right t o accelerate th e debt,
regardless of whe t h e r  the  viola ti on p ose d a  me an in gfu l t hr ea t t o Wee re s’ pros pect s
for  r epaymen t :
Under  the cl ea r  and u na mbigu ous t erm s of this  secur ity a gree men t, t he
collatera l may not be removed from the leased premises without [Weeres’]
pr ior  written consent. The security agreement does not  p rov ide  tha t
withho ld ing of such consent must be r easonable. Although [Brown and Lee]
m ay ha ve fa iled  to a nt icipa te  th at  th ey m igh t h ave  to p ay of f the debt
befor e r emova l o f t he  co ll a t er a l , t h is is insufficient rea son to ignore the
con t r act ’s liter al m ean ing.
Id .
au th orized its conduct. Un der t h is view, in each exam ple th e
Bank would ha ve enforced its r ights in  “good faith ” un der
section  1-203; t hu s, a pplica tion  of the  origin al U CC su bjective
good fa i th  st andard  shou ld p roduce decisions  th at  ar e gene ra lly
cons is tent  wi t h  the E ast er br ook “fr eedom -of-cont ract” view  of
acceleration described in Part  II.64
b. Su bjective defaults. In U CC section 1-208, the dr after s
provided a  specific application of th e genera l du ty of good  fa i th ,
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65. U.C.C . § 1-208 (1995) (emphasis added). Section 1-208 goes on to provide
tha t  “[t]he  bu rd en  of est ab lish ing  lack  of good fa ith  is on  th e pa rt y ag ain st  wh om t he
power ha s been  exer cised.” Id .
66. As discussed infra i n  notes 98-118 an d accompa nyin g text , some cour ts h ave
concluded th at  sect ion 1 -208’s st an da rd  ap plie s t o all a ccelerat ion decisions  th at  res ult
from  a  c redi tor’s  exe rci se  of it s op ti on  to a ccele ra te , r ega rd les s of t he  na tu re  of th e
de fau l t . S ee, e.g., Brown v. AVEMCO Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979). In
con t r a s t , most courts h ave concluded  t ha t  s ect ion  1 -208  does  not  app ly  when  the
cre dit or  ele cts  to a cceler at e ba sed  up on a n objective defau lt. S ee, e.g., Bowen v.
Danna , 637  S.W .2d  560 , 56 4 (Ar k.  198 2).
67. S ee Susan  A.  Wegner , Comment , S ection  1-208 : “Good  Fai th ” an d t he N eed
for a Uniform S tandard , 73 MARQ. L. RE V. 639, 639-40 (1990) (discussin g the  d if fe ren t
in t e rp ret a t ions of good fa ith  an d r evie win g cas es a ppl yin g va ri ous  st an da rd s); see also
Anderson , supra  not e 33; Da rlen e M. Nowa k, N ote, Standards for Insecurity
Acceler ati on  Under S ection 1-208 of the Uniform Comm ercial Code: A Proposal for
R eform , 13 MICH . J.L.  REFORM  623  (198 0).
ar ticulat ed to govern  accele ra t ion  de cis ion s in  wh ich  a  cred it or
act s pursuan t  to an  insecur ity clause. Section 1-208 pr ovides, in
per t inen t  pa r t :
A te rm  pr ovidin g th at  one  pa rt y or h is  su ccessor  in  in t e re s t
m a y  a cce le ra t e  paym en t  o r  pe r form ance  o r  r equ i r e  co l la t e r a l
or  add i t iona l  col l a t e ra l  “a t  w i l l ” o r  “when  he  deem s  him self
in secu re” or in  wor ds  of sim ila r im por t  s h a ll  be  co n s t r u e d t o
m e a n  t h a t  h e  sh a l l have  power  t o  do  so only  i f  he  in  good  fa i th
beli eves  tha t  t h e prospect  of  paym ent  or  perform an ce is
im pa ired .65
Section  1-208 has r esult ed in  som e interpreta tional quan daries.
Does section  1-208 govern  a ll op t ion a l a ccele ra t ion  de cis ion s,  or
only those  de cis ion s b ase d s pe cifica lly  upon  in se cur ity  or  “a t
will” l anguage  in  the  ag reemen t?66 Is it  su fficien t  tha t  the
cred it or  honestly believes that  it s s ecu r it y or  lik eli hood of
paym ent  is th rea ten ed (even if that  belief is mistaken), or must
the credit or’s belief be rea sonable u nder  th e circumst an ces?67
Lit iga t ion  u n der section 1-208 has not produced universal
consensus r egar din g th ese qu est ions, a nd  th e judicia l
u nce r t a in ty is a pr oduct of at  least  two factors: section 1-208’s
uncle a r r ela t ion  to se ct ion  1-203, a nd t he com men tary of on e of
the pr in cipa l UCC d rafters  in h is ex post exp la na t ion s of t he
pur pose of section 1-208.
F i rs t , cour t s h ave s t ruggled  to iden tify the correct
re la t ionsh ip between  sections 1-203 and 1-208. If section 1-208
requ ires  only s ubject ive  good fa it h  (i.e ., t he cr ed it or ’s b eli ef in
its  insecurity must  be honest, but not necessarily r easona ble),
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68. S ee, e.g., Reid v. Key Bank of S. Me., Inc., 821 F.2d 9 , 1 5 n .2 (1st Cir. 1987)
(dict um ); AVEM CO, 603 F.2d at 1378-80; Sheppar d Fed. Cred it Un ion v. Palmer , 408
F.2d 1369, 1 3 71  (5 t h  Cir . 196 9); In  re Mart in Specialty Vehicles, Inc., 87 B.R. 752,
765-66 (Ban kr . D. Mas s. 1988), rev’d on  j u ri sd iction al gr oun ds ,  97 B.R. 721 (D. Mass.
198 9); Kupka  v. Morey, 541 P.2d 7 40, 747 (Alaska  1975); Richar ds En g’rs, In c. v.
Span el, 745 P.2d 1031, 1032-33 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987); Universa l C.I.T. Credi t  Co r p.
v. Shepler , 329 N.E.2d 620, 623-24 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975); Black v. Peoples Bank &
Trust  Co., 437 So. 2d 26 , 29-30 (Miss. 198 3); Blaine  v. G.M.A.C., 370 N .Y.S.2d 323,
327 (Monroe Cou nt y Ct. 19 75); Mitche ll v. For d Motor  Cre dit Co., 68 8 P.2d  42, 45 n .5
(Okla . 1984); Amer ican B an k v. Wa co Airmotive , Inc.,  818 S.W.2d 163, 17 1-72 (Tex.
App. 199 1).
69. In  e labora t ing upon t he “good faith” obligation conta ined in section 1-203,
the original comments provided:
Par t i cu la r applications of this gener al pr in ciple  ap pea r in  spe cific pr ovisi ons
of t he  Ac t  such as  t he option to accelerate at will, the right  to cure a
de fective delivery of goods, the dut y of a mer chant  buyer who ha s rejected
goods t o  effect  sa lva ge op er at ions , su bst itu te d pe rfor ma nce , an d fa ilu re  of
presupposed  condit ions. Th e concept, however, is broader than an y of these
i ll u st r a t ions an d app lies ge nera lly . . . to the performan ce or enforcement
of eve ry  cont ra ct or  du ty  wit hi n t hi s Act .
U.C.C. § 1-20 3 cm t.  (196 2) (cit at ion s om it te d).
70. The original comments to section 1-208 provided:
The increased use  of  accele ra tion clau ses  . . . h as  led  to s ome  confu sion
in  the cas es a s t o t he effect t o be given t o a claus e which  seem ingly gra nt s
the power of an acceleration at th e whim and cap ri ce of one pa rt y. This
Sect ion  is inten ded to ma ke clear t hat  despite lan guage wh ich  can be so
c on s t r u ed and which further  might be held to make t he agreemen t void as
against  pu blic p olicy or  to m ak e t he  cont r act il lus ory  or t oo ind efin ite  for
tha t  would s eem  to r end er s ection 1-208 p ur ely du plica t ive of
section  1-203. After  all, section 1-203 alrea dy imposes a
su bjective  du t y of good  fa i th  in  the  pe r formance  and
enforcement  of every con t ractua l  ob liga t ion .  As  a  resu lt ,  one
migh t  reason that  the dra fters m ust  ha ve inten ded section 1-
208 to ap ply a  higher st anda rd t o discr et ion ary a ccele ra t ion s or
acce le ra t ions bas ed u pon in secu rit y. Under t his view,
acce le ra t ions governed by section 1-208 would h ave to be
objectively rea sonable.68 The comment s t o sect ions 1-203 and 1-
208, however, belie t his view. The comm ent s to section 1-203
suggest tha t  the d ra ft e r s underst ood section 1-208 merely as an
illus tr at ive ap plicat ion of the d ut y of good fait h a s expr esse d in
section  1-203.69 Th e com men ts t o se ct ion  1-208 rein force th i s
view, suggest ing th at  th e dra fters a dded sect ion  1-208 not  to
crea t e a d ifferen t good fait h s ta nd ar d, bu t m er ely t o make  clea r
tha t  because  of the ge ner a l du ty of good  fa ith  expr esse d in
section  1-203, cou rts  s hou ld not  i nval ida t e agreemen t s
permi tt ing  acceleration “at will” as illusory promises.70
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enfo rcemen t , the clause mea ns t ha t t he opt ion is to be e xercised  only in t he
good fai th  bel ief t ha t the prospe ct of payment or performan ce is impaired.
U.C.C. § 1-20 8 cm t.  (196 2).
71. A significan t n um ber of court s ha ve int erpr eted  section 1-208 in  precise ly
th is way. S ee, e.g., Farm ers Coop. Elevator, Inc. v. State Ban k, 2 36 N.W.2d 674, 678
(Iowa 197 5) (“The [debtor] ha s not a dduced subs tan tial pr oof tha t th e Bank ’s concer n
abou t  t he secur it y of it s loa ns , wh et he r o r n ot r ea son ab le,  wa s n ot g en ui ne  . . . . ”);
Van  Hor n v. Van De Wol, Inc., 497 P.2d 252, 254 (Wash. Ct . App. 1972)
(“[N]egl igen ce i s i r re le va n t  to good faith . The s ta nda rd is w ha t t he pla int iff actua lly
knew,  or b elie ved  he  kn ew, n ot w ha t h e cou ld or  sh ould  ha ve k now n.”); see also, e.g.,
Klingbiel v. C om me rci al  Cr ed it  Cor p.,  439  F. 2d  130 3, 1 308  & n .12  (10t h C ir . 19 71);
Pa ine Webber  J acks on & Cu rt is, In c. v. Wi n t er s, 539 A.2d 595, 598 n.1 (Conn. App.
C t . 1988); Quest  v. Barnet t Ban k, 397 So. 2d 1020, 1022 (Fl a.  Dis t.  Ct . App . 19 81);
Ginn  v. Citizens & S. Nat ’l Bank, 243 S.E.2d 528,  530 (Ga . Ct . App . 19 78); Va n
Bibber v. Norr is, 419 N.E .2d 115, 124 (In d. 1981); Ja ckson v.  S t a t e Bank , 488 N.W.2d
151, 156 (Iowa 1 992); Kar ner  v. Willis, 700 P .2d 582, 58 4 (Kan . Ct. App.), aff ’d , 710
P.2d 21 (Kan. 1985); Fort Knox Nat ’l Bank v. Gu stafson, 385 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Ky.
Ct . App. 1964); J . R. Ha le Cont ra cting  Co. v. Un ited  N.M. B a n k , 7 99  P .2d 581, 591
(N.M. 199 0).
72. 2 GR A N T GILMORE , SEC UR ITY IN T E R E S TS  I N  P ERSONAL P R O P E R T Y §  43 .4 , a t
1197 (196 5).
Accordin gly, it  se em s d oubt fu l tha t  section 1-208 “rat cheted up”
the st an da rd  to wh ich a  credit or sh ould be h eld in  accelera tin g
a t  will or ba sed u pon in secur ity. As origin ally p romulga ted,  the
combined  lan gua ge of sections 1-201(19) a nd  1-208 only
requ ired  tha t  the cr ed it or  hones t ly beli eve  tha t  it s s ecu r it y or
prospect  for r epaymen t wa s th reat ened, even if that  belief was
mistaken or unfounded.71
Nevertheless, th e notion th at  th e origina l section  1-208 did
“ra tchet  up” th e sta nda rd r eceived a boost  from t he s cholar sh ip
of Gr an t G ilmor e, one of th e pr incipa l dr aft er s of Article 9. I n
h i s treat ise on secured transa ctions, Gilmore argued that
section  1-208 re quir ed t ha t a ccelerat ion ba sed u pon in secur ity
mu st be objectively rea sonable:
T h e cas es a re  qu ite  clear  th at  th e in secu rit y  clau se w ill n ot
be  a l lo we d  t o o pe r a t e a s  a  ch a r t er  of ir re sp on sib ilit y. A
“r e a s o n ab le  m an ” ru le e m er ges  from  th e ca se s. T h e cr ed itor
h a s  th e r igh t t o accele ra te  if, un der  all t he  circu m st ances ,  a
re as ona ble  m a n ,  m ot iva te d b y good  fait h , wou ld h av e d on e
so. . . . Th e C ode  ad opt s s u ch a  ru le in  §1-20 8 . . . .72
Und er  Gilm ore’s view, a  pa r ty could a ccelerat e for ins ecur ity
only i f t ha t  decision was both  objectively rea sonable a nd
su bjectively honest . Lest he be  misunderstood, Gil more wen t  on
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73. Id . at  119 8 (em ph as is a dd ed ) (foot no te  om it te d).
74. One mi gh t d efe nd  th is v iew  of section  1-208 more nar rowly by a rgu ing  tha t
even un der a  subject ive s t a n d a rd of good faith , th e tr ier of fact legitim at ely ma y
consider th e r ea son ab len es s of a  cre dit or’s a cti on i n e va lu at in g t he  credi tor ’s
credibilit y, i.e .,  wh e t her th at pa rty’s allegedly honest belief of insecurity was sin cere.
S ee, e.g., Hale Con t rac ting,  799 P .2d  a t  591 (“Even  un der  a s ub ject ive t est  of good
faith  the  t r ie r  of  fac t ma y  e va lua te t he cr edibility of a cre ditor ’s claim a nd in  doing
so ma y ta ke in to accoun t t he r eason ablen ess of th at  claim. ”); Fa rn swort h, supra  no t e
33, at 672 (same). The language of Gilmore’s treatise, however, reflects t h a t  Gilm ore
clearly  viewed section 1-208 as establishing an objective reasonableness stan dard.
75. S ee, e.g., Reid v. Ke y Ban k, 821 F .2d 9, 15 n.2 (1st  Cir. 1987) (dictu m, citin g
GILMORE ); Br own  v. AVEM CO I nv . Cor p., 603 F.2d  136 7, 1 378 -138 0 (9t h C ir . 19 79);
Sheppa rd Fed. Credit  Union v. Pa lmer, 408 F .2d 1369, 1371 n.2 (5th Cir. 1969)
(quotin g GILMORE ); In  re Mart in Specialty Vehicles, Inc., 87 B.R. 752, 765-66 (Bankr .
D. Mas s. 1988), rev’d on  jur isd icti ona l grou nd s, 97 B.R. 721 (D. Mass. 1989); Kupka
v. Morey, 541 P.2d 740, 747 (Alaska  1975); Richards E ng’rs, Inc. v. Span el, 745 P.2d
1031, 1033 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) (quoting G ILMORE ); Black v. Peoples Bank & Trust
Co., 437 So. 2d 26, 29-30 (Miss. 1983) (quot ing G ILMORE ); Blain e v. G.M.A.C., 370
N.Y.S.2d 323,  327 (M onr oe Cou nt y Ct . 197 5); Mit che ll v. F ord  Mot or Cred it Co., 688
P .2d 42, 45 n.5 (Ok la. 1984) (citing G ILMORE ); Amer ican Ba nk  v. Waco Airmotiv e,
Inc.,  818  S.W .2d  163 , 17 1-72  (Te x. Ap p. 1 991 ).
t o elabor at e th is poin t  wh ile  discu ss in g t he p rope r  a lloca t ion  of
the  bu rden  of p roof:
O n e cou r t  h a s s u gg es te d t h at  th e bu rd en  [of pr ovin g good
fa it h ] sh ou ld b e on  t h e  c r e d it o r  on  t h e  g r o u n d  t h a t  “a  p u r e
s t a t e  o f  m i n d ” o n  t h e  c r e d i t o r ’s  p a r t  i s  i n v o lv e d .  T h a t  h o we ve r ,
seems  t o b e a n  in a ccu r a t e s t a te m e n t. T h e cre dit or’s st at e of
m i n d is cle ar  en ou gh —h e d ecid ed  to a c ce le r a t e — a n d  t h e
qu es tion  u n de r  th e  “reasona b le  man ” ru l e  .  .  . i s  wh ether  he
h a d  a  r i gh t  t o  fe el  t h a t  w a y .  P re sum ab ly  unde r  t h e  Code’s
burd en  of pr oof ru le, a  d e b to r’s t es ti m on y t h a t h e k n ew  of n o
reason  w h y  t h e cr e d it or  sh ou ld  have  f e l t  i n secu re ,
u n im p e a ch ed  on  c r os s -e x a m i n a t io n  or  u n r e b u t t e d  b y t h e
credi tor  w ould get  h im t o the ju ry. 73
Gilmore’s inter pret at ion of section 1-208 appears  unfa i th fu l
both  to the  st a tu tory  language  of the  1962 Code a nd t he h is tory
sur rounding th e excision of th e objective reasonableness
s t anda rd from the May 1949 dr a ft .74 Never th eless , Gilm or e’s
in te rp r et a t ion  of section 1-208 gained  favor in subsequ ent
judicia l decisions.75 In deed , as  discu ssed  in  P art  IV, Gilmore’s
view even le d t he N int h  Circu it t o conclude  tha t  the “good  fa i th”
s t a n da r d r eq u ir ed  object ive  r ea son a ble n es s e ven  for
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 3\ F I N A L \ F R E - F I N .W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
1035] ACCELERATION PROVISIONS  & GOOD FAITH 1063
76. S ee AVEM CO, 603 F .2d a t 1 378-8 0 (9t h C ir . 197 9); see also infra notes 98-
118 and  accompanying t ext .
77. S ee Fa rn swort h, supra  no te  33,  at  673 -74 (“ The de mis e  of  the s ingle , un i ta ry
defini tion  of good faith [in cludin g refer ence t o rea sona ble comm ercia l sta nda rds ] . . . .
was one of the m a j or  casu alties du ring th e dra fting of the Code. The American Ba r
Associa tion  section r ecognized th is an d su ggeste d th at  if the d efinition  of good faith
w e r e limit ed to honest y in fact, the gen eral obligation of good faith could be
eliminated  as unn ecessary. Although not eliminated, it was so enfeebled that  it cou ld
scar cely qu ali fy at  th is p oint  as  an  ‘over ri din g’ or ‘su per -em ine nt ’ pr inci ple .” (footnot e
om it te d)).
78. S ee Summers, supra  not e 51 , at  215 (“In  su m,  th e Cod e’s defin iti ons
res tr ictively dis tor t t he  doctr ine  of good faith. . . . If an  obligation of good faith  is to
do its job, i t  mu st be  open-en ded r at her  th an  seale d off in a definit ion. Cour ts s hould
be left free, u nder  th e aegis  of a sta tu tory gr e e n  li gh t , to dea l with  an y an d all
s ign if ican t forms  of con tr act ua l ba d fa it h,  fam ilia r a nd  un fam ilia r. ”).
79. S ee i d . at  205 -06 (“E ven  if it  w e r e conceded that  conduct mu st be
subjectively  immora l before it can  constitut e bad faith , it still would not follow tha t
d ishones ty is the only form of contractua l bad faith. Thus  w h e n  a  man  open ly  and
str aigh tforwa rdly  give s a not he r a  ‘ra w de al ,’ he d oes  not  ne ces sa ri ly a ct d is h on estly.
Tha t is,  he  doe s n ot u nd er ta ke  to m isl ea d or  dece ive.  . . . S uch  cond uct  i s n ot
d ishones t . But it  may well be th ought im mora l, and it is cert ainly commer cial bad
f ai t h . In t ru th , good faith can not be  defined in  ter ms of hon esty.” (footn ote omit ted)).
acce le ra t ions based upon objective defaults (alt hough section 1-
208, on  it s fa ce, d oes  not  pu rpor t  to gover n  su ch decis ion s). 76
D. T he Du ty  of “Good  Fa it h” S ta ges a  R al ly–T he Res ta tement
(Se cond) of Cont ract s
 Over th e decades following the pr omulga tion of the U CC, a
nu mber  of lead ing schola r s offered  poin ted  cr it icis m of th e
de cis ion  to exci se  the object ive  rea son able nes s s t anda rd fr om
the May 1949 draft.  Professor Allen Farnsworth decried the
decis ion  as  one t ha t “enfeebled ” th e du ty of good fait h a nd
r ender ed it devoid of mean ingful force.77 Pr ofessor Rober t
Summers a rgued tha t  t he Code’s defin ition of good fait h
d is tor ted  the  proper  unders tand ing of good faith  performa nce;78
fu r the r, he a rgu ed t ha t good fait h could not be defined
m ean ingfully  only in  te rm s of hone st y.79 The se crit icisms
informed th e deliberat ions of th e American La w Inst itut e, then
engaged  in th e ear ly stages of work  on th e R estat em ent (S econd)
of Con tracts  [hereina fter Con tr act s R estat em ent]. When
even tua l ly promu lgated, t he Con tr act s R estat em ent reflected
the in flu en ce of t he  cr i t ici sms  of Farnswor th ,  Summers  and
othe r s in  se ct ion  205, w hich  provided  tha t  “[e ]very  con t ract
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80. CONTRACTS  RE S T AT E M E N T, supra no te  27,  § 205  (em ph as is a dd ed ).
81. S ee Fr iedr ich K. J uen ger, Listenin g to Law Professors Talk  A b ou t Good
Faith : S ome Aft erthou ghts , 69 TU L . L. RE V. 1253 , 125 3 (199 5) (“[T]he con cept  of good
faith  wa s sm ug gled  int o th e Com m e r cial Code by Ka rl Llewe llyn, wh o had  found it
in  Germany.  Havin g su cceeded in  put tin g good faith in to th e [UCC], Llewellyn
prom ptly  covered up t he tr aces of the concept’s Teutonic origin. Untaint ed by residues
of foreign soil, it sprout ed roots and grew beyond th e U.C.C.’s confines. In  his
capac ity a s  Repor t e r  fo r  t he Restatem ent  (S econd ) of Con tr act s, Pr ofess or F ar ns wor th
foun d a l ar ger  fiel d of cu lt iva ti on  for  th is t ra ns pla nt .” (footn ote s om it te d)).
82. CONTRACTS  RE S T AT E M E N T, supra  no te 27, § 205 cmt. a. The absen ce of a
positive  de fin it ion  of good  fai th  clea rl y r efle cts  th e in fluen ce of Professor Summers’
wor k a rgu ing  tha t  good faith  is pr operly u nde rst ood as a n “exclude r,” th at  is, as  a
way to descr ibe condu ct th ough t t o be un der ta ken  in ba d fait h. See generally
Summer s, supra  note 51.
Likewise, com me nt  d t o se cti on  205  re in for ced th e idea  th at  a cour t sh ould
eva lua te a part y’s good faith performance based upon an objective standar d:
[F]air  dea ling may requi re  more  than h o n es t y. A complete catalogue of types
of bad faith  is impossible, but th e followi ng  ty pes  ar e a mon g t hos e wh ich
ha ve been r ecognized in ju dicial decisions : evasion of th e spir it of th e
ba rga in , lack of dilige nce  an d s la ckin g off, wi llfu l r en der in g of im per fect
performan ce, abuse of a power t o spe cify te rm s, a nd  int er fer en ce wit h or
failur e to cooperate in t he other  part y’s performan ce.
CONTRACTS  RE S T AT E M E N T, supra  note 27, § 205 cmt. d.
imposes up on ea ch pa rt y a duty of good faith and fair dea l ing
in it s pe rform an ce an d it s en forceme nt .”80
Section  205 r evived  the h is tor ica l con cep t ion  of a  d u ty of
good fa i th  per formance  tha t  encompassed exter n a l  objective
stan dards  of rea son able  behavior .81 Ra the r  t han  a t t empt  to
define the te rm  “good faith ” posit ively, however , Se ct ion  205  left
t o th e judiciary t he t ask  of ident ifying condu ct th at  brea ched
th e r ea sona ble exp ecta tion s of a cont ra ctin g pa rt y:
Th e ph ra se “good fa ith ” is use d in  a  va rie ty  of cont ext s, a nd  its
m ea n in g va r ies  som ew h a t w it h  th e con te xt . Go od fa it h
p e rfor m a n ce  o r  en forc emen t  o f a  con t r ac t  em pha s izes
fa i th fu lness  t o  a n  a g r e e d  com m on  pu rp ose  a n d con sis te n cy
w i t h t h e  ju s t i fi ed  e x pe ct a t ions  o f  t he  o the r  pa r ty ;  i t  excludes  a
v a r ie t y of typ es  of con d u c t  cha rac te r ized  as  invo lv ing  “bad
fa it h ” be ca use  th ey violate  comm un ity s ta nd ar ds of  decency,
f a i rnes s  o r  r easona b leness .82
Moreover , the  comments  st rong ly  a rt i cula ted  th e view t ha t fa ir
dea ling req uir ed n ot only h onest y but  als o rea sona blen ess in
the enforcement of contr actual claims:
T h e obliga tion  [of good fa ith ] is viola te d b y d ish on es t con du ct
s u ch  a s  c o njur in g up  a  pr eten ded d isput e ,  asser t ing a n
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83. CONTRACTS  RE S T AT E M E N T, supra  note 27, § 205 cmt. e.
84. When  this provision was initially discussed and t entat ively approved at the
May 197 0 m ee ti ng  of th e Am er ica n L aw  In st it ut e, P ro fes sor  Br au che r (t he Reporter
a t  the t im e) felt obliged to defen d th e definit ion of “good faith” aga inst  criticism  th at
it  was  an “a t t e m p t .  . .  t o wr it e  t he Se rmon  on  the  Moun t  i n to the  Res t a t emen t  of
Cont ra cts.” Robert  S. Su mm ers , The General Duty of Good Faith–Its Recognition and
Con ceptu ali zat ion , 67 CO R N E LL  L. RE V. 810, 814 (1982) (quoting 47 A.L.I. P ROC . 489
(197 0).  Evident ly worried abou t  cr iticism t ha t t he br oad st an dar d would in vite ju dicial
activ i sm , Br au che r w as  “am aze d” wh en  his  pr ese nt at ion p rod uce d n o comm en t fr om
the floor. Id . at 815.
As discussed infra  in  note 85 and a ccompan ying text, Articles 3, 4, and 4A were
revised in  1990  to b roaden  the  def in ition  of good faith within those art icles to include
“the observance of reasonable commercial sta n d a rds of fair dea ling.” Although  th is
objective sta nda rd does  not a ppea r t o have ge ner at ed th e significan t objections  it did
in  the 1950s, it was n ot without controvers y. At leas t s ix st at es—Ala ba ma , Id ah o,
Louis iana , Mis sou ri , Ten ne sse e, a nd  Ut ah —eit he r r efu sed  to a dopt th e broader
defin iti on  or s ub se qu en tl y r em oved  th e obj ect ive co m ponen t of th at  definit ion. S ee
ALA. CODE  § 7-3-103 (a)(4) (Su pp.  1996 ); ID AH O CODE  § 28-3-103(1)(d) (1995); L A. RE V.
STAT . AN N . § 10: 3-10 3(a ) (Wes t 1 998 ) (al tog et he r o mi tt in g a ny  de fin it ion  of good faith
in  Article 3, ther e b y i n corp ora tin g th e pu re ly su bject ive d efin iti on fr om Ar ticl e 1); M O .
RE V. STAT . 400.3-103(a )(4) (Su pp.  1998 ); TE N N . CO D E  AN N . § 47-3-103(a) (1996)
(altogether  o m it t ing a ny defin ition of good faith in  Article 3, t her eby incorpor at ing t he
pur ely su bject ive d efin iti on fr om Ar ticl e 1); U TAH  CO D E  AN N . § 70A-3 -103 (1)(d) (1 997 ).
in te rp re ta tion  c on t r a r y  t o o n e ’s  o w n  u n d e r sta nd ing,  or
fals ificat ion  o f f a ct s .  It  a l s o e x t e n d s  t o d e a l in g  w h i ch  i s  ca n d i d
b u t u n f a i r , s u c h  a s  t a k i n g  a d va n ta ge of t h e n eces sit ou s
cir cu m s t a n ce s o f t he  o t h er  pa r ty  to  ex to r t a  m odi fica ti on  of a
con t r a ct  for t h e sa le of good s w ith ou t  l eg i t im a t e  com m e r ci a l
r e a son . . . . Ot h er  ty pe s of viola tion  h a v e  b e e n  re cognize d in
jud icial  dec i sions :  ha r a s s ing  dem and s  for  a s su ran c e s  of
pe r fo rman ce , re ject ion  of per form an ce  for  u n s ta t e d r e a son s ,
wi llfu l failu re  to m it ig a te  d a m a g e s , a n d  a b u s e  of a  p o w er  t o
de te rm in e com pli a n ce or  to t er m in a te  th e con tr a ct. 83
E. Th e Post-Section 205 Era
 Section  205 r ejected the p urely  su bject ive  view of good  fait h
per formance ar ticulat ed in UCC Art icle 1, in favor of a broader
concep t ion  of good  fa i th  per formance  tha t  i s cons is t en t  w ith  it s
origins —includin g th e not ion th at  good fait h d oes not  per mit  a
pa r ty to a bus e righ ts  best owed u pon it  by  a con t r act  so a s  t o
defea t th e re as ona ble expect at ions of th e oth er cont ra ctin g
pa r ty. Despite t his cha nge, section 205 appea rs  n ot  to have
e n cou n te red wides pr ead  opposition  at  th e tim e of its
cons idera t ion  or  p romulga t ion .84 Indeed, s ection 20 5’s im plicit
crit icism of th e more limi ted UCC duty of good faith appea rs to
have had t he effect ultimately desired by its adherents; as th e
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85. S ee, e.g., U.C.C. §  3-103 (a)(4 ) (199 0) (“ ‘Good fa it h’ me an s h one st y in  fact  an d
the obse rv an ce of r ea son ab le com me rci al  st an da rd s of fa ir  dea lin g.”); U.C .C. § 4 -104 (c)
(1990) (incor por at ing  Art icle 3 ’s de fini tion  of good f ai t h  int o Ar ti cle 4 ); U. C.C . § 4A-
105(a)(6) (1990) (using iden tical de finition a s in Art icle 3); U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(10) (1995)
(“ ‘Good fa ith ,’ for p ur pose s of t he  obliga tion  of good fa ith  in t he  per form an ce or
en fo rcemen t of cont ra cts  or du ties within [Article 8], means honest y in fact and t he
obse rv an ce of re as on ab le com me rci al  st an da rd s of fa ir  de al in g.”).
86. Most of th es e cr it ics a rt icu lated  a v iew  of th e good  fait h p er form an ce
requ ir emen t in for me d b y effi ciency concerns. For exa mple, Professor Clayton Gillette
worried tha t
[a]n  exp an sive  defin iti on  of good faith, however, may also serve as a
sou rce  of uncertainty if it perm its ju dicial modificat ion of legal r u l es  r elied
on  in the parties’ c on t r a c tua l ar ra ng em en ts . Th e cost s of en te ri ng  int o a
tr an sact ion a re  r educed  to the  e xt e n t  t ha t  t he  pa r t i es  a r e  ce r t a in  o f t he
consequences of cont ract terms a nd can predict who will bear specific risks.
Ex ist en ce of a broad prin ciple, judicially applied a n d  n ot ca pa ble of
disclaimer by bar gain ing, int rodu ces an  eleme nt  of uncert ain ty t ha t is lik ely
to increase risks  and r aise costs at th e contract formation st age.
Cla yton  P. Gille tt e, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 DUKE  L.J . 619,
651. Likewise, Professor Steven Burton argued t ha t “[t]radit ional lega l an alysis
supplies no t ools for  ba la nci ng  th e r ela ti ve ca pa cit ies  of th e pa rt ies  to p rot ect
themselves” by securing more explicit contractual promises, and th u s  t h e du ty of g ood
faith  ha d t o be in form ed b y econ omi c an aly sis  an d it s r ole  in  “e n h a n c[ing] economic
efficie ncy  by re ducin g th e costs  of cont ra cting .” Steven  J . Bur ton , Breach of Cont ract
and the Com m on Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. RE V. 369, 392-93
(1980) (foot no te  om it te d).
UCC revis ion pr ocess ha s pr ogress ed du rin g  t h e 1980s , th e
revi se r s cons is tent ly have b roadened the  UCC’s  s t atu tory  good
fait h  definit ion t h r ough out  the ot her  Art icle s.  Revis ion s of
Articles 3, 4, a nd  4A incorporat ed an  “objective reasona bleness”
s t anda rd of good fait h  in 1990; revision of Art icle 8 in 1995
accomplish ed th e sam e.85
Nevertheless, a ft er  se ct ion  205’s pr omulga t ion , some cr it ics
expressed  concern  th at  section 205 described the  du ty of good
fait h  bet ween  contr act ing pa rt ies in  rh etor ical t e r m s tha t  were
too gen er a l a nd  invit ed  too m uch  judicia l in ter ven t ion . Ma ny of
these cr it ics  a r gued  th at  th e scope of the d ut y of good fait h
could be defen ded n orm at ively only by not ions of econom ic
efficiency; severa l expressed  conce rn  tha t  un le ss  it s  parame ter s
were  pr ope r ly r es t ra in ed , a  br oad d u ty of good  fa i th
per formance would invite unwar ran ted judicial activism th at
would  res u lt  in  uncer ta in ty, li t iga t ion , and  undesi r ab le  cos t s for
con t r act in g part ies.86 In deed , in t he  year s following t he
p romulgat ion  of sect ion  205, l it iga t ion  ar ose in  a  wid e va r iet y of
conte xts  involving claim s of bad fa ith : dispu t es in volving t he
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87. S ee, e.g., Pa cific F irst  Bank  v. New Morgan P ark  Corp., 876 P.2d 761 (Or.
1994) (dis cus sin g ba d fa it h i n co nt ext  of lea se  ag re em en ts ).
88. S ee CONTRACTS  RE S T AT E M E N T, supra  note 27,  § 205  cm t.  a (“ The  appropr ia t e
remedy  for  a b re ach  of th e d ut y of good  fai th  al so v ar ies  wit h t he  cir cum st an ces .”).
89. Many of these decisions are n ot e d i n  P atricia A. Milon, Recent Development ,
Im pli ed  Coven an ts of  Good  Fai th  an d F air  Deal in g: Loose C an non s of Liability f or
Financial Institut ions?, 40 VA N D. L. RE V. 1197 (1987) a nd An der son, supra  note 33.
90. PEB  COM ME NT ARY NO . 10 (Fe b. 10 , 199 4); see U. C.C . § 1-2 03 cm t.  (199 5).
int erp ret at ion of sa les  cont ract s, landlord-tenant disput es,
lender  liability disputes, and numer ous others. 87 Pe rhaps  more
a la rming ly for defendant s, plaint iffs seekin g to vind icat e th eir
r igh t s in  thes e ca se s cr ea t ive ly fr amed  t h eir  cause s of a ct ion
and sought  remedies  (such  as pu nit ive da ma ges) typ ically
un availa ble in  con t ract  disput es. Neith er  Con tr act s R estat em ent
section  205 nor UCC section 1-203 specify a precise remedy
when  one party breaches its dut y of good faith  performa nce;
instead,  the dra fters of those respective provisions argued t h a t
the appropr ia t e  r emedy shou ld vary with  the  con text  of the
disput e.88 I n  t he face  of t h is silence, aggr ieved p ar tie s sou ght
relief based not  only u pon  br ea ch  of con t ract ,  bu t  a l so b reach  of
fiduciar y du ty, d ures s,  and (b or rowin g fr om case s r ecognizin g
cau ses  of act ion  aga ins t  insurer s  who acted  in  bad  fa it h  in
dea l ing with their insureds) th e “in de pe nde nt” tor t  of br ea ch  of
th e du ty of good faith  an d fair  dea ling. 89
Concerned  th at  judicial decisions recognizing bad fa ith
per formance as a “tort” were beyond the bounds i nt e nded by
section  1-203, th e Per ma nen t  Ed itorial Boar d for th e UCC
[hereina fter  PEB] p romulgated new  comment ary designed to
cla r ify the con se qu en ces  of ba d fa it h  in  the p er formance or
enforcement  of contr acts. In  PEB  Comm entary N o. 10. t he  PEB
re jected  the  tor t  of “commercia l bad fa i th”:
T h is  sec t ion  does  n o t  s u pp ort  an  in de pe n de n t ca u se  of act ion
for  failu re  to p er form  or en force in  good fa ith . Ra th er , th is
se ction  m e a n s  t h a t  a  fa i lu r e  t o p e r fo rm  o r  e n force , in  good
fa it h , a s pe cific du ty  or ob lig a t io n  u n d e r  t h e  co n t r a ct ,
con sti tu tes  a b rea ch  of th at  con tra ct or m ak es u n av ai la ble,
u n d er th e pa rti cu la r cir cu m sta n ces, a  rem ed ia l ri gh t or p ow er .
T h is  dist inct ion  m a k es it  clear  th at  th e doct rin e of good fa ith
mer e ly d i r ec t s a  c ou r t  t o w a r d s  in t e r p r etin g cont ra cts w ith in
t h e comm er cial co n t e xt  i n  wh ich  th ey  a re  c rea t ed ,  pe r form ed ,
a n d  en fo rced ,  and  does  no t  c r ea t e  a  s epa ra t e  du t y  o f f a i rnes s
a n d  r e a s o n a b l e n e s s  w h ic h  ca n  b e  i n d e p e n d e n t l y b r e a c h e d .90
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91. Id . (emphasis added) (some a lter at ions in or iginal) (quot ing Amy H . Kast ely,
S t ock  Eq ui pm ent  for t he B arg ain  in  Fact : Tr ad e Us age,  “Ex pres s T erms,” an d
Consis tency Un der  S ection  1-205  of th e Un iform  Com m ercia l Cod e, 64 N.C. L. RE V.
Although PEB  Comm entary N o. 10 ar ticu lat es a  limite d
view of th e scope of th e aggrieved pa rt y’s r em edy for
con t ractua l bad fait h per form an ce, its r ea l sign ificance lies in
t he sweeping lan guage it u ses t o describe the proper
unders tand ing of the U CC du ty of good fait h  e n for cemen t. It  is
wor th  not ing  tha t  PEB  Comm entary N o. 10 arose in r e sponse to
concer ns a bou t  the un war ra nt ed in crea se of litigat ion involving
claim s of “bad faith.” The PEB might have responded  t o t h is
lit iga t ion  boom let  by a r t icu la t in g fr eedom -of-cont ract  rhet or ic;
instead, th e PE B did  pr ecisely t he  opposite, describing t he U CC
duty of good faith  in broad t erm s, th us  reflectin g th e full
evolu t ion  of a d u ty of good fa it h  pe r form ance defined by
ext er na l s t anda rds  of behavior :
T h e concep t  o f  Agreem e n t  p e r m e a t e s  t h e e n t i r et y  of t h e
Code . . . . Th e “a gr ee m en t o f th e p a r ti es ” can n ot  be  re a d off t h e
face  o f a  d o cu m e n t ,  b u t  m u s t  be  d i sc er n e d  a g a in s t  t h e
b a ck g rou n d  of act u al  com m er cial  pr act ice. N ot on ly  d o es  t h e
C od e  r ecogn ize  “the  r easonab le  p ra c t i ces  and  s t an da rd s  of th e
comm er cial  c om m u n i t y . . . [a s ] a n  a p p r op r ia t e  sou r ce  of l eg a l
obliga tion ,” bu t  i t  a l so  r e j ect s  t h e  “p rem ise t h a t  t h e  la n g u a ge
used  [by t h e p ar tie s] h as  th e m ea n in g a tt rib u ta ble  to [it]  by
ru le s  of con st ru cti on e xis t in g  in  t h e  la w  r a t h er  t h a n  t h e
m e an in g  w h ich  a ri se s ou t of t h e com m er cia l con te xt  in  wh ich
it  wa s u se d.” Th e cor re ct p er sp ect ive on  th e m ea n in g of good
fait h  pe r fo rman ce  and  en fo rcemen t  i s  t h e  A g r e em e n t  o f t h e
pa r t i e s . T h e  cr it ica l qu es tion  is, “Ha s ‘X’ act ed in  good fa ith
w i t h r e spec t  t o  the  p erform an ce or  enforceme nt  of  some  r ight
or  d u t y  u n d er  t h e  t e r m s  o f t h e  A gr e e m e n t ?” I t  i s  there fore
w ron g to  conc lude  tha t  as  long  as  the  agreem ent  a l lows  a  par ty
to d o som eth ing , it is  u n d er al l ter m s a n d  cond iti on s
p erm issib le.  S u c h  a  co n cl u s io n  ov e r lo ok s  co m p le t e ly  t h e
d i s t in cti on  bet we en  m er ely p er form in g or  en forcin g a  rig h t or
d u t y  u n de r a n  ag re em en t on  th e on e h an d a n d, on  t h e  ot h e r
h a n d ,  do ing  so in  a  wa y  tha t  r ecogn izes  t h a t  t h e a g re em e n t
s h ou ld  be  in t e rp r e t ed  in  a  m ann er  cons is t en t  w it h  t h e
reason abl e  e xp ect a ti on s of t h e p a r ti es  in  th e lig h t o f th e
comm er cial  cond ition s  e x i s tin g  in  t h e  con t e xt  u n d er  s cr u t in y .
Th e la tt er  is t h e cor re ct a pp ro a ch .91
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777, 780  (198 6) a nd  U. C.C . § 2-2 02 cm t.  1(b) (1 995 )).
92. S ee U. C.C . § 9-1 02(a )(43) (1 998 ) (“ ‘Good faith’ means hones t y  in  fac t and  the
obse rv an ce of re as on ab le com me rci al  st an da rd s of fa ir  de al in g.”).
93. S ee DENNIS  M. P ATTERSON , GOOD F AITH AND LENDER LIA B I LITY 35 (1989)
(“L imi t ing th e ‘agr eem en t of t he  pa rt ies ’ to t he  wr it te n w ord s a lon e cr am p s  t he
contex tua l chara cter of the [UCC] concept of Agreemen t. Meani ng is  wider than  words
al on e.”).
PEB Comm entary N o. 10 is  sign ifica n t  for  several reasons.
F i rs t , it  refle cts t he U CC’s n ea r -tot a l reject ion of the p ur ely
su bjective  underst anding of good fa ith  as  “hon est y in fa ct.”
With  th e J uly 199 8 pr omu lgat ion of the r evised Art icle
9—which  a lso in corpor a tes  the com mer cia l r ea son ableness
s t anda rd92—the UCC n ow consist en tly d efines  th e t er m “good
fa ith ” in  a  fash ion  tha t  eva lua tes  a  pa r ty’s  per formance  and
enforcement  by reference not only to honest y but a ls o to
rea sona ble commercia l s t andards  of good  fa i th  and fa i r  dea ling.
Second, and  more  sign i fi cant l y, PEB  Comm entary N o. 10
d iscl a ims th e Ea st erb rook a bsolu t e  freedom -of-cont ract  view of
“good fait h,” overtly  re jectin g th e not ion  tha t  a  cour t  can  a lways
eva lua te a part y’s good faith p erforma nce or enforcement by
reference on ly to the  fou r  corne r s of a  wr it t en  agreemen t .93
Instead,  PEB  Comm entary N o. 10 plainly compels courts to
in te rpre t agreements  in  a  fash ion  t h a t  respe cts t he r eas ona ble
un expr ess ed exp ecta tion s of a cont ra ctin g pa rt y.
IV. TH E  RH E T O RI C O F  GO O D  F A IT H  I N  TH E  CO U R T S —OF  GO O D
IN T E N T I O N S  A N D  (SO M E TI M E S) QU E S T IO N AB L E  DE C I SI O N S
 As a r t icu l a t ed  in  Contracts Resta tement section 205 and
PEB Comm entary N o. 10,  t he duty of good faith compels a cour t
to inq uire in to whet her  a credit or’s decision t o accelerat e based
upon th e occur ren ce of an  objective defau lt comp ort s wit h t he
rea sona ble expect a t ions  of the  bor rower  a t  the  t ime  tha t  the
par ties  ent ere d in to t he s ecur ity  agreemen t . As  a  r esu lt , a  cou r t
faced w ith  a ch alle nge  to a  cred it or ’s a ccele ra t ion  decision mu st
inqu ire  whet her  a r easona ble borrower would  have appreciated,
a t  the t im e s he execu t e d  t h e loa n  docu men ts,  the li keli hood
t h a t  t h e lender  would decide to accelerat e th e loan un der t he
ci rcumstances tha t  have n ow t ransp ir ed . If t he a nsw er  to tha t
inqu iry  is “yes,” th en t he credit or’s decision can not come as a n
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94. In  his book on  good faith in  th e lend er lia bilit y cont ext, P rofessor D enn is
Patt erson proper ly recognized t he cont extu al n at ur e of this in quir y:
Good faith mea ns lack of surprise, an eq u a t i on  consi st en t  wi th  the
t rad i t iona l con t r act  l a w n o t ion  th at  th e r ea son ab le e xpe cta ti on s of t he
part ies is the fundamen tal interest  to be protected by t he  court s. To
accomplish th is,  . . . t he  la w m us t r efle ct t he  commer cial rea l ity  tha t
bus ines spe r sons f requen t ly employ express  t e rms in  the ir  ag reemen t s wh ich ,
when  read a gainst t he commer cial background aga inst which th e part ies
enter  in to t he ir  ag re em en ts , do n ot m ea n w ha t t he y sa y; fu rt h e r , t he
expecta t ions of th e pa rt ies , wh ich  ar e ex pr es se d in  th eir  la ng ua ge, ca nn ot
be un der st ood ex cept  by r efer en ce t o th at  b a ck g r ound out of which those
expecta t ions ar e forged. . . .
L lewel lyn ’s vision [of the concept of “a greemen t” a s  expressed in  the
UCC] is very much like th e herm eneut ic circle. To under stand t he
Agreemen t  o f t he  pa rt ies  one must look at their language. To understand
the langua ge one must in vestigate t he commer cial background of its use.
The expectations of the part ies are creat ed both by their lan guage a n d  the
c ir cumstances su r round ing  fo rma t ion . To unde r st and  any s ing le  e lemen t
requires  an  un ders ta ndin g of the t otalit y.
Id . at  33-35 (footnote s omit ted ). 
95. Ju dge Eas t er b r ook’s  rhe tor i c i n  Kh am  & N at e’s S hoes  appea r s  t o f al l i n to
th is categor y, as it  denie s th e rele van ce of good faith  alt og et her  when  a  par t i cu la r
en fo rcemen t de cisi on  is a ut ho ri zed  by t he  lit er al  te rm s of a  writ ten  in str um ent . S ee
supra  no t e 25 and  accompanying t ext .
unfa i r sur prise t o the borrower ,94 and  a  cour t  shou ld sus ta in
the credi-t or’s a ccelerat ion as  good fait h  e n for cem en t  of th e
secur i ty agreement .
Such  a  sw eeping con cep t ion  of good faith  obviously vests
sign ifica n t  tr ust  in th e ability of judges to app reciate t he
conte xt  of the  t r ansact ion  a t  i ssue in  a  cons is t en t  fa sh ion  and  to
as cert ain  corre ctly a ny  un expressed  yet  rea son able  exp ect a t ion s
of th e cont ra ctin g pa rt ies. As is a lways  tr ue w hen  th e law
leaves i t  to judges  to make de cis ion s us ing su ch a  ma lleable
stan dard,  sometimes this trust is misplaced. In some cases,
cour t s fail t o ascert ain correctly th e rea sonable u nexpr essed
exp ect a t ion s of the  con t ract ing p a rties becau se of a
ph ilosophica l per spect ive th at  sim ply den ies t he  possib ility t ha t
a  par ty’s un expressed  expectat ions could be r eas ona ble.95 In
other cases, court s push th e s t a n d a rd beyond its proper limits,
a scr ibing “bad fa i th” to enforcement decisions tha t doubtless
could have been expected by a  rea sonable borrower. In  order t o
high light  th e te ns ions p res ent  whe n cour ts  at tem pt  to ident ify
the “rea sona ble” expectat ions  of lender s and borrowers, Part  IV
of th is  Ar t icle discus ses s ever al n ota ble decisions  int erp ret ing
th e UCC dut y of good faith —first  evalua ting t he exten t t o
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96. S ee infra  note s 98-141 an d accompa nyin g text .
97. S ee infra  note s 142-53 an d accompa nyin g text .
98. 603 F. 2d  136 7 (9t h C ir . 19 79).
99. S ee id . a t 1 369 . Th e s ecu ri ty  ag re em en t a lso con ta in ed a  clause pe rmi t t ing
AVEMCO to a cce le ra te t he m atur it y of t he n ot e i f i t  “de em [s ] i t sel f insec ure. ” Id .
100. S ee i d . The Buyers became co-insured p a rtie s a long  wit h H er ri ford  on t he
insu rance covering th e plane, and  AVEMCO appar entl y received a cop y of t he  poli cy
lis t ing th e Bu yer s a s co-in su re ds . Ba se d u pon  th is fa ct,  th e cou rt  cou l d  h a ve
concluded tha t since AVEMCO had k nowledge of Herriford’s breach  of the se curit y
ag reemen t in 1973, AVEMCO had  waived it s righ t t o accelera te ba sed u pon t his
objective default by waiting un til Ju ly 1975 to accelerate th e debt a nd  re pos sess  t he
plane.  As discuss ed in t he t ext, h owever, t he N int h Cir cuit d i d n o t  tr eat this as a
waiver  case.
which  cour t s  have use d t he con cep t  of im pa ir men t  of s ecu r ity  to
in form th is in qu iry, 96 and t hen  the ext en t  to wh ich  the cou r t s
have us ed (or m isu sed ) th e du ty of good  fa i t h  as  a s hield
against pretextua l actions by creditors.97
A. Good  Fa it h  an d  S ecuri ty  Im pa irm ent
1. The AVEMCO cas e an d  it s p rogen y
 Alth ough  M or tg ag es  R es ta t em e n t sect ion 8.1  gener ally
adop t s the view tha t secur ity impa irm ent  is not necessa ry when
a  cred it or  se ek s t o accele ra te t he m atur it y of a  de bt  ba se d u pon
an  object ive  de fau lt , a  sign ifica n t  number of decisions h ave
adopted  a view th at  ma kes t he a bsence  of secur i ty impa i rment
re leva nt  to th e cour t ’s eva lua tion  of the cr edit or’s good faith .
Perha ps the m os t  notor ious  deci sion  adopt ing  th is  view is  the
Nin th Circu it ’s opinion in  Brown v . AVEMCO Inves tment
Corpor at ion .98 In  Se pt em ber  1972, Rob er t  Her r ifor d executed a
p romissory note payable to AVEMCO Invest me nt  Corp .,
secured  by a lien upon Herr iford’s airplan e. The  secur ity
agreement pe rmit t ed  AVEM CO to acce ler a te t he debt  if t he
p lane was sold, leased, or  en cumbered  wit hout  AVEM CO’s p r ior
writ ten  consen t .99 In  J uly 19 73, H er r iford entered a
lease/purchase agreem en t  wit h  th ree  other  pa r t ies  (the
“Buyers ”), under  which each  of th e Buyers a greed to pay hour ly
ren ta ls for  u se of t he  pl ane  and to con t r ibu te  one-four th  of the
amount  necessa ry to ret ire t he AVEMCO  debt ; in excha nge , th e
Buyers  received an option t o purcha se a one-four t h  int ere st  in
the plan e for one dollar  upon s at isfaction of the AVEMCO
deb t .100
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101. S ee i d . Accordin g  t o t h e opinion, the discrepancy between the parties’
res pective  payoff amoun ts was  a function of AVEMCO’s c la im tha t  it  was  en t i t led  to
re imbursemen t for sums a dvanced for insurance pursuan t t o  the  t e rms o f t he  secu r ity
ag reemen t .
102. S ee id .
103. S ee id . at 1369-72.
104. S ee id . at 1371-72.
For  the next t wo years, the loan rema ined curr ent. In J u ly
1975, the Buyers opted to exe rcise t heir  pu rchase  opt ion  and
ten dered  payment t o AVEMCO in  sa t is fact ion  of wha t  the
Buyers  believed to be the corr ect  ba la nce of t he debt. AVEMCO
refused  th is t end er, in dicat ing t ha t t he a ctu al balan ce was
h ighe r ; further, AVEMCO accelerated the loan based upon
Herriford’s leas ing t he p lan e in  violation  of the s ecur ity
agreemen t .101 The  Buye rs  objected, n ot ifying AVE MCO in
wr it ing that  the tendered funds were  in e scrow and were
ava ilable  to AVEMCO  u pon  p resen ta t ion  of t he  sa t is fi ed  note
and secu r ity agree men t. Sh ortly t her eafter , AVEMCO
rep ossess ed t he p lan e an d even tu ally sold it  in  Septem ber  1975
for  a  tota l of $7 ,00 0—m ore t han  the exis t in g ba la nce of t he
deb t .102
The Buyer s filed a n a ction a gain st  AVEMC O in the  United
Sta tes  District Cou rt  for th e Dist rict  of Monta na , allegin g th at
AVEMCO’s accelera t ion  of the  debt  and  repossess ion  of the
p lane were wrongful, constituted a conversion of the Buyers’
in te rest  in  the p la ne, a nd b rea ched  AVEM CO’s d u ty of good
fait h  un der t he UCC. The Bu yers essen t ially advanced a “no
ha rm, no foul” ar gum ent , notin g th at  th e leas e did n ot ser iously
th rea ten  AVEMCO’s secu r it y in  any m ea nin gfu l r es pe ct ;
Her r ifor d and t he Buyer s h ad con t in ued  to pa y t he n ote on  a
tim ely bas is, t he  pla ne ’s va lu e fa r  exceede d t he ba la nce of t he
d eb t , an d th e Buyers could not a cquire owners hip of the p la ne
without  paying off AVEMCO in  full.103 The Buyer s th us a rgued
tha t  no rea son able  len de r  in  AVEM CO’s p osi t ion  would have
accelerated  the loa n  as a  cons equen ce of t he leas e, which
constit ut ed at  best a  techn ical default . Accordin gly, the Bu yers
ask ed the cou r t  to in st ruct  the ju ry, consist ent  with  UCC
sect ion 1-208, t ha t  AVEMC O could accelera te t he loa n on ly if it
believed in good fait h t h a t  th e lease a ctua lly impa ired
AVEMCO’s securit y inter est in  th e plan e.104 The d is t r ict  cou r t
refu se d a nd inst ructed  the ju ry t ha t  AVEM CO’s e nforcem en t  of
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105. Id . at 1372-73, 1375-76.
106. The pa r t ies had s pecifi ed t ha t T exa s la w wou ld gov er n t he  int er pr et at ion
of the  secu r ity  agreemen t . See id. at 1369. Under  UCC sect ion  1-105(1) , pa r t i es  a re
free to in clud e for um  choice  clau ses  in t he ir  cont ra c t s,  and such  c lauses a re
enforcea ble so long as the state chosen bears a  “r eas ona ble r ela tion sh ip” to t he
su bject  of th e t ra ns act ion.
107. S ee supra  note s 65-76 an d accompa nyin g text .
108. As discussed supra  in n otes 2 3 an d 64 a nd a ccompan ying t ext, t he m ajor i ty
of cour ts  ha ve in te rp re te d se ction  1-208  in a  fas hion  incon sisten t  w ith  the  Nin th
Circu it ’s i n t erp re t a tion  in  AVEM CO.
109. AVEM CO, 603 F .2d at  1378. 
t h e acceleration claus e was va lid if th e jury found even  a
“tech n i ca l brea ch of a l ea se  wit hout  cons en t” in viola t ion  of th e
secu r ity agreemen t .105 Th e ju ry r et urned  a  ver dict  for
AVEMCO, and  the d is t r ict  cou r t  ent er ed  judgment  upon  tha t
ver dict .
Applying  Texas law,106 t he  Nin th Cir cu i t  r eversed the
judgment and  remanded  for  a  n e w t r ial. Th e Nin th  Circu it
acknowledged severa l  st a te  cour t  decisions h olding th at  UCC
section  1-208—an d its r equ i re m ent  th at  th e cred itor  mu st  in
good fa ith believe th at  its secur ity is impa ired wh en
acce le ra t ing based upon  in secu r ity107—does not  apply to
accelera tion  based upon objective defaults.108 The  Nin th  Circu it
concluded,  howeve r , tha t section 1-208 applies wh enever a
secured  pa r ty exer cises  it s d iscret ion  to accelerat e a secur ed
deb t , eve n  in  the even t  of an  object ive  de fau l t  su ch  as
Herriford’s lease to the Buyers:
Accordin g to it s la ng ua ge, § 1.20 8 a pp lies  w h en  a  pa rt y in
in t e re s t  m ay  accele ra te  pa ym en t “at  will” or  “ w h e n  he  deem s
him self  i n secu re” o r  “in  words  o f s imi l a r  impor t . ” Here  t he
a g r ee m e n t pr ovid ed  th at  AVE MC O m ay , a t  i t s  opt ion ,
a cce le r a te  p ay m en t  wh en  th e d ebt or le as es  wit h ou t con se n t or
when  AVE MC O d ee m s it se lf in se cur e or  wh en  v a r ious  o the r
con t ingen c ie s  occur .  The  ag reem en t  does  no t  r e q u ir e
imm edia t e ,  a u t om a t i c a cce le r a tion  u p on  one  o f t hese  even t s
b u t fu r the r  tie s a cceler at ion  to t h e op tion  of AVE MC O. S ect ion
1 .208 app l i e s  t he  Code’s  good  fait h  conce pt  to s u ch a cceler at ion
a n d  p rov ides t h a t  t h e cr e d it or  h a s  pow er  to e xer cise  th e op tion
“only if h e in  good  fai th  be liev es  th a t t h e p ro sp ect  o f  paym e n t
or p er form an ce is i m pa ire d.”109
Th e Nin th  Circu it conced ed t ha t object ive an d su bjective
defau lt s were different , not in g t ha t  object ive  de fau lt s (s uch  as
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110. S ee id . at  1378-79; U.C.C . § 1-208 cmt . (“The incr ea sed  us e of acce ler at ion
clauses . . . has  led to som e confusion in  th e cases  as t o the  effect to be given  to a
clause wh ich  se em in gly g ra nt s t he  pow er  of an  a c ce l er a t ion  at  th e wh im  an d ca pr ice
of one  pa rt y. Th is S ect ion i s in te nd ed t o ma ke  clea r t ha t . .  . [su ch a n] op t ion is  to
be exe rcis ed on ly in  th e good  fait h b elie f th at  th e pr ospe ct of pa ym en t or  p e r formance
is im pa ir ed .”).
111. AVEM CO, 603 F .2d at  1378-79. 
112. Id . at 1379.
113. Id .
114. S ee i d . at 1380.
Herriford’s leas e) ar e gene ra lly with in t he  cont rol of the deb tor ,
whereas a cr edit or’s feelin gs of inse cur ity a r e not ,  leaving the
deb tor  more  sub ject  to the “whim and capr ice” of t he cr ed it or .110
Based  upon this distinction, the Ninth Circuit conceded that
one migh t  rea d s ect ion  1-208 to app ly on ly t o accele ra t ion  based
upon insecur ity, because t ha t t ype of accelera t ion  was more
likely to su bject t he d ebt or t o th e “uncont rolled wil l of the
cred itor .”111 Th e N in th C ir cuit  re ject ed th is view, however,
not ing that  the facts strongly suggest ed t he  possib ility t ha t
AVEMCO  had  acce le ra ted “from an inequitable desi re to take
advan tage of a  t echn ica l defa ult .”112 Based upon  the ir  v iew tha t
the UCC drafters did not intend t o leave debtors defenseless
against su ch cred itor  abu se, t he N int h Cir cuit  conclude d t h a t
section  1-208 govern ed a ll si t u ations in wh ich a secured
cred it or  exercises its discret ion  to acce ler a te t he m atur it y of a
secu red deb t :
W h ile  [th e in se cur ity ] clau se  m ay  be t h e p rim ar y focu s of
§ 1 .208 , t h i s  cour t  does  no t  be l ieve  i t  i s  t he  only  focus. Abu se is
poss ible  wit h  “du e-on -lea se ” accele ra tion  as  we ll. Th e “opt ion ”
t o acce ler at e ba se d on  a l ea se , like  th e on e ba se d on  feelin gs of
insecu ri ty ,  cou ld  be  used  by  AVEMCO a s  a  s w ord  for
comm er cial  ga in r at he r t ha n a s a  sh ield a ga ins t s ecu rit y
i m p a ir m e n t .  Sect ion 1 .208, gr owin g from  an d in corp ora tin g
e qu i ta b le  p r in ciple s, d efin es  “good fa ith ” in a cceler at ion  to
p rov ide  p ro tec t ion  f rom such  abu se .113
The Nin th  Circu it t hu s r eversed the  di st r i ct  cour t  and
rem an ded for a  new tr ial addr essing whet her AVEMCO’s
decision was reasonable under the circumst ances.114
T h e AVE MCO  decis ion  is  not  un iqu e a s a n  exa mple of a
cour t ’s willingness to un dert ak e ex post r eview of th e
reasonablen ess of a cred itor ’s a ccelera tion  decision . A
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115. S ee Davis v.  P le t ch er, 727 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. App. 1987). On July 1, 1977,
Davis  pur chas ed wh at  he belie ved was  at  least  670 acr es of land  from t he P let c h er s,
execut ing a $210,000 promissory note and deed of trust . The Ple t ch ers ’ deed exp res sly
covenan ted  title t o at lea st 670 acres of land, but requ ired Davis to provide the
P let cher s w ith  ce r t a in  no tice within five years from the da te of the deed to trigger
any liabilit y on t his coven an t. See id.  a t  33.  Nea r  t he  end of t h i s pe r iod,  a  di spu te
arose over  the  parcel ’s  acreage.  On June  30 , 1982 , Davi s’ a t t or n ey  sen t  a  mai lg ram
to th e P let che rs , not ifyin g th em  of a s hor ta ge of 41  acr es,  bu t d id n ot se nd  a ce rtified
survey un til Ju ly 5, 1982. The Pletchers r esponded tha t th e five-year period specified
in  the  deed  had pas sed  wi thout  a va lid objection by Da vis, th at  no ad just men t in  th e
pr ice was  due , and  tha t  th e y e xp e ct ed Davis to make t he regula rly scheduled
insta l lm e n t on August 1, 1982. Davis did not pay this installment to the Pletchers;
in stead,  Davis sued for a declaration th at th e Pletchers had br eached the deed
covenan t, and att empted to pay the mortgage installment into the court.  On August
31, 1982, the Pletchers accelerated the ma turity of the note and t hereafter filed a
count erclaim  seek ing t o foreclose th e deed  of tru st. See id.  at 31-32.
The t r i a l cour t g ra nt ed  su mm ar y ju dgm en t for  th e P let che rs , h oldi ng  (a) t ha t
Davis’ failu re  to p rov ide  th e P let che rs  wit h a  cer tifi ed s ur vey p ri or t o Ju ly 1, 1982,
deprived Da vis  of an y r ecou rs e u nd er  th e de ed cov en an ts  an d (b) t ha t t he  Pl et cher s
legally  had a ccelerat ed the m at ur it y of th e not e bas ed up on Davis ’ mone ta ry defa ult .
The Texas Court of Appeals reversed, however, concluding tha t Davis provided
su ff ic ien t notice to place the Pletchers in br each of the covenan t. As the cour t
recognized, Da vis’ re me dy for  t h i s  br e a ch w as  st ill in dep en den t of h is obl iga tion  to
make h is m ort gag e pa ym en ts . Ne ver th ele ss,  th e cou rt  he ld t ha t t he  acce ler at ion o f
the debt  was a  nu llity, re lying pr ima rily u pon t he  cour t’s eq ui ta ble  powe r t o pr ote ct
Davis  as mortgagor from the Pletchers’ unreasonable actions:
Davis’ a t te m pted t ende r t o the  court  regist ry clear ly showed a n a bility an d
willingness to  pay  the  annua l ins ta ll m en t  pa ym en t u pon  det er mi na tion  of
the amoun t of set off, if any, he is entitled to ta ke. We can see no thr eat
to th e se cur ity  of th e de bt  wh ich ca lled  for e xer cise  of th e opt ion t o
accelerate. Nor  can we  find any thing  ind icat ing  th at  th e se cur ity  for t he
debt  was in any way th reaten ed.
Id . at  36. Per ha ps n ot su rpr isingly, t he cour t’s opinion relies  upon  ear l ie r  Texas
decisions—Par ker  v .  Mazur, 13  S.W .2d  174  (Te x. Ap p. 1 928 ) and Bi sch off v . R eari ck ,
232 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. App. 1950)—th at  th e Nin th  Circuit  also r elied u pon in  its
decis ion  in t erp re t ing  Texas  law  in  AVEM CO. See AVE MCO , 603 F.2d at 1376.
sign ifica n t  number  of decis ion s involvi ng r ea l or  pe r son a l
p roper ty collat era l ha ve us ed t he r het oric of good fait h t o shield
the bor rower  aga in st  accele ra t ion  unde r  cir cumst ances  tha t
neith er  imp air ed t he len der ’s secu rit y nor t hr eat ene d it s
prospects for repa yment . For exam ple:
C The Texas Court  of Appeals nu llified t h e acce le ra t ion  of a
purchase money m or tga ge d ebt  and e n join ed  the for eclos ure
of t ha t  mor t g a ge—even  though  the  mor tgagor  had  fa i led to
pay i n st a llments on a timely basis during a title dispute
wit h  t he  se ll er /mor tgagee—on the  ground  tha t  the
ci rcumstances de monst ra ted  no mea nin gfu l t h rea t  to the
mort gagee’s securit y or prospects for repa yment .115 
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116. S ee In re Prim e Motor Inn s, Inc., 131 B.R. 233 (Bank r .  S.D.  Fl a.  199 1).
P r i m e Motor Inns (PMI) agreed  t o advance up to $200 million to North east H otel
Associates  and oth er affiliated en tities (Borrowers), secured  by m or tgages  on  va r ious
motel proper ties own ed by Borr owers. Th e loan a greem ent  requ ired tha t  Bor rowers
had to pr ovide PM I wit h fina ncial s ta tem ent s on a  tim ely ba sis ea ch yea r, a nd
permit ted  acceleration in t he event  of default . In late  1990, the Borrowers default ed
when  the ir  account a n ts filed for ban kr upt cy and cea sed oper at ing, pr event ing t he
Borrowers from  pr ovidin g th e n eces sa ry  fina ncia l st at em en ts  to P MI o n a  t i me ly
basis. When PMI (operating under Ch apter 11 bank ruptcy pr otection) threat ened
acce le ra t ion , th e Borr owers s ought  an  injun ction  and th e bankr uptcy court gran ted
t h a t  injun ction, citin g AVEM CO for the pr oposition that  acceleration would be
inequ ita ble under th e circumstances:
[E]qui ty pr eclu des  [PM I] fr om a ccele ra ti ng  th e loa n.  Th e br ea ch w hi ch g a ve
rise to [PMI’s] right to accelerate d id  n ot  impa ir [PMI ’s] secur ity or a bility
t o recover on t he loan . [PMI’s] economic risk  is not  increa sed m erely
bec a u se [Borrowers] are u nable to provide audited finan cial statemen ts
tim ely. In contra st,  [Borrowers] may suffer ext rem e an d irr evocable ha rds hip
because a defa ult  u n der  th e Loa n Agr eem en t m ay t ri gger  th e a cceler at ion
of the repa yment of $222,840,000 to other lender s unde r other  loan
agreements.  I n  s um , a c celeration of the loan in this case would be unjust
in  ligh t of t he  ha rm  th at  wou ld a ccr ue  to [B or ro we rs ] an d the fact  tha t
[their ] defau lt is m erely a  techn ical one wh ich does n ot pu t [PMI ] at r isk.
Id . at  236  (foot no te  om it te d).
117. S ee Williamson v. Wan lass,  545 P .2d 1 145 (U ta h 1 976).  In  1971 , Lor na  an d
George  Wa nla ss p ur cha sed  a fa rm  from  Don  an d  C at herine Williamson, who retain ed
a  pu rch as e m one y n ote  an d s econ d m ort ga ge t o se cur e the $20,00 0  ba lance  of  the
purchase  price. The Wanlasses m ade mont hly payment s  u n d er  t he note for two years,
th ough  i t  appea r s t ha t  many  of  these paymen t s  were  unt i m ely. Wh en  th e Wil lia ms ons
did not r eceive th e Wan lass’s Ju ly 1973 paym ent , th e Willia m s on s  a cce le ra t ed the
ma tu r i ty of th e n ote . Mr . Wa nla ss t he n t en der ed a  che ck for  t h e Ju ly  in s t a llmen t ,
a long with an  explanat ion that  the original paym ent h ad been  l os t  in  t he  ma il s.  The
Wil li amsons refused t his ten der a nd su ed to collect the a ccelerated ba lance. The  t r i a l
cour t  enter ed a judgmen t in favor of the Williamsons, but t he Supreme Cour t  of  Utah
C A Florida ba nk ru ptcy cour t en joined a  na tional m otel
franchisor  from a ccelerat ing a  $200 m illion credit  line
secured  by mor tga ges on va riou s m otel pr opert ies—des pit e
the borr ower’s failu re  to provide the m ortgagee with  au dited
fina ncia l  s t a t em en t s a s r eq u ir ed  in  t h e loa n
agreem e n t —because  the  breach  d id  not  impa i r  the
mort gagee’s secu r i ty or  i t s p rospect s  for  repayment  and
because  accelerat ion would h ave p laced t he b orr ower in
de fau lt  on  more t han  $220 mill ion  of other  loa ns. 116
C The Utah  Supreme Court applied UCC se ct ion 1-208 to
re ins t a t e a  mor tgage n ot e acceler at ed for defa ult  in
paymen t , because t her e wa s “l it t l e doubt” tha t  the
mort gagee would be  pa id  and t he m or tga gee  had n o good
faith reason to believe that  its security was thr eatened.117 
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reversed  an d re inst at ed t he n ote. See id.  at 1146, 1149.
The court should ha ve decided the case on simple waiver or es toppel g rounds ; t he
evid en ce indicated that t he Williamsons ha d routinely accepted late paymen t s  and
had n ot  co m m un icated clearly to the Wanlass es tha t timely paym ent wa s expected
in  th e fut ur e. S ee i d . at 114 6-47. The court  proceeded, however, to invoke UCC
sect ion  1-208 to just ify its decision. Alth ough t he de fault  w a s  a n objective moneta ry
de fau l t , the court  held th at se ction 1-208
s e em s to  r ecogn ize tha t  accelerat ion is a ha rsh  rem edy which should be
allowed only if there is some re as ona ble  jus ti ficat ion  for d oin g so,  su ch a s
a  good faith b elief that t he prospect of payment is impaired. There was no
such  showing m a d e  in  this case. From the fact tha t the plaint iffs had a
secon d mortgage on th is extensive proper ty,  the re  can  be  li t t le  doubt  tha t
the note would be paid, principal and interest.
Id . at 1149.
118. United  States v. Grayson, 879 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1989). The U.S.
Depar tmen t of Comm er ce E conom ic Deve lopm en t Age ncy (E DA) loa ne d $2  mi llion  to
Un ivox-California,  I n c. (Un ivox), gu ar an te ed b y Un ivox’s pr esi den t J ohn  L. Gr ays on
and his wife Dor othy. Wh en U nivox defau lted by fa ili n g t o  m a ke  any in st a l lmen t
paymen t s aft er  J uly  1985 , ED A accel er at ed t he  ma tu ri ty of  th e loan  in  Februa ry
1986, dem an ded pa ymen t from  th e Gra ysons u nder  th eir gu ar an ty, an d even tu ally
filed su it a gai ns t t he  Gr ays ons  to e nfor ce th eir  gu ar an ty ob liga tion s. T he  Gr ays ons
objected  th at  th e res ponsible E DA official did no t  acce le ra t e  t he  loan  based upon  a
good fa ith belief that E DA’s prospects of repayment wer e impaired, but  instead
accelerated  the  loan  in  order  to rece ive  a  bo n u s u n d e r  the  EDA’s  new incen t ive  p lan
for  collections officials. See id.  at  623 . Accor din gly,  th e Gra yso ns  ar gu ed  th at  ED A’s
acce ler at ion  violated section 1-208.
The dis tr ict cou rt  gr an te d E DA’s mot ion fo r s u m m ary  judgmen t , and  the Nin th
Circuit  a ff irmed . Ra ther  t han  r e ly  upon th e exist ence of th e paym ent  defau lt,
however , the Nint h Circuit reaffirmed i ts  st a t ement  i n  AVEM CO tha t section 1-208
governs all optional accelerations, even those based upon objective monetary de faults.
S ee id . at  623 n.3 (citin g AVEM CO, 60 3 F .2d  at  137 8-90). Eval ua t ing the  su r round ing
circumsta nces, t he  cour t  found tha t  Un ivox  had no t  cu red  it s m one ta ry de fau l t s
du r ing an  11-m ont h p er iod,  an d t ha t U ni vox’s own  fin an cia l  s t a tement s projected net
losses of $3.5 million for  1995. See id.  at  623.  As a  re su lt,  th e cou rt  concluded tha t
EDA’s decision to accelerate “was support ed by objective business-related
conside ra tion s,” re nd er in g it  “irr ele va nt ” th at  th e E DA official may also have been
motivated  by the desire to collect a performance bonus.  I d . at 623 n .4.
C Fu rt her more, t he  Nin th  C ircuit—faced with  an  oppor tun ity
to limit or reject its  ear lier AVE MCO  decision—inst ead
rea ffirm ed the view tha t  se ct ion  1-208 governs a ccele ra t ion s
pursuan t to object ive  de fau lt s a nd r equir es  tha t  su ch
de cis ion s be supported by “objective busin ess-relat ed
considerations.”118
2. R eflecti ng on  th e AVEMCO  decision
 Numerous cour t s an d comm ent at ors ha ve roundly criticized
the A V E MCO decis ion , a nd t he decis ion  mer it s m ost  of th a t
crit icism. The court’s int erpr eta tion of section 1-208 as
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119. S ee supra  note s 62-76 an d accompa nyin g text .
120. S ee MO R TG A GE S RE S T AT E M E N T, supra  note  1, § 8.1 cmt. a  (“While  such
au toma tic acceler at ion pr ovisions m ay be e ffective, a  m ortgagee is well-advised to
avoid th eir u se becau se th ey circum scribe t he m ortga gee’s dis cretion  in  dea ling with
mor tga gor  defa ult  an d m ay h ave  a va ri et y of un int en ded  cons equ en ces for  bot h
pa rt ies .”).
121. As discussed supra  i n  note  18 , t here is n o ser ious  dis sen t fr om t he  posi tion
art iculated in  se cti on 8 .1(d )(2) th at  th e m ort ga gee ’s con du ct or  fa i lu re  to ac t  may
incorpora t ing a d ut y of good fait h in forme d by objective
reasonableness i s ques t ion a ble becau se, a s dis cuss ed in  Pa rt
III, th ere is a  str ong textu al ar gumen t t ha t t he t hen -existin g
du ty of good faith  ar t iculated in U CC Art icle 1 requ ired  only
the credit or’s su bjective belief th at  its securit y was
thr eatened.119 Fu rt her more, th e founda t ion  l a id  by  the
AVE MCO  court  as a basis for th is interpr etation of sect ion  1-
208 is profoundly weak in several important r espects.
F i rs t , the Ninth  Circuit placed an  u n just ifie d leve l of
impor tance upon  the  fact  t ha t  t he acce le ra t ion  was not
au tomat ic but  was  ins tea d a t AVEMCO ’s opt ion. This
dist inct ion is absur d . E ssentially all acceleration decisions are
opt iona l in th e sense t ha t t he AVE MCO  cou r t  u ses  tha t  t erm;
no p ruden t  mor tgage lend er s pecifies th at  accelera tion  is
au tomat ic upon  defau lt .  Cer tain ly, t he  UCC dra ft e r s were
capable of appreci a ting tha t  acce le ra t ion  p rov isions in
commer cial docum ent at ion ar e nea rly un iversally exercisable at
the cred it or ’s op t ion .120 Ha d t he d ra fter s origin ally in t ended
tha t  all accelera tion s be objectively re as ona ble, t he y could h ave
sa id so in lan guage far  more sweepin g tha n section 1-208,
which  specifies a ccele ra t ion s “a t  wil l” or b ase d u pon
“insecur ity.”
Second, the Ninth  Circuit ignored obvious and less
objectiona ble alternat ive theories of relief. The facts suggested
tha t  AVEMCO knew tha t  the Buyers  had  acqu ired an  int er est
in  the  plane—t he Bu yers  wer e list ed a s co-insur eds w ith
Her r ifor d on the in su rance p olicy cover in g t he p la ne, a  fact
known  t o AVEMCO—an d AVEMCO n oneth eless accepted debt
ser vice  paymen ts from th e Buyers with out objection for two
years. As  such ,  t he court easily might have ruled that
AVEMCO  ha d waived its  abilit y to de cla re a  de fau lt  ba se d u pon
the lease, th ereby obviating an y need  t o i n qu i re in to the
rea son able nes s of AVE MCO’s de cis ion .121
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res ult  in a waiver of the right  to accelerate.  In  contrast , as this Article reflects, there
is significan t disa greem ent  as t o the  proper  bound s of the obliga tion of good faith.
122. S ee PEB  COM ME NT ARY NO . 10, supra  note 90.
Fin ally,  t h e AVE MCO  decision m ak es for poor comm ercia l
policy, subjecting th e lender  to the ris k of after -th e-fact lia bility
based  upon  exper t  t e st imony (or  worse , the judge’s own  se nse  of
fairness) that  a reason a ble lender would n ot ha ve accelera ted
desp it e th e occur ren ce of an  objective defau lt a s defin ed in  t he
loa n  docum ent s. To the exten t  t h a t t he AVE MCO  s t anda rd
incorpora t e s im pair men t  of secur it y a s a  necess a ry con di t ion  of
the acceleration decision and r e qu ires t ha t t he decision be
objectively re as ona ble, AVEMCO im pl icit ly p la ces  upon  the
lender  a d ut y of car e in e xer cising its contr act remedies that
goes beyond t he n otion  of en forcin g on e’s rem ed ies  in  a  fash ion
tha t  is n ot  oppor tun is t ic and  does not  cause un fa i r su rpr i se  to
th e oth er  contr act ing p ar ty.
Nevert hele ss, a l though  one  can  p roper ly a rgue tha t  the
Nin th Cir cu it  rea ched  the wrong con clu sion , on e ca nnot
pr operly  crit icize the  deci sion  for  as k in g the wron g qu est ion .
Indeed, the evolving du ty of good fa ith s eems  to compel the
scop e of the Nin th  Circu it’s in quir y in AVE MCO . Th e cou r t
encount ered  a s itu at ion in  w h ich  a  credi tor  invoked an
accelera tion  claus e th at  on its  face ser ved a  clear ly legitim at e
pr otect ive pur pose; th e ci rcumstances , however ,  did not  appear
to p resen t  t he th rea t of h a r m  tha t t he pr ovision was des igned
to pr otect a gain st . The e volving du ty of good fait h a rt iculat ed in
PEB Comm entary N o. 10 r eject s th e view tha t just  because t he
writ ten  docum ent  per mits t he cr ed it or  to act , t he cr ed it or ’s
de cis ion  to act is th ereby pe rmissible  wit hout  fu r the r i nqu iry .122
P E B Comm entary N o. 10 suggests tha t other factors ar e
re leva nt  to t he  inqu iry: Wou l d a  rea sonable lender  ha ve acted
sim ilar ly in  simila r  ci rcumstances? Has  th is  pa rt i cular  lender
a ct ed sim ilar ly with  res pect t o other  borr owers  in s imila r
circumstan ces? To the exten t  tha t  ther e exis t s e vid en ce
sugges t ing th at  th e an swer  to t hes e qu est ions is  “no,” the
evolving du ty of good  fa i th  compels  the cour t  t o inquir e whet her
accelera tion  in  the absence  of actua l  ha rm was  with in  the
rea sonable, yet un expressed , expecta tions of the borrower.
As a r esult , decisions like AVE MCO  cannot  be t e r r ib ly
s u r pris ing,  for  a t  the  margin  the rhe tor ic of good  fa i th  invite s
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123. 12 U. S.C . § 17 01j -3 (19 94).
124. Tie rce  v. APS Co., 382 S o. 2d 485, 488 (Ala. 1979) (Torber t, C.J ., dissen tin g
from  de ni al  of ap pli cat ion  for  re he ar in g).
cour t s to look t o th e na tu re  of the  un der lying t ra ns a ct ion in
order to inform the un derlying expectat ions of the par ties. In
th i s regard , the na tu re of th e mor tga ge tr an sa ction—in w hich
the mor tga gee re ceives an  int ere st  in p r ope r ty for  t he  pr imary
pur pose of securin g a debt—pr ovides th e cont ext  for iden tifying
those un der lying expectat ions. As discussed below, in proper ty
law  an d in  mor tga ges la w, cour ts  ha ve consist en tly—a lth ough
perhaps  not always correctly—looked to the concept of se cu r i ty
impa i rment  as  a ba sis for ide nt ifying th e pa rt ies’ rea sona ble
expectations.
a. The “d ue-on-sa le” ph enom enon. Th e r he tor ic of good
fa it h  influenced mort gage law most  vividly in th e bat tle over
the validity of “due-on-sale” an d “due-on-encumbr an ce” clau ses
pr ior to the federal preemption occasioned by the Garn-St.
Ger ma in  Act .123 Dur ing th e 1970s, mort gage lender s often
re fused  to consen t  to a  pr oposed t ra ns fer by a  mortgagor unless
the mor tgagor  and pr oposed tr an sferee agreed t o an upwa rd
ad jus tment  of th e mort gage inter est r at e. Mortgagors objected
to su ch condu ct, ar guin g th at  th e du e-on-sale cla us e ser ved only
to p rotect  the  secur i ty of the  mor tgagee’s  in te res t  in  the
proper ty its elf, i.e., as se cur ity  for  t h e  m or t ga gor ’s
indebtedness. Mor tgage  lende r s a rgu ed  tha t  thes e d ecis ion s
const itu te d a  legit ima te  exer cise of th e r ight s g ran ted by a due-
on-sa le clau se, a s su ch decisions  allowed le nd ers  to a djus t t heir
loa n  por t folios  in  line with prevailing inter est ra tes. In
lit iga t ion , th e cour ts t ypically fram ed th e quest ion  in  ter ms of
the part ies’ justified expectat ions: Wou ld accelerat ion based
upon in ter es t  ra te con cer ns,  in  the a bs en ce of a  th rea t  to the
lender ’s security, be cons is t en t  w ith  the mor tgagor ’s
un expressed  exp ect a t ion s? O r  wou ld  accele ra t ion  ba se d u pon
interest  ra te concer ns  ins tea d be a  “hid den  pu rp ose, not  with in
the con templa t ion  of the  pa r t ie s  when  they s igned  the
agreemen t?”124
A nu mb er  of sta te  court s u ph eld a tt em pt s by m ort gage
lender s to use du e-on-sale clauses in  th i s fash ion ,  holding tha t
if th e agreem ent  prohibited  sale with out t he lend er’s consen t,
t he re was no inequ i ty in conditioning th e lender ’s consen t  upon
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125. S ee, e.g., T ierce , 382 So. 2d at 487-88; Malouff v. Mid l a nd  Fed . Sav . & Loan
Ass ’n , 509 P.2d 1240, 1244-45 (Colo. 1973); Baker v. Loves Park Sav. & Loan Ass’n,
333 N.E .2d 1, 4-5 (Ill. 1975); Stith v. Hu dson City Sav. In st., 313 N.Y.S.2d 804, 808-
10 (1970); Crockett v. First Fed. Sa v. & L oan , 22 4 S .E .2d  580 , 58 6-88  (N. C. 1 976 );
Gunt her  v. Wh it e, 4 89 S .W.2 d 5 29,  531 -32 (T en n.  197 3).
126. S ee, e.g.,  Pa t ton  v. Fir st F ed. Sa v. & Loan  Ass’n, 578 P.2d  152, 156-58 (Ariz.
197 8); Tucker  v . Pulaski Fe d. S av . & L oan , 48 1 S .W.2 d 7 25,  728 -31 (Ar k.  197 2);
W el le n k a m p v. Ban k of Am., 582 P .2d 970, 9 73-77 (Cal. 1978); Tucker  v. Lass en Sa v.
& Loa n As s’n, 5 26 P .2d  116 9, 1 173 -75 (C a l. 1974); First  Fed. S av. & Loan  Ass’n v.
Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156, 158-59 (Fla . Dist. Ct . App. 1 980); N ichol s v. An n Ar bor
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 250 N.W.2d 804, 807-09 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977); San ders  v.
Hicks, 317 So. 2d 6 1 (Miss. 197 5), overruled by F ir s t  N a t ’l  Ba n k v. Caru ther s, 443
So. 2d 861, 864 (1983); Fidelity Land Dev. Corp. v. Rieder  & Son s Bldg. & De v. Co.,
377 A.2d 691, 694-95 (N.J . Super. Ct . App. Div. 1977); Continen tal Fed .  Sav.  & Loan
Ass’n  v. Fetter , 564 P.2d 1013, 1017-19 (Okla. 1977); Bell in g h a m F irst  Fed . Sav. &
Loan  Ass ’n v. G ar ri son , 55 3 P .2d  109 0, 1 091 -92 (W as h.  197 6).
127. 385 So. 2 d 1 56 (F la . Di st . Ct . App . 19 80).
128. Id . at  159  (cit at ion  om it te d) (foot no te  om it te d).
the mort gagor/tra nsferee’s agr eemen t t o pay a higher  interest
r a t e.125 A sign ifica n t  number  of decis ion s r efu se d t o sa nct ion
such  con d u ct , however, and instead held that a  lender’s refusal
to consen t  t o a  t r ans fe r  was  un reasonab le  and unenforcea ble
(despit e th e te chn ical viola t ion  of the m ort gage a gree men t) if
the t r ansfe r  pos ed  no de monst rable  th rea t  to the m or t g a gee’s
secu r ity or  p rospect s  for  r epaymen t .126 The op in ion  of the
Flor ida  Cour t  of Appea l s in  First Federal S av in gs &  Loan  Ass’n
v. Lockwood 127 provides a classic example of a  cour t  us ing  the
rh etor ic of good fa it h  to pr event w ha t  the  cour t  cons idered an
“ineq uit able ” accelera tion :
Flor ida  cour t s  r ecogn ize  tha t  a  le n de r  h a s  t h e  r ig h t  t o
accele r a t e  a m ort ga ge w h en  th e viola tion  of th e a cceler at ion
pr ovisi on  goes  to t h e im pa irm en t of  t he  l ende r ’s  s ecu r i ty .  They
r e q u ir e  t h a t  th e  le n d er  in  a  forec losu re  a c t ion  bea r  t he  bu rden
of d e m ons t r a t ing  l eg it ima te  g round s  for  r e fusa l  t o  accep t  th e
t r a ns fe ree . By  so  do ing ,  our  cour t s  p r o tec t  bor rowers  by
pr ovidin g t h e m  w i t h  e qu i t able  defe ns es t o ine qu ita ble
a c ce le r a t i on s  by le n de rs . Th is a pp roa ch i s ba se d on  th e
h i st or i ca l p u rp ose  of acce ler a tio n  cla u se s, w h ich  is t o pr ote ct
the  secu r i ty  o f  lende r s .
. . . [T ]h e  sole  p u rp os e s et  ou t  b y F ir s t F e d er a l [in  t h e
mor tga ge ] dea l s  w i th  th e  p ro tec t ion  o f  it s  s ecu r i ty .  The re  i s  no
m e n t i on  a n y w h e r e  in  t h e m or tga ge in st ru m en t t ha t r isin g
in t e re s t  ra te s w ill subve rt  t he s t a t ed int ent  an d ser ve  t o  ju s t i fy
F i r s t  F ede ra l ’s  a t t em pt  to  ga in  a  comm erc ia l  advan ta ge .128
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129. 582 P. 2d  970  (Ca l. 1 978 ).
130. Id . at  976  (foot no te s om it te d).
Likewise, t he Ca lifor n ia  Su pr em e Cour t  decision  in
Wellenkamp  v. Bank  of America,129 which essen tially tr iggered
the eve ntua l a dop t ion  of the Garn-St . Ge rmain  Act , refused  to
per mit  the bl anke t  en force men t  of du e-on -s a le claus es de spit e
acknowledg ing th at  th ey could ser ve th e lend er’s busin ess
pur pose:
Althou gh  we  r ecogn ize  tha t  l ende r s  f ace  inc reas in g cos t s  o f
doin g bu sin ess  an d m us t p ay  incr ea sin g a m o u n t s  to  de p os it or s
for  t he  u se  o f t he i r  fu n d s  in  m a k in g  lon g -t e rm  r e a l e st a t e loa n s
a s  a  r e s u l t  o f i n fl a t i on  a n d  a com p e t it i ve  m o n e y  m a r k e t , w e
beli eve  tha t  exe rc i se  of  t he  due -on  c lause  t o  p ro tec t  aga ins t
t h is  k i n d  of b u s in e s s  r is k  w ou l d  n ot  fu r t h e r  t h e  p u r p o se  for
w h ich  the  du e -on  c l ause  was  l eg i t i m a t e ly  d e si gn e d , n a m e l y  t o
p ro tec t  a g a i n s t  i m p a ir m en t t o th e len der ’s se cur ity t ha t is
s h o w n t o r e su l t  f rom a  t r an s fe r of tit le. E con om ic r isk s s u ch  a s
those  caus ed by a n in f la t ionar y economy a re  a mon g th e
g e n e r a l r isks  inh eren t  in  eve ry len ding t ra nsa ct ion.  They a re
ne i the r  u n fore se ea ble  n or u n fore se en . Le n de rs  wh o p rov id e
f u n d s for  l ong-t e rm  rea l  e s t a t e  l oans  sh ou ld  and  d o , a s  a
ma t t e r  of bus ine ss n ecess ity, t ak e in to  accou n t  t he i r
p r oje ct ion s  of futu re  econom ic condit io n s  wh en  th ey in itia lly
d e te r m in e  the  r a t e  o f  paymen t  an d  the  i n t ere st  on  th es e lon g
t e r m  loans .  .  .  . [ I ]t  wou ld  be  un jus t  t o  p l ace  the  bu r d e n  of t h e
l en d e r ’s  m i s ta k e n  e co n om i c p r ojec t ions  on  p r ope r ty  owners
exe rcisin g t h eir  rig ht  to  f reely al iena te  th eir  pr opert y th rough
the  a u tom at i c  en forcemen t  o f a  du e -on  c l ause  by  the  l ende r .130
Toda y, of cour se, t he  G a r n -St .  Germa in  Act  p reempts  s ta t e
laws limit ing t he e nforcea bility of due -on-sale clau ses , and
yea r s of commerce  under  the shadow of Garn-S t . Germain  ha s
resh aped  the p ar t ies ’ exp ect a t ion s r ega rding t he u se  of objective
defau lt  clauses  as a hedge against the higher costs  of borr owing
as int ere st  ra tes  ris e. Never th eless , th e his t or y  of how the due-
on-sa le clause far ed in st at e cour ts p rior to Gar n-St. Ger m a in
refle ct s th e str ong ten dency of ju dges  to view enforcem en t  of
m or tgage rem ed ies  in  a  context  in formed  by t he n a ture of t he
mort gage as a  securit y device.
b. Casualty and  par tia l condemnat ion . Mor tgage law has
also seen  th e rh etor ic of good fait h in flue nce th e disput es over
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131. Foll owin g a total condemn ation, of course, restora tion of the mortgaged
premises  is im poss ible , an d a ll a ut hor iti es g en er all y r ecogn ize t he  mor tg agee’s r igh t
to apply th e awar d again st th e mort gage debt . S ee, e.g., Morgan v. Willman , 1 S.W.2d
193, 198-200 (Mo. 1927); 1 Ne lson & Wh itm an , supra note 17, § 4.12, at 175.
132. With  rega rd t o condem na tion , see, e.g., In  re Wolf,  77 B.R.  51,  56 (Bankr .
E.D . Va. 1 987); Cit y of C hi cago v . S ali ng er, 52  N. E. 2d  184 , 18 8 (I ll. 1 943 ); In re
Forman , 240 N.Y.S. 71 8, 719-20 (Sup. Ct. 1930); 1 NELSON  & WHIT MAN , supra  no t e
17, § 4.12, at 175-76.
With  rega rd t o casu alt y insu ra nce, se e, for exa mple , First Na t’l  Bank v .  Martin ,
7 N.E .2d 6 37, 6 37 (Il l. App . Ct . 193 7); Giberson v. First Fed. Sav. & L oan Ass’n , 329
N.W.2d 9, 11 -13 (Iow a 1 983); General G .M.C. S ales, Inc.  v.  Passarella, 481 A.2d 307,
312 (N. J .  Supe r . C t . App. D iv. 19 84); S av ares e v. O hi o Far m ers’ In s. C o. , 182 N.E.
665, 667-68 (N.Y. 1932); Mon tgom ery  v . F i rs t  Na t’l  Bank , 508 P.2d 428, 434-35 (Or.
197 3); En glis h v . Fi sch er, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522-23 (Tex. 1983); 1 NELSON  & WHIT MAN ,
supra  note 17, § 4.15, at 186 & n.2.
133. S ee, e.g., Swanson v. Un ited Sta tes, 156 F. 2d 442, 450 (9t h C ir . 19 46);
People  ex rel. Dep’t of Trans p. v. Redwood Baselin e, Ltd., 149 Cal. Rptr. 11, 16-17
(Ct. App. 1978); Harwell v. Georgia Power Co., 298 S.E.2d 498 , 49 8 (G a. 1983); First
W. Fin. Corp. v. Vegas Continen tal, 692 P.2d 1279, 1281 (Nev. 1984); State ex rel .
Com m’r of Transp. v. Kast ner, 433 A.2d 448 , 44 9 (N .J . Su pe r.  Ct . La w Di v. 1 981 );
Buell  Realty  Note  Col lect ion Trus t  v . Centra l  Oak Inv. Co., 483 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Tex.
App. 197 2).
Cour t s ha ve a lso d isa gr eed  over  th e qu est ion w he th er  th e m ort gag or ma y waiv e
the prot ection s of this  ru le. Compare Pim a Coun ty v . IN A/Old fa ther 4.7 Acres Trust
#2292, 700 P .2d 8 77, 8 79-80  (Ariz.  Ct . App.  1984 ) (uph olding  cont ra ctu al a lloca tion
of awa rd t o mort gagee ), with  Sessler v. Arsha k Corp., 464 So. 2d 612,  612-13  (F la .
Dis t . Ct. App. 1985) (limiting mortgagee r ecovery to extent  of secu r ity  impa irmen t ,
no twi thst and ing contr actu al pr ovisions a llocatin g awa rd t o mort gagee ), and Firs t W.
F in . Cor p. v . Veg as  Con ti ne nt al , 69 2 P .2d  127 9, 1 281  (Ne v. 1 984 ) (sa me ).
t he proper disposition of a monetar y award for th e partia l
condemna t ion  of th e mor tgaged p remises  or  the  insurance
proceeds from an  i n su red casua lty to the mortgaged premises.
Following  a  casu a lt y or  pa r t ia l con de mnat ion , t he m or tga g ee
may wish t o apply the condem nat ion  award or  insurance
proceeds toward  sa t i sfact ion  of the underlying debt; in contrast,
the mortgagor ma y insist upon use of those monies to rebuild or
r e store the premises.131 Cour t s ha ve split as  to th e proper
res olut ion of su ch  disp u tes . A si gn ifica n t  n u m ber  of decis ion s
have upheld the  mor tgagee’s right to apply such funds against
the mort gage debt ,  r egard less of th e circumst an ces.132 Another
sign ifica n t  body of decisions , however , ha s pla ced equ ita ble
lim it a t ion s upon t he m ortgagee’s dominion an d cont rol over
such  funds . In  the condemnat ion  con text ,  num e r ous cases
per mit  th e mort gagee to collect  the  award  from a  par t ia l  t aking
only t o the exten t  tha t  the mor tgagee can  demons t ra te tha t  the
tak ing has  imp air ed it s se cur ity;133 th e Mortgages  Res ta tement
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 3\ F I N A L \ F R E - F I N .W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
1084 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1998
134. Sect ion  4.7(b) provides in pertinent pa rt:
Un less t h e mor tga ge e ffecti vely  pr ovide s t he  cont ra ry , if r est ora tion  of
t h e loss or dam age . . . is reasonably feasible within t he rem aining ter m  of
the mortgage with  the funds  received by the mort gagee , t oge the r  wi th  any
a ddit iona l fun ds m ad e a vai lab le by  th e m ort gag or, a nd  if aft er  re st orat ion
t h e r eal estat e’s value will equal or exceed its value a t th e time t he
mort gage  was made,  th e m ort gag ee h olds  th e fu nd s r eceiv ed s ub ject  to a
du ty to a ppl y th em , at  th e m ort gag or’s re qu est  an d u pon  reasona ble
conditions, t oward  r e sto rat ion .
MO R TG A GE S RE S T AT E M E N T, supra  not e 1, § 4 .7(b). T he  comm ents  to sect ion 4.7
demons t r a t e s ign if ican t am bivalen ce rega rdin g whet her  th e mor tga gor’s waiver  of this
r igh t  sh ould  be e nfor cea ble,  an d clea rl y ope n t he  door  for a  cour t t o ta ke  int o accou nt
the rhetoric of good faith in interpreting the parties’ underlying expectations:
It  is common t o find mortga ge clauses tha t pur port to give the
mortgagee  th e righ t t o casua lty ins ur an ce and  emin ent  doma in a w a r ds
withou t  me nt ioni ng  an y corr esp ond ing  du ty t o per mi t u se of t he  fun ds for
re st ora tion  of the pr emis es, or t ha t expr essly n egat e an y such  dut y. While
such  a  pr o vi si on  m ay be construed to preclude the mortgagor’s right to use
of the funds  for rest oration un der Subsection (b), it may a lso be disregarded
by the courts . For example, in jurisdictions following the Restatem e n t,
Second, of Contracts the pr ovisi on m igh t b e con sid er ed u ne nfor cea ble on  th e
gr oun d t ha t . .  . en force me nt  wou ld vi olat e t he  mor tga gee ’s du ty of g ood
faith  an d fair d ealin g.
Id . cm t.  e (cit at ion  om it te d).
135. S ee, e.g.,  Schoolcraft v. Ross, 146  Ca l. R pt r.  57,  59-6 0 (Ct . App . 19 78);
C ot t m a n Co. v. Continen tal Tr ust  Co., 182 A. 551, 554-55 (Md. 1936) (persona l
p rope r ty collateral); Miller v. Van Kampen, 397 N.W.2d 253, 254-25 (Mich. Ct. App.
1986) (inst allm ent  lan d cont ra ct); Sta rk ma n v. Sigm ond, 446  A.2d 1249, 125 3-56 (N.J .
Super . Ct. Ch. Div. 1982); 1 NELSON  & WHIT MAN , supra  note 17, § 4.15, at 186-88.
136. S ee supra  no t e 132  and accompany ing  t ex t .
137. 146 Ca l. R pt r.  57 (C t.  App . 19 78).
adop t s th is view absent  an  effective waiver by th e mor tgagor .134
In  the  casu-a l ty insurance cont ext, th ere is likewise m odern
sup p or t  for  the view tha t  the m or tga gee  must  make in su rance
proceeds available for restoration if restoration is pract ica l  and
will not  impa ir  t he  mor tgagee’s  s ecu r ity;135 th e Mort gages
R estat em ent also adopts th is view.136 The m ost  notab le  such
de cis ion , th e Ca lifornia  decision in  S choolcraft  v. Ross,137
st ron gly incorpor at es t he r het oric of good fait h:
“In  eve ry  cont ra ct t h er e is  an  im plie d cove n an t of good
fait h  a n d  fa i r  de a li n g t h a t  n e it h e r  par ty  w ill do a ny th ing
w h ich  in ju r es t he  rig h t of t h e ot h er  to r eceiv e t h e be n efit s of
th e a gr ee m en t.” . . .
. . . .
[T ]h e  pu rp ose of a  dee d of tr us t is  th at  th e bor row er  will
h a v e the  u se  o f funds  loaned  on  spec i fi c t e rm s  a n d  t h e  l ende r
will  h a v e  t he  r ig h t  t o a  spec i f ied  repa ymen t  th a t  i s  secured  by
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138. S chool craft , 146 Cal. Rptr. at  59-60 (quoting Brown  v. Superior Ct ., 212 P.2d
878, 881 (Ca. 1949)) (citation s omit te d). The court ’s re ason ing is a ll the  more  str iking
in  light of th e eviden ce, which su ggeste d th at  th e mor tga gee’s  conduct was m otivated
by th e fa ct t ha t s he  wa s “old and s ick  and needed the  money immedia te ly  to take
ca re of her m edical n eeds .” Id . at 60.
139. S ee, e.g., Fir st F ed. Sa v. Ban k v. Key M kt s., In c., 559 N.E .2d 600, 6 02-0 4
(Ind. 1990); Ja cobs v. Klawan s, 169 A.2d 677-79 (Md. 1961), overruled by Ju lian v.
Chr is tophe r , 575 A.2d 735 (Md . 1990); Gru ma n v. In vest ors Dive rsified  Ser vs., In c.,
78 N.W.2d 377, 379-82 (Minn. 1956); Abraha mson v. Bret t, 21 P .2d 229, 232 (Or.
193 3); Reynolds v. McCullough, 739 S.W.2d 424, 429 (Tex. App. 1987); B & R O il Co.
v. Ra y’s Mobi le H om es , In c., 4 22 A. 2d  126 7, 1 267 -68 (Vt . 19 80).
140. S ee, e.g., Homa -Goff Int erior s, Inc. v. Cowden , 350 So. 2d 1035, 1037-38 (Ala.
197 7); Hend rickson v. Fre ericks, 620 P.2d 205, 211 (Alaska  1980); Tucson  Med.  Ct r .
v. Zoslow, 712 P .2d 459, 461 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Warmack v. Merchant s Nat’l
t h e  de ed  of t r u s t . T h e  le n d e r  d oe s  n ot  h a v e  t h e  r ig h t  t o
u n i la t e r a ll y cu t  off t h e  bo rr ow e r ’s  r i gh t  t o u s e  t h e  l oa n e d  f u n d s
u n l e s s  h e  ca n  s h o w  t h a t  h i s  se cu r i t y  is  i m p a i r e d .
H e r e th er e is n o evid en ce th at  th e se cur it y  w a s  impa i red
by t h e  fi r e n o r  is  t h e r e  any  ev idence  tha t  p l a in t i f fs  were
u n w i l lin g or  u n a b le  t o con t in u e  m a k in g  pa y m en t s  on  t h e
prope rty. 138
c. Tran sfer of tenant’s leasehold interest. Outs ide the
conte xt  of mortga ge law, property law ha s st ru ggled t o res olve a
comparable i ssue in  th e l andlord-tenan t  con text : Under  wha t
ci rcumstances ma y th e lan dlord  exercise  its  con t ractua l  r igh t t o
with hold consen t  to a  t enan t ’s  t r ans fe r  of the  leasehold? When
ma rk et  r en ta l r a t es boomed  in certain ar eas in the 1980s,
landlords  often  withh eld consen t t o a proposed as signmen t  or
sublease un less th e te na nt  an d t ra ns feree  agr eed t o pay a
higher  r en t . Th is  p ract i ce  r esulted in a  series of cases
address ing whe th er t he la ndlord could in good fait h wit hh old
consen t  solely to obtain a  higher  re nt al, i.e.,  when  th e proposed
tr an sfer d id  not  t h reat en t he security of the landlord’s interest
or  t he  land lord ’s  p rospect s  for  payment  of th e original sta ted
r e n t. Tra ditionally, of cour se, th e land lord could en force a n o-
tr an sfer rest r i ct ion  con ta ined  in  a  l ease and t h e r eby refuse
consen t  t o t r a n sfe r  for  any  reason ,  or  for  no reason  a t
a ll—cons isten t wit h  the n ot ion  tha t  the la ndlord’s fr eedom  of
conveyan cing gave the landlord an a bsolute r ight t o select h er
tenan ts.139 Recently, however, some court s have refused to
permit  a lan dlord to with hold consen t t o a proposed tr an sfer
solely to capt u r e th e bonus valu e presen t in t he leas e, absent  a
freely-ne gotiat ed a bsolut e r igh t  t o w ithhold consen t .140 In these
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Bank, 612 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Ark. 1981); Kendall v. Ernest  Pest ana , Inc., 709 P.2d
837, 843-49 (Cal. 1985); Basnet t  v. Vista Village Mobile Home Pa rk, 699 P.2d 1343,
1346-47 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984 ), rev’d on  oth er grou nd s, 731 P.2d 700 (Colo. 1987); 1010
Potomac Assocs. v. Grocery Mfrs . of Am ., I nc. , 48 5 A.2 d 1 99,  208 -10 (D .C.  198 4);
Fern andez  v. Vazquez, 397 So. 2d 1171, 1173-74 (Fla. Dist . Ct. App. 1981); Fu nk  v.
Funk, 633 P .2d  586 , 588-89  (Idaho 1981); Jack Frost Sales, Inc. v. Harr is Trust &
Sav.  Ban k, 433 N .E.2d 941, 94 9 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Ju lian v. Christ opher, 575 A.2d
735, 736-39 (Md. 1990 ); Newm an  v. Hinky Di nky Om aha -Lincoln, Inc. 427 N.W.2d 50,
53-55 (Neb . 198 8); Rin gwood As socs. , Lt d. v. J ack ’s of Rou te  23, In c., 379 A.2d 508,
512 (N.J. Supe r. Ct. Law Div. 1977); Boss Bar bar a , Inc. v. Newbill, 638 P.2d 1084,
1085-86 (N.M. 1982); Ernst  Home Ce nte r, In c. v. Sato, 910 P.2d 486, 492-94 (Wash.
C t . App . 19 96).
141. Kendall , 709 P .2d a t 8 44-45  (quot ing  Coh en  v. Ra tin off, 195 Cal. Rptr. 84
(Ct. App. 1983); California  Lett uce Gr owers, In c. v. Union  Sugar  Co., 289 P.2d 785
(Cal. 1955); Univer sal Sa les Corp. v. Ca lifornia P res s Mfg. Co., 128 P.2d 665 (Ca l.
194 2); Schweiso v. Williams, 198 Cal. Rprt . 238 (Ct. App. 1984); R i n gw ood A ssocs .,
379 A.2d  at  512 ).
opin ion s,  th e rh etor ic of good faith  often  plays a  significan t r ole,
as is  evide n t  in  the Ca lifor n ia  de cis ion  in  Kendall v . Ernest
Pes ta na,  In c.:
“[T]he re  h as  been  an  in cre as ed  re cogn ition  of and  emph as i s  on
t h e du ty of good  fait h a nd  fair  dea ling  inh er en t in  eve r y
c on t r a c t .” T h u s , “[i ]n  e v e r y c on t r a c t  th e r e i s  an  impl i ed
covenan t  th at  n eit h er  pa rt y sh al l do a n y th in g  wh ich wil l  have
t h e effe ct o f de st r oyin g or  in ju r in g t h e r igh t o f th e  o t h e r  pa r t y
t o re ceiv e t h e fr u its  of th e con tr a ct. . . .” “[W]h er e a  con tr a ct
con fer s  on  on e p ar ty  a d iscr et ion ar y p ow e r a ffe ct in g  th e  r i gh t s
of th e oth er , a d ut y is im pose d t o exer cise t ha t d iscre tion  in
good  fa it h  a n d  in  a ccor d a n ce  w it h  fa ir  d ea lin g .” H er e t h e le ss or
r e ta in s  the  d i sc re t iona ry  power  to  app rove  or  d is a p pr ov e a n
ass ignee  proposed  by th e othe r  pa r ty  t o t h e  con t r a ct ; t h is
dis cre tion ar y pow er  sh ould  th er efore  be e xer cised  in
accor da n ce w ith  com m er cial ly r ea son ab le s ta n da rd s. . . .
. . . .
. . . [It  is  n o t ] r e a s on a b l e t o  de n y  co n s en t  “i n  or d e r  t h a t  t h e
la n dlor d  ma y char ge a  h igher  ren t  th an  or igina l ly  co n t r a ct e d
for.” This  i s  because  th e  l essor ’s  des i re  fo r  a  be t te r  ba r g a in
t h a n  con t r a ct e d for  h a s  n ot h in g  to d o w it h  t h e p e rm issib le
pur poses of th e [n o-tr a n sfe r cl a u se ]—t o pr ote ct  t h e  le s so r’s
in t e re s t  i n  t h e  p r e s e r v a t io n  of  t h e  p r op e r t y  a n d  t h e
p e rfor m a n ce  of th e le as e cove n an ts . “ ‘Th e cla u s e  i s  for  t h e
pr ote ction  of th e la n dlor d  in  i ts  ow nersh ip  and  opera t ion  o f  the
p a r t i c u l a r  p r o p e r t y—n ot  fo r  i t s  gen er a l  econ om ic
pr ote ction .’”141
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142. Brown  v. AVE MCO  In v. C or p.,  603  F. 2d  136 7, 1 379  (9t h C ir . 19 79).
143. 658 So. 2 d 1 352  (Mis s. 1 995 ).
144. S ee supra  note s 62-76 an d accompa nyin g text .
145. S ee Cerm ack , 658 So. 2d at 1355.
B. Good  Fa it h  as  a S h ield  Ag ai nst  Pretex tu al  Con duct
 In  AVE MCO , the N inth  Circuit a rt iculated  the concern  tha t
a  creditor might use its  discretion to accelerate a debt as a
“sword for commer cial gain rat her th an a sh ield against
secu r ity imp air me nt .”142 The Ninth Circuit determined th at  th i s
concern  just ified scru tin y of th e re as ona blen ess of all
accelera tion  decisions. More appr opr iat ely, mos t cour ts  ha ve
not  pushed the  du ty of good  fa i th  so fa r  and  ins tead  would
per mit  an  inqu iry i nt o t he obje ct ive  rea son able nes s of a n
accelera tion  decision only when t her e is evidence tha t t he
cred it or ’s decision wa s pret extua l and  opportun istic in na tu re.
Alth ough  th is view of good  fa i th  doub t le ss  compor t s  more
closely with  th e view a rt iculat ed in  PEB  Com m enta ry N o. 10
than  th e AVE MCO  view, it  does not assu re t ha t t he cour t will
not  make  mis take s in  eva lu a t in g t he u nde r lyin g fa cts of a ny
given disput e.
The poten tia l for well-int end ed, yet  mis guide d, decisions  is
demons tr at ed by the r ecent  de cis ion  of th e Mississippi Su prem e
Cou r t  in  Peop les Bank &  T ru st  Co. v . Cer m ack ,143 a d ecision
driven  in  sign ifica n t  pa r t  by t he cou r t ’s con fusion over  the
proper  relationship between UCC sections 1-203 an d 1-208.144
Conta iner  Engineer ing Corp . and i t s  pres ident , Jerry  Cermack,
had main ta in ed  a  bor rowin g r ela t ion sh ip  wit h  Peop les  Bank &
Trust  Compan y since 1973. In 1987, Cermack sought  add it iona l
fina ncin g for Cont ain er in  an  a t t empt  to ob ta in  a  new accoun t .
The ban k agr eed to rest ru ctur e t he exis t in g debt  of Cermack
a n d Cont ainer , and  to advan ce an a dditiona l $25,000 in cred it ;
in  con junct ion  with  th i s r es t ructu r ing,  Con ta ine r  agreed  not  t o
incur  addi t ional  debt  without  the  pr ior  consent  of the  bank.145
On Mar ch 31, 1988, Con ta in er  pu rchase d t wo n ew t rucks on
credit  withou t  ob ta in ing the ba nk ’s prior a ppr oval. The bank
discovered  Con ta ine r ’s  purchase in J uly 1988; rat her  th an
decla r ing an  immedia te  de fau l t , however , t he  bank  op ted  to
wait  and  see  whe ther  the p u r ch ase  wou ld  nega t ive ly a ffect
Con ta ine r ’s cash flow. After  reviewing th e next qu ar ter ’s
fina ncia l reports, the bank determined th a t  Conta iner’s cash
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146. S ee id . at 1356.
147. Id . at  135 8 (cit at ion  om it te d).
148. Fur th e r m or e, as discussed supra  in n otes 62-76 a nd a ccompan ying te xt,
t he re is a strong t extual ar gumen t th at section 1-208 merely restates  the  genera l
good fa ith  dut y conta ined in  section 1-203, s uch t ha t t he Ba nk ’s good faith  in
acce le ra t ing would be determined based upon its subjective belief that its sec u r it y  was
th re at en ed—n ot  th e r ea son ab len es s of t ha t b eli ef.
flow position had deteriorat ed. The bank th us accelerated the
ma tu r ity of the outstan ding debts to Conta iner and Cermack
and dema nded r epaym ent  of th e $176,543.54 balance. When
Cermack was un able to obtain  financing from th e SBA or oth er
b a n ks, Cermack  ente red  in to a  lea se /pu rchase a r r angemen t  for
its  bus ine ss fa cility in  orde r t o gener at e t he  fun ds n ecess ar y to
re t ir e  t he bank’s  deb t .146
Shor t ly th ere aft er, Ce rm ack a nd  Cont ain er filed s uit
against  the ba nk a llegin g (a m on g  other  cla ims) tha t  the  bank
ha d br each ed it s du ty of good fait h in  accelera tin g th e ma tu rit y
of the debt. Cermack argued t hat  th e ba nk ’s a ccelerat ion
viola ted  the bank’s d u ty of good faith un der UCC section 1-208,
as ther e was n o rea son able  ba sis t o qu es t ion  the s ecu r it y of the
bank’s position or the a bility of Cerma ck and  Conta iner t o
repay the d ebt . Th e t r ia l cou r t  in st ructe d t h e ju ry  tha t  the
bank’s de cis ion  to a cceler at e ha d t o be objectively r eas ona ble
un der  section  1-208, a nd  th e jur y ret ur ne d a  verd ict in  favor  of
Cermack an d Conta iner. Th e Su prem e Cour t of Missis sipp i,
howeve r, r ever sed , holdin g th at
[Se ction  1-2 0 8 ]  is  in ap plica ble  to s itu at ion s w h er e a  cre dit or,
un de r  t h e  t er m s  o f i ts  co n tr a ct  w it h  t h e  d eb t or , has  a cce le ra t ed
its  deb to r ’s  ou t s t an d ing  ob liga t ions  a f t e r  t he  occu r r e n ce  of a n
even t  t h a t  w a s in  th e com ple te  cont rol of t h e d ebt or,  i .e . , wher e
t h e cre dit or  a cce l e r a te s in deb te dn ess  beca us e t he  deb tor  fails
t o com ply  w i t h  t h e  t er m s  a n d  c on d i t io n s  co n t a in e d  in  t h e
p r o m is s or y  n ot e , d e e d  of t r u s t  or  l oa n  a g r e e m e n t .147
As Cermack  had  breached the  loan  agreemen t  by  incur r ing the
debt  to purchase the  t rucks—an objective d efau lt wit hin  his
cont rol—t he cour t ’s  r a t iona le  wou ld seem to for eclose an y
possibilit y th at  section  1-208 would r equ ire  t he  cour t  t o
eva lua te th e objective r e ason able nes s of t he bank’s a ct ion .148
However , t he  cour t  le ft  th e door open  for such  an  evalu at ion
based upon the bank’s delay in accelerating the loan :
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149. Cerm ack , 658 So. 2d at 1358.
150. S ee id .
151. S ee In  re Martin Specialty Vehicles, Inc.,  87 B.R. 752 (Bankr. D. Mass.
198 8),  rev’d on juri sdict ional gr oun ds, 97 B .R.  721  (D. M as s. 1 989 ). Martin  Spec ia l ty
Vehicles (MSV) was a s mall bu siness  engaged  in  van  convers ion . The  Bank
floorplanned  its vehicles pursua nt t o a promissory note tha t w a s  fa cial ly pa yab le on
demand,  bu t  t he pa r t ies ha d ora lly agr eed t ha t MSV would  pay t he n ote via
installments. While negotiat ing with t he Ban k for a $50,000 credit line unconnected
with  th e pu rch as e a nd  sa le of ve hicl es,  MSV d id n ot p a y  in s t a llments of interest
under  th e floor pla n n ote ; at  al l t im es , h owe ver , MS V ha d s uff icient  funds  on deposit
w ith  th e Ba nk  to cove r t he se i ns ta llm en ts . Wit hou t p ri or n oti ce to MSV, the  Bank
padlocked MSV’s plant, a ccelerat ed the floorplan  note  an d dem an ded it s full
r epaymen t , allegedly on account of the arr eara ge in interest  paymen ts . See id.  a t 759.
MSV ne ver  re ope ne d it s d oor s; t he  Ba nk  re pos se ss ed  an d s old a ll of M SV’s ta ngible
Peop les Ban k  d id  no t  imm edia t e ly  acce le ra t e  C e r m a c k ’s
in d e bt e dn es s  u pon  lea rn in g of Ce rm ack ’s br ea ch of t h e loa n
a g r e e m e n t . I n s t e a d , P e o p le s  B a n k  w a i t e d  a p p r o x im a t e l y  t w o
m o n th s  a fte r le ar nin g of Cer m ack ’s br ea ch b efore  accele ra tin g
C e r m a c k ’s  outs t an ding i n d e b tedn ess .  There fore ,  i t  cou ld  be
a rgu ed  t h a t  t h i s  d e l a y  . .  . i n d i ca t e d  t h a t  P e o p l e s B a n k
acce le ra t ed  the  ou ts ta nd in g  deb t  n o t  because  o f  the  b r e a ch ,
bu t b eca u se  P eop les  Ba n k d ee m ed  its elf “ins ecu re .”149
The cour t h eld th at  if the ban k did a ccelerat e Cerm ack’s
ind ebtedness ba se d u pon  in se cur it y a nd n ot  du e t o the
incur rence of addit ional debt, t hen  section 1-208 would govern
the ba nk’s d ecis ion  to accele ra te t he d ebt  and Cer mack could
demons t r a t e tha t  the  bank’s  deci sion  wa s objectively
un rea sonable.150 Thus,  because the  bank’s delay permitt ed an
in fer en ce of pret ext , th e  cou r t  rem an ded th e case for fur th er
proceedings.
Like th e Miss issip pi court  in Cerm ack ,  othe r  cour t s  have
used  the rh etoric of good faith to sustain challenges to
accelera tion  de cis ion s ost ens ibly bas ed u pon objective de fau lts
when  th e borrower has presented evidence that  suggested the
possibilit y of pret ext ua l act ion by t he  cred itor . For  exam ple, a
Massachuset t s bank ru ptcy court a war ded damages against
Bank of Bos ton–Wes tern  Massachuset t s  for  wrongfu l ly
acce le ra t ing an  in s t a llmen t  note for  nonpaymen t  of in ter es t , on
the g round tha t t he ba nk  could h ave covered t he ins ta llment s
us ing funds from the borrower’s op er a t ing account but chose
instead to a ccelerat e becau se it  ha d discovered tha t  one  of the
borrower’s sha reh olders ha d ties t o organ ized crime.151
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assets.
Pr ior  to filing for ban kr upt cy, MSV sued t he Ba nk  alleging, inter alia , conv er sion
of i t s  proper ty  (based on the absence of an actionable default) and estoppel. MSV
argued  tha t  i t  was not in m ater ial default under  the floorplan agreemen t, because th e
B a n k had the r ight to withdraw funds from MSV’s operating account to satis fy  t he
interest  inst allm e n t s  in  question, because th e operating account h ad contained
su ff ic ien t funds to cover the inter est ar rear age, and because t he  B a n k  h a d charged
MS V’s accou nt  for in st all me nt s on  th e floor p la n  n ot e  in  t he p ast . See id.  at 760, 763.
MSV argu ed th at t he Ban k’s action wa s in  bad faith because the ar rearage was a
pret ext  for  it s r ea l con cer n—t ha t on e of M SV’s  shareholders ,  Fel ix  Tranghese , was
known  by reputat ion as a member of organized crime in th e Springfield,
Massachuse t t s area. In deed, the evidence showed that du ring discussions with MSV
following  th e p ad lock in g, t he  Ba nk  in for me d M SV t ha t  “in  o rde r  fo r  t he company to
reopen , it must  make u p all arrear ages on loans an d ta k e  Tr anghese ’s  name  of f any
loan ” and  tha t  “Tran ghese’s interes t as a  stockholder would h ave  to be t erm ina ted .”
Id . at 760. The court h eld t h a t  the  Ba nk ’s a cceler at ion b re ach ed t he  Ba nk ’s du ty of
good fa ith  in en forcing th e provision s of its secu rit y agr eeme nt . The cour t conclud ed
tha t  the Bank h ad acted dishonestly and thus in subjective bad faith; the court also
ch ara cterized the Ban k’s decision to accelerate th e floorplan note a nd foreclose upon
MS V’s asse t s as  “i r ra tiona l[]” and “unfair[]” and t hus in objective bad faith, regardless
of the Bank’s honesty or motives. I d . a t  767 . Th is  la t te r  conclusion a ppea rs t o have
been based  upon  the court’s  view t ha t “th e one m ont h’s arr ear age in  int ere st . . .
would  no t b e a  ma te ri al  br ea ch g ivin g r igh t t o ac cele ra ti on , in  vie w of t he  fact t ha t
the Ban k h ad t he r ight  to wit hdr aw t he fu nds  from MS V’s accoun t.” I d . at 763.
152. S ee Texa s Refr igera tion  Sup ply, In c. v. FDIC, 953 F .2d  975  (5t h C ir . 19 92).
Texas Refriger at ion Su pply (TRS) ma int ain ed th is line of credit  f r om  t h e  Bank,
s e cu r ed by the invent ory of TRS. The note evidencing this line of credit req uired TR S
to p rov ide  the Bank w it h  a  monthly financial statement , but TRS failed to provide
thes e fina ncial sta teme nts  (allegedly becaus e of a compu ter p roblem). The Ban k
accelerated  th e matur i ty o f the  note ,  and when  TRS fa i led  to make  immedia te
pay m en t , rep ossesse d an d sold th e inven tory for $20,0 00 (despit e th e collater al’s fair
mar ket  valu e of at le ast  $200,000 ). S ee id . a t  978 , 981-82.  TRS then  sued the  Bank
for  brea ch of contra ct, wron gful accelera tion, a nd br each of th e dut y of good faith .
Tr ia l occurred after FDIC ha d succeeded  t o the  Bank’s  pos i t ion  under  the  loan
documents,  and t he distr ict court  grant ed s u m m ary  jud gm en t for  FD IC on  th e gr oun d
tha t  TRS ’s a ffirm at ive cl ai ms  an d con tr act  defenses were bar red by the D’Oench ,
Duhme doct ri ne . Th e F ifth  Cir cuit  re ver sed , conclu din g th at  “[o]bligat ions  ab out
tim ely acce ler at ion a nd  th e di spos al of coll at er al a re  im plicit  in e ver y pr omi ssor y
not e,” ar e n ot “se cre t” or  “un wr itt en ” obliga tion s, a nd  th us  could  be e nfor ced against
the FDI C as  success or t o th e Ban k. Id . a t  981 . The  cour t  then  re ma nd ed t he  cas e for
a  determ ination rega rding whet her t he Ban k accelerated th e ma t ur i ty o f t he  note  and
wheth er  it did s o in bad  faith . Notin g th at  good faith is  “betra yed by ‘[c]ircu msta nces
wh ich  te nd  to s how  th at  th e h olde r h as  exe rcis ed h is op tion  to a cceler at e, n ot for
Likewise, th e Fift h Cir cuit  rever sed s um ma ry ju dgm ent  in
favor of the FDIC as su cces sor  to Repu bli cBa nk Sp r in g Br anch ,
which  had accelera ted  th e ma tu rit y of a $25 0,000 lin e of cred it
due to borrower’s failure to provide financial statements as
requ ired  by t he s ecu r it y a gr eemen t , on  th e  gr ound  tha t  the
record pe rmit t ed  an  in fer en ce t ha t  the Bank’s insi st en ce u pon
th e fina ncia l st at eme nt  was  pr ete xtu al. 152
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purposes  of preser ving h is debt  or pr eser ving th e secur ity the re fo r , bu t  fo r  t he
purpose of coercing the  maker  to pay  the then  ba lance remain ing  unpa id on  the  note ,’”
i d . (quoting Davis v. Pletcher , 727 S.W.2d 29, 35-36 (Tex. App. 1987)), t he  cour t h eld
tha t  the Bank’s conduct was susceptible of two interpretat ions:
The condition of the $250,000 loan t hat  required t he debtor to give the
bank mon thly finan cia l  s ta tements i s  clear ly  in tended to a l low the  bank to
mon itor  th e bor row er ’s fin an cial  well -bein g. . . . T wo pos sib le im plica tion s
flow from the record before us. First, it could be that the ba nk decided to
demand the  financia l s t a t emen t  . . . beca us e of leg iti ma te  mi sgiv ing s a bou t
the fina ncia l st at e of TRS . On  th e ot he r h an d, t he trier of fact could also
infer tha t th e bank k new th at t he defaul t  was s imply due  to a  t empora ry
technica l p rob lem,  bu t  was neverth eless requiring st rict compliance to creat e
an  excuse to accelerat e.
Id . at  982. Althou gh t he F ifth Cir cuit’s rhet oric of good faith  is not as sweep ing as
th a t  o f t he  Nin th  C ircu it  i n  AVEM CO, th e opi nion  us es e nou gh  lan gu age  of
“rea son ab len es s”—su ch  as the suggestion that the ban k’s misgivings abou t  i t s debto r ’s
finan cial state should be “legitimate”—that t he opinion seems to leave the door open
for  th e t ri al cou rt  to con clud e, on  re ma nd , th at  th e ex ist en ce of a  t echn ical defau lt
does not by itself reas onably or ra tionally justify acceleration of the debt .
In  terms of com m e r ci al policy, th e Cerm ack  res ult  is sim ply
abysmal . The  court ’s de cision t o tr ea t t he  cred itor ’s de lay a s
evide nce of creditor pret ext is plain ly count erint uitive an d
provides pr ecisely t he  w r on g  incen tives  to len der s faced w ith
poten t ia l problem loa ns . As comp ar ed t o th e tw o-year d elay in
AVE MCO —a gap which legitimat ely suggests th e possibil it y of
pr et ext  by t he le nde r—the t wo-m on t h  delay in  Cerm ack  s eems
more rea di ly expla in ed  as t he a ct ion  of a p ru den t  l ender  tha t
wan ted  to avoid precipitous an d possibly unwa rr an ted
collect ion  e ffor t s . Ins t itu t iona l  lenders  typica l ly  have  formal  or
in formal policies tha t “build  in ” som e s hor t  de la y pr ior  to the
inst i t ut ion  of form al recovery proceedings. These policies
doubtless r e fl ect  wha t  in  many ca ses is prudent business
pra ctice; such  a d ela y enables t he lend er t o evaluat e th e
s itua t ion , mak e  a  ca re fu l ly  cons idered judgment  abou t  the
borrower’s pr osp ect s,  and t her eby a void  pr ecip it ous d ecis ion s.
The cos t s  associa ted  with  for ma l  r ecovery  and  bankrup tcy
pr oceedings  are significant  enough tha t lenders have a  built -in
incen tive t o ta ke t he t ime n ecessa ry t o at tem pt  to work  with
their  bor rowers t o avoid  thes e cos t s.  Th is  cir cumsp ect ion
appea r s t o exp la in the  conduct  of Peoples Bank  in  Cerm ack ;
ra th er  th an  declare a  defa u lt  immed ia tely  upon  lea rn in g a bou t
the new  debt , th e ba nk  ins tea d wa ite d to see whet her  th e new
debt  in  fact  would ha ve a deleter ious effect upon Cont ainer ’s
cash flow. As a policy mat ter , commer cial law should encoura ge
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153. See, for exam ple, th e app roach  of the Oh io Court  of Appea ls in Metropolitan
Life Insu rance Co. v. Triskett Illinois,  In c., 646 N .E .2d  528  (Oh io Ct . App . 19 94).
Tr iske t t own ed  a co mm er cia l office park subject to a $5.4 million nonrecourse
mort gage  held by Metropolitan. When Tr is k e t t encoun ter ed sign ificant e rosion in  its
t enan t ba se, Tr isket t wa s un able t o service t he de bt a nd fell int o default  on its
mort gage  note insta llments in Augus t 1990. Over the ens uing six month s, Trisket t
made  se ver al  wor kou t p rop osa ls t o Met rop olit an , in clu din g on e pl an  for “n et  cas h
flow” pa ym en ts  un til  Tr isk et t cou ld r est ore  i t s t e n a n t  base and  anothe r  t o l is t  t he
p rope r ty for sale. Me tr opolita n  insis ted, r epea tedly a nd in  writ ing, th at  it would  only
consider mo dify ing th e loan on ce Trisk ett  brough t t he loan  curr ent  by ma king t he
past  du e in st all me nt s. Aft er  ne ar ly se ven  mon ths, when Tr i ske t t  had no t  brough t  t he
loan  cu r ren t ,  Me tr o po li t a n accelerated th e balance of the debt and  institu ted
foreclosure  proceedings. Triskett counter claimed that  Metropolit an  fail ed t o en force
i t s mortgage a greemen t in good faith. The  tr ia l cour t e nt er ed s um ma ry  jud gm en t for
Met ropol it an , an d th e Ohio Cour t of Appeals a ffirmed.  The  cour t  re ject ed  Tr i ske t t ’s
a rgumen t  th at  Met rop olit an  act ed i n b ad  fait h in  obta inin g t he ex parte appoin tmen t
of a r eceiver, n oting t ha t “the  decision of a len d e r  in  a n  a rm’s-length  commerc ia l
t r an sact ion  to en force its  contr actu al r ight s does n ot const itu te a n a ct of bad fa ith .”
I d . a t  534. Fu rt her , th e court  rejecte d Tris ket t’s compla int  about  Metr opolitan ’s dela y
in  i t s en fo rcemen t , notin g  tha t  “Triskett ’s contention th at Metlife breached its implied
du ty of good faith  by engaging in pr otracted  negotiat ions which mis led  Tr i ske t t  in to
an t i cipa t ing a workout  is obviated by the corre spondence be t w e en  t he pa rt ies , wh ich
re fl ec t s Met life’s in sis te nce , from  th e ou ts et , th at  Tr isk et t e ith er  br ing  th e loa n
cur ren t  or  fa ce  le ga l a ct ion .” Id .
tha t  sor t  of ci rcumspect ion ,153 b u t  t he court ’s r eas oning in
Cerm ack  pr ovides pr ecisely th e opposit e in cen t ive . To the
extent  t ha t  Cermack permits the borrower to recast the
cred it or ’s ci rcumspect ion  as  a  de facto waiver  of an object ive
defau lt , it en coura ges cred itor s t o act im m e di a tely a nd w it hout
r eflect ion —a result tha t often leads to bad decisions and t he
cos t s  tha t  fl ow from them.
Again,  however , it  is  im por tan t  to separ at e the scope of  the
court’s inqu iry in Cerm ack  from the cour t’s  u lt imate conclusion .
Alth ough  one can criticize the m erits  of th e Cerm ack  cou r t ’s
conclu sion  to t r eat  a t wo-mont h d ela y as  eviden ce of pret ext ,
the na tu re of the court ’s inqu iry was both  appr opriat e an d
cons is tent  with  th e conception  of good faith  expr esse d in  PEB
Comm entary No. 10. If a cr edit or’s a ction is  in fa ct pr et ext ua l or
oppor tun is t ic, tha t  act ion  may not  compor t  with  the  reasonab le
un expressed  expectat ions of th e borrower a nd t hus cou ld
violate  th e dut y of good faith  performa nce expressed in
Con tr act s R estat em ent section 205 and  UCC section 1-203.
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154. S ee infra  note s 185-91 an d accompa nyin g text .
155. In  compar ison, som e covenan ts a re “subject ive” covenan t s  t ha t  r equ ir e  t he
exercise of discret ion by t he p ar ty ch ar ged wit h en forceme nt  (e.g., a  c ovenan t
r equ ir ing th at  an y hous e’s ar chitect ur e mu st be  consiste nt  with  th e sur roun ding
ne igh bor ho od).  Where, for exam ple, an a rchitectu ral r eview covenan t  p rov ides vague
standa rds  for it s en force me nt  (or n o st an da rd s a t a ll), cou rt s h av e  im p l ie d  a  du ty to
ac t in g ood fa ith  in a ppr ovin g pla ns , an d h ave  re fus ed t o en force de cis ions tha t  were
V. “RA T I O N A L I T Y” A N D T H E  R E S T A T E M EN T  (T H I R D) O F
PR O PE R T Y —S E R V I T U D E S : A DI F F E R E N T  P A R AD I G M?
 The debr is left in  th e w a k e of t h e  a ca d em ic and judicia l
debat es about the proper scope of good faith  provokes th e
que st ion of wh e t h er  mor tgage  law shou ld sea rch  for  a  d iffe ren t
s tandard—one withou t  t he baggage a t t endan t  t o the ter m “good
fa i th”—to constr ain the mortgage lender’s r ight t o accelerat e
the mor tga ge debt . In t his  r e gard , i t  is  usefu l  to note  tha t
p roper ty law ha s faced a simila r qu es t ion  (i.e.,  how to measure
the “reasonableness” of con t ract  enforcement ) in  the l aw
govern ing the enforcement of restrictive covenant s and
equ ita ble servitu des. Court s faced with cha llenges to ser vitu de
enforcement  have articulated the tension in familiar terms.
Should an  equita ble servitu de be e n for ced against a successor
land owner  if it is  reasonable on its face, without the need to
demons t r a t e actua l ha rm? Or  must  e n for cement of a servitude
be rea sona ble un der  th e circum st an ces, i.e., mus t  the
cha llenged  use th rea ten  th e holder  of the s ervit ud e wit h t he
ha rm aga ins t w hich  th e ser vitu de wa s de sign ed  t o protect  he r?
The law of equit able  se rvit ude s p rovid es  a  use fu l con t rast ,
because  alth ough cour ts h ave s t r u g gled with t he pr oper
res olut ion of th is ten sion, they have often  done  so withou t  us ing
the du ty of good  fa i th  as an  explicit ba sis for in formin g th eir
ana lysis. Accordin gly, th e law of equ ita ble ser vitu des, es pecially
a s  re f l ec ted  in  t he  new R est at em en t  (T h i rd ) of
Proper ty—S erv it udes,154 pr ovides by a na logy an  alt er na tive
s t anda rd for  t h e limita tion up on a m ortgagee’s power to
accelerate t he m at ur ity of a debt .
The va st  major it y of covenan ts  and  se rvi tudes  a re  of the
“objective” var iety (e.g., “the la nd  may be  use d on ly for  a  single-
family  r esidence” or “an y house m ust  cont ain a t leas t 3,000
squa re fee t  of livi ng a rea ”), su ch  tha t  the h older  need n ot
exercise discr et ion  in  de ter min in g wh et her  the cov en a n t  was
violated.155 One could  ana logize s uch  coven ant s t o the typical objec
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a rb it r a ry or cap ricious . S ee, e.g.,  Rhue v. Cheyenne H omes, Inc., 449 P.2d 361, 363
(Colo. 1969 ); ROBERT  G. NATELSON , LA W  OF  P ROP ER TY OW N E R S  AS S O C IA T IO N S § 4.7,
a t  154  (198 9).
156. 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 29 9 (Ct. App. 1992) [hereina fter Nahrstedt I], vaca ted  and
rev’d , 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994) [hereinafter Nahrstedt II ].
157. Nahrst ed t I, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at  301.
158. Ms. Na hr sted t a lleged th at  agen ts of th e Associat ion  discovered the cat s by
peer ing th rou gh  he r w ind ows a nd  en te ri ng  he r u nit  wit hou t p er mi ssi on.
159. S ee Nahrstedt II , 878 P.2d at 1278. The Association initially assessed to
Nahr stedt  a fine of $25/month, which progressively increased to $500/month when
Nahr stedt  contin ua lly refu sed t o rem ove th e cat s. S ee Nahrs tedt I, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d
a t  301-02.
160. S ee Nahrstedt II,  878 P.2d at 1278-79. In pertinent part,  section 1354
provides: “The coven an ts a nd r estr ictions in  th e declar at io n  sh a ll be enforcea ble
equit able  ser vitu des, unless un reasonable,  and sha ll  inu re  to the bene fi t  of  and  b ind
all  owner s of sepa ra te in ter est s in t he d evelopm ent .” CAL . CIV. CO D E  § 1354(a) (West
tive  defau l t  covenan t  in  the m odern  mor tgage  or  s ecu r ity
agreemen t , and  for  e a ch  covena nt , th e sa me  int er pr et ive
quest ion arises  regar ding its en forcemen t.  Can an objective use
re st r ict ion  b e e n for ced accord ing to i t s t e rms withou t  r ega rd  to
the existence of actua l harm, or should the absence of ha rm
preven t  en forcemen t  of t ha t  r e st r i ct ion? The pos it ions
under lying th ese r espe ctive views a re d emon st ra ted  in
N ahrstedt v . Lak eside Village Condom iniu m  Ass’n. 156
A. Factua l Background
 In J anu ary 1988, Natore Nahr stedt pur chased and occupied
a  un it in  th e La kes ide Village Con domin ium s in Cu lver  City,
Californ ia.  The  re corded  coven a n ts , cond it ions  and  res t r ict ions
(CCRs) for La kes ide Village p rovid ed  tha t  “[n]o a n im als  (wh ich
sha ll mean  dogs and cats), livestock, rept iles or  pou l t ry sha ll  be
kept  in a ny u nit  except t ha t u su al a nd  ordin ar y domes tic fish
and bird s . . . ma y be kep t a s h ouseh old pet s wit hin  an y
uni t . . . .”157 Notwithst andin g the CCRs, Nahr stedt owned and
kept  th ree  cat s in  her  un it . Shor tly a fter  Na hr st edt  moved in ,
the Lak eside  Village  Con dom in iu m Ass ocia t ion  (Ass ocia t ion )
lea rned about her cats,158 dem an ded  th at  sh e r em ove th em , an d
fined her for violating the CCRs.159 Nahrst edt  sued  the
Ass ocia t ion  seek ing a  declar at ion  tha t  the  pe t  r es t r ict ion  was
un rea sona ble and t hus u nen forceable aga inst  her  un der
Californ ia  Civ il Code  se ct ion  1354, on  the gr ound t h a t  h er  ca t s
posed no th rea t t o the pea ce, quiet, a n d  s a fety of her
n e i g h b o r s . 1 6 0  T h e  A s s o c i a
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Supp. 199 8) (em ph as is a dd ed ).
161. S ee Nahrstedt II,  878 P.2d at  1279.
162. S ee Wilshire Condo. Ass’n v. Kohlbrand, 368 So. 2d 629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (upholdin g regu lat ion th at  preve nt ed condomin ium  re s iden t s f rom rep lac ing pe t s
who died); Dulaney Towers Main tena nce Corp. v. O’Brey, 418 A.2d 1233 (Md. Ct.
Sp ec.  App . 19 80) (u ph oldi ng  re st ri cti on  th at  pe rm it te d on ly on e p et ).
163. S ee Nahrstedt I, 11 Cal Rptr. 2d a t 306-37.
164. 235 Cal. Rp tr . 509 (Ct. App . 1987), over ru led  by  N ahrstedt II,  878  P .2d  a t
1289.
165. 5 Cal. Rp tr . 2d 580 (Ct . App. 1992), overruled by N ahrstedt II,  878  P .2d  a t
1289.
t ion  demur red, a rgu ing t ha t t he p et r est rict ion wa s r eas ona ble
and enforcea ble as  a  mat ter  of l aw because i t  fu r the red  the
collective well-bein g of resid en ts  wit hin  th e deve lopment . The
t r i a l cour t  su st a in ed  the Associa t ion ’s dem ur rer  an d dism issed
Nahrs t ed t ’s  compla int .161
B. Nah rstedt  I and  the “Reasonable as Applied” S tand ard
 A ma jor ity of th e Ca lifornia Court  of Appeals reversed the
t r i a l cou r t ’s  judgmen t  of d ismis sa l and  ordered the  t ri a l cou r t  t o
vaca te its  orde r s us ta inin g th e Associat ion’s dem ur rer
(Nahrsted t I). Ignoring decisions in other  sta tes u pholding
condomin ium  regu la t ions  tha t  limited  res iden t s ’ ability t o
main ta in  pets,162 t he  major i ty in  Nah rstedt I  r e jected the
Ass ocia t ion ’s defense that  the pet  r est rict ion wa s facially
rea sona ble an d th us en forceable und er section 1354. The
major i ty , clearly troubled by a  per se ba n on pet s r ega rdles s of
ha rm, deter mined  th at  existing California pr ecedent per mi t ted
enforcem ent of covenan ts u nder  section 1354 only where
enforcement  of those covenant s was r ea sonab le  under  the
part icular circumst ances.163
In  pa rt icula r, t he  ma jorit y felt  const ra in ed  by t wo p revious
decisions, Bern ar do Vi llas  Man agem ent Corp. Num ber Two v.
Black16 4  a n d Portola H il ls  Com m unit y A ss ’n  v.  J am es.165 In
Bernardo Villas,  apar tment  managers  sued  a  res iden t  to
e n force a  recor de d r es t r ict ion  tha t  pr eve nted  res iden t s fr om
p a rk ing tr uck s, except  for te mp ora ry loa din g or u nloa din g. The
manage r s had fined  the r es iden t  in  qu es t ion  over  $2,00 0 for
violatin g this restriction by parking his n ew p ick up
t ruck—which  he u sed on ly for p ers ona l tr an spor ta tion —in his
ass igned ca rpor t  space . The cour t  r e fused  to permi t  the
manage r s to recover  th e un pa id fine s, conclud ing t ha t t he
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166. Bernardo Villas, 235 Cal. Rptr. at  510.
167. Portola Hills , 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at  583.
168. S ee Nahrstedt I, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 307. The Nahrstedt I cou r t  s t a t ed :
The qu es ti on of w he th er  th e pe t r es tr ict ion  at  iss ue  in  th e ca se befor e
us is a n e nfor ceable equ it ab le s er vit ud e . . .  is a  mi xed  iss ue  of la w a nd  fact
wh ich  can only be resolved in th e context of the pa rticular circums tan ces
of t h i s ca se . In  Portola Hills  a nd Bernardo Villas,  the courts did not address
t he ques tion of law (i.e., th e rea sona blenes s of the r estr ictions be ing
cha lle ng ed ), un ti l t he  qu es ti on  of fact  (th e cir cum st an ces  of the pa r t i cu la r
homeowners who were challenging the rest rictions) was determined.
Id . (cit at ion s om it te d).
169. Nahrs t ed t ’s complaint alleged that  her cats “are no t  a nu i sance,  a r e c lean ,
a re kept  inside  her  un it a nd h ave n ot been  th e object of compla in t s  b y a n y of her
close neigh bors.” Id . at 302.
r e st r ict ion  violated  section 1354 as a pplied to “clean
noncommercia l p ickup  t rucks” and  tha t  “the  pa rk ing  of such
vehicles in  condomin ium carpor t s  was not  aesthe t ica l ly
unpleasan t  to rea sonable per sons an d did not in ter fere wit h
other owners’ use a nd en joyment  of th eir  pr oper ty.”166 In
Portola Hills , th e dis pu te  involved  an  a t t empt  by  the
community ass ocia t ion  to en force a  recor de d p er  se  res t r ict ion
on  sa tell ite dishes against a r esident who had insta lled a dish
in  his  back yar d. Th e tr ial cour t d ism issed  th e commu nit y
associa t ion’s compla int, and the court  of appeals affirmed,
not ing tha t
[t h e sa t e l l i t e ] d i sh  i s  no t  v i s ib l e  to  othe r  r e s iden t s  or  t h e
pu blic.  W it h  th a t  e s t ab l i shed ,  t he  qu es t ion  becomes  whe t he r
t h e ba n  a ga in st  a  sa te llit e d ish  th a t ca n n ot  be  seen  p r omotes
a n y legit im at e goa l of th e a ss ociat ion . It  clea rly  doe s n ot.
Accordingly,  t h e  r e s t rict io n  is  u n r e a so n a bl e a s  a  m a t t e r  of
l a w .167
Based  upon t hese pr ecedents, the  major i ty in  Nah rstedt I
conclud ed tha t  se ct ion  1354 pe rmit t ed  en forcem en t  of
covenan ts  only if the covenant s were reasonable as applied to
the specific factua l ci r cums tances p resen ted by a dispu te. 168 The
cour t  thus  concluded tha t  Nahrs ted t ’s  compla in t  cou ld not  be
deemed  ins ufficient  as  a m at ter  of law, be cau se it  al leged tha t
the ca t s  did not  d is tu rb he r  ne ighbor s169 and  because the  r ecord
conta ine d n o findin gs of fact  sugges t ing  tha t he r  ca t s  posed any
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170. “[T]he  enforceability of th e pe t r est ri ction  will b e de cided  in t he  tr ial  cour t
after  the  t ak ing  of  ev idence  as t o the r el ev an t  cir cu mstance s of t h is  ca se. ” Id . at 307.
In  contrast , the dissent ing judge would have su s t a ine d t he  de mu rr er , be cau se  “[t]h e
cour t s should leave the en forcement  of covenan ts an d restr ictions to th e homeowners
as soc ia t ions un les s  t here  a re  const itu tion al pr inciples a t st ake , enforcem ent  is
ar bitr ar y, o r  t he  a ssoci a t ion  fa il s to fo ll ow  it s own pr oce du res .” Id . at  312 (Hin z, J .,
dis se nt in g).
171. Nahrst ed t II, 878 P.2d 1 275, 1286 (Cal. 1994) (quot ing CAL . CIV. CODE
§ 135 4, s ub d. (a ) (Wes t S up p. 1 998 )).
172. Id . (qu oti ng  Ha nn ul a v . H aci en da  Ho me s, I nc. , 21 1 P .2d  302  (Ca l. 1 949 )).
173. Id .
174. S ee i d .
175. Id .
th rea t or  d is tu rbance .170 The cour t  thus re tu rned  the case to the
tr ial cour t for a n evid en tia ry h ea rin g.
C. Nah rstedt  II and  the “Reasonable on Its Face” S tand ard
 In  a s ix to one d ecision, th e Ca lifornia  Supreme Cou r t
revers ed and reinsta ted the dismissal of Nahrstedt’s compla in t
(Nahrsted t II). Expressly disappr oving of Bernardo Villas and
Portola Hills , th e Nah rstedt II  cour t  adop ted a  “facia lly
reason a ble” sta nda rd for th e enforcement  of covenan ts. Th e
major i ty ar gued  th at  section  1354’s pr oviso tha t a  covena nt  is
“enforceable . . . unless un reasonable” mean t  t ha t  a r ecorded
use r es t r ict ion  wa s clothed  wit h  a  pr es um pt ion  of
reasonableness th at  ren der ed it  en forcea ble  un les s t he p er son
cha llengin g it pr oves it t o be unrea sonable.171 To in form the
s ta tu torily un defined ter m “unr easona ble,” th e ma jority looked
to background principles of the law of equitable servitudes.
Not ing the contr actual nat ure of private land use restrictions,
the major i ty sugges ted tha t “[w]hen  landowners  express the
in ten t ion  to limit  la n d  u se, ‘th at  inten tion sh ould be carried
ou t .’”172 Ba se d u pon  th is  st rong “fre ed om-of-cont ra ct” view, th e
cour t  thus  concluded tha t  “when  enforcing equ i table servitudes,
cour t s a r e gener a lly  disinclin ed  to qu es t ion  the wisdom  of
agreed -to restrictions”173 and should freely en force s uch  a
re st r ict ion  un less it  violate s pu blic pol i cy  (such  a s  r es t r ict ive
covenan ts  ba se d u pon  race, e thn icity, s ex, r eli gion  or
disa bil it y);174 is ar bitra ry (mean ing th at  it “bear [s ] no ra t iona l
re la t ionsh ip to the p rotect ion , pres er va t ion , ope r a t ion  or
purpose of the a ffected  lan d”175); or  imposes burdens on  the
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176. S ee i d . at 1287.
177. Id .
178.
[G]iving defe re nce  to u se  re st ri cti ons  cont ai ne d in  a con dom in iu m p roj ect ’s
origina tin g docume nt s pr otects t he gen era l expecta tions  of condom iniu m
owners ‘tha t rest rictions in place at th e t i m e t hey pur chas e th eir u nit s will
be enforceable.’ . . . [This] also prot ec t s buye r s  who  have pa id  a  p remium
for condominium unit s in reliance on a pa rticular r estrictive scheme.
Id . at 128 4 (qu oti ng N ote, Ju dicial Review of Condomin ium  Ru lemakin g, 94 HARV.
L. RE V. 647 , 65 3 (19 81)).
179.
[The pr es um pt ion  of validit y] provides su bsta nt ial as sur an ce to prosp ective
condomin ium  purchasers t h a t  the y m ay r ely w ith  confid en ce on  th e
promises  embod ied  in  the pr oject ’s r ecor ded  CC & R ’s. . . .  Wh en  cour ts
t rea t re cord ed u se r est ri ction s a s pr esu mp tiv ely v ali d, a nd  pla ce on  th e
challenger  t he  bu rden  of proving  the r e s t r ic t ion  ‘un reasonab le ’ unde r  t he
defe ren t ia l standa rds  a pp lica ble  to e qu it ab le s er vit ud es , a ss ocia ti ons  can
proceed to enforce rea son able r estr ictive covenan ts wit hout  fear t ha t t heir
ac tions will embroil them in costly and prolonged legal proceedings.
Id . at 1288.
180. “[G]iving deference to use restr ictions contained in  a  condomin ium pro ject ’s
origina tin g docume nt s . . . encour ages t he de velopmen t of sha red own ers hip
hous in g—gener ally a less costly alter nat ive to single-dwelling ownersh ip—by
a t t r act ing buye rs w ho pr efer a  sta ble, pla nn ed en viron men t.” Id . at 1284.
181. S ee i d . at 1288. The Nahrstedt II  cou r t  s t a t es  t ha t :
When  court s accord a  pres um ption of validit y to .  .  . recorded use
re s t r ic t ions and mea sure th em against deferent ial standa r ds of equit able
affected  land tha t ar e disproport ion a te t o the r es t r ict ion ’s
beneficial effects.176
Accordin g to the  major i ty in  Nah rstedt II , thes e prin ciples
compelled  th e conclus ion t ha t cour ts  mu st  give sign ifica n t
defe rence to the  judgment of hom eowner s a ssociat ions in
enforcing an d a dm inis ter ing se rvit ud e regimes, in order  to
ach ieve “th e sta bility and p redicta bility so essentia l to the
success of a  shared  ownersh ip housin g developm en t.”177 The
major i ty fea red  tha t  if h omeowner s a ss ocia t ion s ha d t o just ify
enforcement  of recor de d r es t r ict ion s  on  a  case -by-case ba sis, a
variet y of ad verse consequ ences would follow:  nonenforcement
wou ld  frust ra te t he barga in ed -and-p a id-for  exp ect a t ion s of un i t
purchasers;178 ass ocia t ion s m igh t  refu se  to en force covena n t s
for  fear  of litiga t i on  ch a ll en gi n g t h e  en for ce m en t
de cis ion ;179developers migh t  be  discou raged  from developing
afforda ble housin g alter natives such as condominiums;180 un i t
purchas er s m i ght  bea r cost ly incre as es in  legal fees t o ena ble
associa t ions to defen d t heir  enforcem ent  decision s; 181 and
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servitude  law, it  discourages lawsuits by owners of individual units seek ing
pe r sona l exemp tions  from t he r estr ictions. Th is . . . prote cts a ll owner s in
the p lanned development from una nticipated increas es in association fees to
fund the defense of legal challenges to recorded restrictions.
 Id .
182. S ee id . at 1288-89. The Nahrstedt II  cou r t  s t a t es  t ha t :
[Case-by-case enforcem ent ] would impose  grea t st ra in  on t he  socia l fab ri c of
the common interest  development .  It  would  frus t ra te  owners  who had
purcha sed th eir u nit s in r elia n ce on the CC & R’s. It would put th e owners
a n d the homeowners association in the difficult and divisive posit i on  of
deciding whet her  par ticula r CC & R’s should  be app lied  to a  par t i cu la r
o wn e r . .  .  . Homeowners’ associations are ill-equipped to make such
investigations, and an y decision they might mak e in a pa r t icular  case could
be divisive or su bject to claim s of part iality.
Id .
183. “Under the h olding we adopt today, the reasona bleness or unr easonableness
of a condominium use restr iction . . . is to be determined n o t b y r e fe r ence to  fac ts
tha t  are specific to the objecting homeowner, but by reference t o th e common interest
deve lopmen t as a  whole.” Id . at 1290.
184. Id . 
nonenforcement  migh t  disr upt  harmony be tween  neighbor s
with in  the common  in t e res t  developmen t .182 Accordin gly, th e
ma jor i ty concluded tha t  covenan t s  shou ld be fr eely e n for ced as
lon g as  those  covenan ts were fa cia lly  rea son able , wi thout  the
need  for  p roof of actua l ha rm.183 Eva lua t in g  th e challenged pet
r e st r ict ion  on its face, the Nah rstedt II  majority concluded as a
ma tt er  of la w t ha t  the r es t r ict ion  “is n ot  a r b it r a ry,  bu t  is
ra t iona l ly re lat ed t o hea lth , sa n it a t ion  and  noi se  concerns
legitim at ely held by residen t s of a high -dens ity condom iniu m
pr oject.”184
D. Syn thes iz ing the Debate: The Rest a tem en t  (Th ir d) of
Pr operty: Servitu des .
 For  th e pa st  decad e, th e Amer ican  Law  In st itu te  has
at tem pted  to m odern ize an d r est at e th e law  govern ing
equ ita ble servitu des. The pr oduct of th is effort, th e pr oposed
R estat em ent (T h ird) of Prop ert y: S erv it udes [hereina fter
S ervi tudes R estat em ent] dire ctly a ddresses the proper
res olut ion of th e “on its face or as a pplied” dilemma  ma nifested
in  the Nahrsted t lit iga t ion .
The S erv it udes R estat em ent d raws the  t r adi t iona l
dist inct ion between dir ect  re st ra int s on a lien at ion (e.g., a
cov en a n t  forbid ding t he s a le of a  un it  wit hout  the a ss ocia t ion ’s
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185. RE S T AT E M E N T (THIRD ) O F  P ROPERTY : SE R V IT U DE S  § 3.4 (T en ta tiv e Dr aft  No.
2, 1991) (hereina fter SE R VI T U DE S RE S T AT E M E N T).
186. The SE R VI T U DE S RE S T AT E M E N T explains:
Tradi t i on a lly, th e int eres ts of a la ndlor d wer e rega rded  as s tr ong en ough
to jus tify  ab solu te  pr ohib iti ons  on t ra ns fer  of th e t en an t’s in te re st  wit hou t
consent  of the la ndlor d, an d th e lan dlord was per mi t t ed  to withho ld  consen t
ar bitr ar ily. Modern law res tr icts  t he  land lo rd’s  power , r ega rd ing  the
re s t r a in t  on a liena tion a s un just ified un less t he la ndlor d can w ith hold
consen t  only for rea sons related t o protection of the landlord’s rent  and
reve r s iona ry interest s, at least  in the a bsence of an explicit agreem e n t  t h at
the landlord can  withho ld  consen t  fo r  othe r  r easons . To the  exten t  t ha t  t he
l andlord -t enan t ru le w as  ap pli ed  to [co m m on  in te res t  ownersh ip],  the  same
evolu tion  in the consent  rule should t ake place.
Id . § 3.4 cmt. d.
187. S ee supra no te 140  and accompany ing  t ex t .
188. This  is  not to suggest, however, that  section 3.4 would requir e an ad  hoc,
case-by-case eva lu at ion  of en for cem en t of a ll con ceiv ab le for ms  of direct restraints.
F o r example, the commen ts to section 3.4 clearly suggest t hat  certa in r ights  of first
re fus al—for  exa mp le, a  re st ra in t t ha t g ra nt ed t he  as socia t ion  a  p reempt ive r igh t  t o
purch ase a u nit  from it s owner  by ma tchin g an y bindin g offer r eceived by th at
owner—are reasonable under section 3.4’s balancing test,  unless exercised for  an
illegit i m ate pur pose (e.g., for r acially e xclusion ar y rea sons ). S ee SE R VI T U DE S
RE S T AT E M E N T, supra  no te  185 , § 3. 4 cm t.  f.
consen t ) an d indir ect rest ra ints  on aliena tion (e.g., the pet
r e st r ict ion  in Nahrsted t). The S erv it udes R estat em ent concludes
tha t  a d irect  r estr aint  is enforceable only if it is r easona ble as
app lied to the specific circu ms ta nces of th e disp ut e, i.e., only if
the “u t il it y  of t he  r es t ra in t  [outwe igh s] t he in ju r iou s
consequ ences of en forcing the  r es t r a in t .”185 The comment s
jus t ify the adoption of this stan dard by reference to the sam e
“commer cial re as ona blen ess ” st an da rd  (inform ed by t he
rh etor ic of good fa it h ) tha t  cour ts h ave ap plied to govern a
landlord’s discretion t o withhold consen t t o a  t ena nt ’s proposed
ass ignment  or sublet t ing. 1 86 By invok in g t he r a t ion a le of
Kendall  v.  Ern est  Pesta na,  In c. and  it s pr ogeny, 187 t he
S erv it udes Restatem ent thus r equir es  eva lu a t ion  of di rect
r e st r a in t s on a ca se-by-case ba sis, givin g due cons idera t ion  to
th e ind ividua l consequ ences  th at  would  flow from  enforcin g the
res t r ict ion .188
In  con t ras t , the  S erv it udes R estat em ent requires a  much
less dem an din g st a nda rd of r evi ew for  in di rect  res t ra in t s on
alien at ion such  a s  t he pet  rest rict ion in  Nahrsted t. Sect ion 3.5
provides:
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189. Id . § 3.5  (em ph as is a dd ed ).
190. The reporter s’ note to section 3.5 explicitly rejects the r ationale of Bernardo
Villas by na me. See id.  § 3.5, rep ort er’s note . 
191. Id . 
A se rv itu de  is n ot i n va lid  be ca u se  it i n dir ect ly  r e st r a in s
a l ie n a t i on  by lim itin g the  u se  tha t  can  be  m ade  of  p roper ty ,  by
r e du cin g t h e  a mou n t  r ea l i zab le  by  the  owner  on  sa l e  o r  o the r
t r a ns fe r  of th e p rop er ty , or b y ot h e r wise  re du cin g t h e va lu e of
t h e p rope r ty ,  un le s s  t he re  i s  n o ra tion al  ju sti fica tion  for  t h e
se rv i tude . 189
The S erv it udes R estat em ent th us  contem pla tes  only facial
review of objective covenant s such a s th e pet r es t riction in
Nahrsted t, t he  t ruck  ban  in  Bernardo Villas, or  t he  sa t e ll it e
dish p roh ibi t ion  in  Portola Hill s.1 90 As t he Rep or ter ’s N ote
explains, th is decision r eflected a  delibera t e ch oice designed to
p romote cert ain ty a nd  pr edicta bility in  administering servitude
regimes:
[Se ction  3 .5 ’s  “ra t iona l i t y” s t an da rd ]  r e fl e ct s  th e  a pp r oa ch  of
t h is  Re st a te m en t, w h ich  is t o giv e e ffect  to  t h e in te n tion s of
t h e p a r t ie s u n l es s t h e r e i s a  su b s t a n t ia l  r ea s on  t o d is r e ga r d
t h em.  In  th e r ea lm  of dir ect  re st ra in ts  on  al ien at ion , th e
r e s t r a in t s  clea rly  in te rfe re  wit h  ope r a t i on  o f  t he  f r ee  mar ke t
economy,  and  the  r easonab leness  t e s t  has  been  e l abora t ed
th rough  m a n y  c a s es . H o w e ve r , i n  t h e  r ea l m  o f a r r a n g e m e n t s
c h a l l e n ged  a s  ind i r ec t  r e s t r a in t s  on  a l i ena t ion ,  it  i s  mu ch  l e s s
c lea r  th at  [th ey] in te rfe re  wit h  fre e fu n ction in g of t h e m a rke t
in  lan d.  I t  i s  m ore l ikely th at  a  m u s h y “reasona b leness”
s t a n d a r d w il l i n t er fe r e w i th t he m ar ket  by intr oducing a
s u b st a n t ia l e l e m e n t  of doub t in to t he  pr ocess of form ing
t ra nsac t ions . Th e “lackin g in  ra tion al j u s t i fi ca t io n ” s t a n d a r d
prov ides s u bs t a nt ia lly m ore  gu ida nce  to p ar tie s in  ne gotia tin g
t h e fina ncia l ter m s of lan d sa les, w hile  pr otect ing  lan d
resources  f rom i r r a t iona l ly  crea t ed  se rv i tudes . 191
In  evalua ting objective covenan ts, t hen , the S erv it udes
R esta tement emb ra ces a “ra tion alit y” st an da rd  or facial
r easonableness standa rd compar able to the one articulated in
Nahrsted t II—a s tandard tha t  involves no jud ici a l i nqu iry  in to
whet her  the s pe cific b rea ch  of the  covenan t  has  p roduced actua l
ha rm.
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192. MO R TG A GE S RE S T AT E M E N T, supra  note 1, § 8.1 cmt. e.
193. Indeed, th e Gar n-St. G erm ain  Act’s pr eemp tion of sta te la w limit ing  the
en fo rceab il it y of due-on-sa le clau ses, see 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (1994), reflects t his
ph ilosophy pr ecis ely . In  Con gr es s’s ju dgm en t,  th e “r at ion al it y” of du e-on -sale clauses
(i.e., t he  r isk  tha t  a  t r ansfer  m ight  res ult  in t he im pair m e n t  of the m ortgagee’s
secur ity) an d t he  ben efit s a chie ved  by bl an ke t e nfor cem en t (i.e ., n o lit iga tion  a n d  the
enha nced solvency of financia l inst itu tions  enga ged in m ortga ge lending) were deemed
to outweigh the costs imposed upon individual borrowers who did not  an ticipa te tha t
E. Com pa ring the T wo R estat em ents –T he R hetor ic of
“R ati onal ity” an d S ection 8.1
 T h e “rea sonabl e on its face/rea sonable u nder  t h e
circumstan ces” debate in servitude  en forcement  mi r rors  the
deba te in ju dicial de cision s r evi ewin g t he enforcem en t  of
mor tgage acceleration clauses.  As  a  r esu lt ,  t he  “ra t iona li t y” or
“facia l rea sonablen ess” stan dar d of th e S erv it udes R estat em ent
provides a p oten tia l alt erna t ive s t anda rd  for  en forcemen t  of
mor tgage acce le ra t ion  clauses , or  perhaps  a  m eans for
inform ing the p rope r  in ter pr et a t ion  of the  “bad fa i th” cons t ra in t
upon the  creditor ’s  en forcemen t  au thor i ty  under  Mort gages
R estat em ent se ct ion  8.1 . As noted  a bove, th e S erv it udes
R estat em ent exa lt s e fficie ncy concern s t o just ify its  “r a t iona li t y”
s t anda rd for t he r eview of objective covenan ts. Th ese  sa m e
effici en cy conce rns a lso mot ivat ed section 8.1; the comm ent s
em ph as ize the need t o pr omote  pr edict ab ility in  mor tga ge
rem edies and to a void “difficult a nd  tim e-cons um ing ju dicial
inquir ies in to such  m at ter s a s t he d egr ee  of mor tga gor ’s
negligence, the relative hardship tha t acceleration imposes, and
oth er  su bjective concer ns .”192
The ap plicat ion of a r at iona lity s ta nd ar d wou ld h ave
d r a m a t ic consequ ences for t he ana lysis of m or t g a ge
acceler a t ion  decisions  in m ar gina l cases . Un der  a r at iona lity
stan dard,  the  ci rcums t a nces  su r rounding t he a ccele ra t ion
de cis ion  and th e consequences that acceleration might impose
up on t he b orr ower be come tot ally irrelevan t. The  ra tion al ba sis
for  an  objective defa ult  pr ovision (i.e., th e poten t ia l  ha rm tha t  a
par t icu la r defau lt  could  im pos e on  t he mortgagee) and the
bene fi t s of certa inty a nd pr edictability achieved by across-the-
boa rd enforcement  ar e deemed to ou tweigh  harms  tha t
individual borrowers  migh t  su ffe r  as a  conse qu en ce of decis ion s
tha t  may in reality be impruden t  or  incons is tent  with  the
rea sona ble yet unexpressed expectat ions of th e borrower.193 A
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t h e claus e would be e nforced a gain st t hem  in t he cont ext of a “nont hr eat enin g”
t r ans fe r .
194. The Servi tudes  Res tat emen t does  not  pr ovide  spe cific exa mp les  or
i ll u st r a t ions a s  t o how it w ould  tr ea t s ome one  en forcin g a con cede dly r at iona l
servitude  for wholly personal reasons. Suppose, for example, that  Mrs. Nahr stedt’s
ne ighbor s chose to en force  th e pe t r es tr ict ion s n ot b eca us e of con cer ns  ab out  he r ca ts ,
bu t in order to ret aliate aga inst her  for h er  a t t empts  t o pe r suade  condomin ium
res iden t s to vote in opposition to the ass ociation’s plans to renovate common facilities,
or  (even more tan gentially) because Mr s. Nahr sted t’s  son w as  ar re st ed on  su spi cion
of dr ug  poss ess ion.  Th e r at iona lit y st an da rd  of sect ion 3 .5 se em s t o suggest  t ha t  t he
cour t  shou ld enforce t he se rvit ude, bu t it  seem s likely t ha t given  an  egregiou s  s et  of
facts, a  c ou r t  like ly m igh t p lace  an  over ar chin g du ty of g ood fa ith  up on t he
en forcemen t of the s ervit ude  an d re fuse t o perm it pr ete xtu al en forceme nt . Cf.
Building Monitoring Sys., Inc. v. Paxton, 905 P.2d 1215 (Uta h 1995) (tena nt m ay
raise retaliatory eviction as affirmative defense to landlord’s  s u m m a r y act ion for
poss ess ion  of lea se d p re mi se s).
ra t iona lity  st anda rd w ould  thus d ict a te enforcem en t  of
acce le rat ion  decis ion s in  es se n t ia lly a ll ca se s; a ny com mon
objective default provision appear ing in stan dar d mor tgage
docum ent at ion easily pass es ra tional-basis s crut iny. Consider,
for  exam ple, t he Ba nk ’s decision  to call  in Ra nd olph’s cred it lin e
in  the hypotheticals in Part  I. R a n dolph  could ha rd ly
cha ract e r ize the requirement t o provide financial statements as
i r ra t iona l ; his failure to provide such statement s cou ld lea ve
the Ban k with  insu fficient  informat ion to mak e informed
judgmen t s about  th e e n forcement  of i t s r igh t s  under  the  loan
document s. Under t he r at iona lity st an da rd , Ran dolph ’s failu re
to provide th e st at eme nt s in  a t imely fa sh ion would  cert ain ly
jus t ify Ban k’s decision  in  Example On e (Ra ndolp h  is  in solven t ),
Example Two (Ban k m ista ken ly believes itself insecure),
Exam ple Thr ee (Bank s eeks h igher  in teres t  r a te ),  and Example
Four  (Ban k ch an ges it s len din g policy). Fur the r , Randolph’s
viola t ion  ar gua bly would ju st ify the Ban k’s decision  in E xam ple
Five  (Bank offi ce r  acce le ra t es  based  upon  an imus  toward
Randolph), as  un der  a r at iona lity st an da rd , th ere  would  be no
occasion  or  need  for th e court to evaluate th e reasonableness of
the Ban k’s decision u nder  th e par ticular  circumst an ces.194 As a
re su l t, one migh t a rgu e t ha t a  ra tion alit y st an da rd  would  ha ve
cap tu red more  precis ely section  8.1’s st at ed efficiency goals
t han  the “ba d fa it h” st anda rd a ctua lly u se d in  sect ion  8.1 (d)(3).
A ra t iona li t y s t anda rd  wou ld ca r ry th e appea l  of ce r ta in ty  and
pr edicta bility  (i.e., no evalua tion of Ran dolph’s  financia l
condition  or t he a dequ acy of Bank ’s secu rit y), while lea ving
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195. PEB  COM ME NT ARY NO . 10, supra  note 90; see also supra  no t e 90 and
accompany ing t ext .
com m ercia l borrowers free t o bargain  for “reasona ble”
cons t ra in t s upon  the le nde r ’s d iscret ion  (e.g ., a  pr ovis ion
req uir ing th at  a decisi on  to accele ra te be base d u pon  a
rea sona ble bel ief t ha t  t he le nde r ’s s ecu r it y or  pr osp ect s for
repayment a re impaired).
VI. RE F L E CT IN G  O N  TH E  F U T U RE  IM P AC T  OF  SE C T I O N
8.1 —SO M E  CO N C L U D I N G  VI E W S
 While  th e comm ent s in ea ch Resta tem ent  offer simila r
efficiency ra tion ales , th e Rest at eme nt  pr ovisions t hem selves
st ill use  di ffer in g t er ms—“r a t ion a lit y” ver su s “ba d fa it h”—th a t
ha ve tr ad itiona lly carr ied qu ite  differen t r het orical force. Thus,
while  the ra tionality standa rd of t h e S erv itudes R estat em ent
provides an  in t r igu in g per sp ect ive  on the enforcem en t  of
mor tgage acceleration clauses, sect ion  8.1 (d)(3) of th e
Mort gages R estat em ent st ill incorpora tes  the  t erm “bad fa i th” as
one of the  opera t ive  cons t ra in t  upon  the  enforcement  of those
clauses. As a  res ult , cour ts  seek ing t o inte rp ret  section  8.1 will
have to add res s t he a pp ropr ia te s cope  of the evolvi ng du ty of
good  fa i th  manifes ted  in  Con tr act s R estat em ent s ect ion  205  and
t h roughout  the revised UCC. As this Article has explained, t he
concep t ion  of good  fa i th  expres sed  in  those enactmen t s d ict a t e s
tha t  cou r t s  cannot  pay per functory h oma ge to the liter al ter ms
of a  wr itt en d ocumen t in  un th ink ing fas hion. I ns tea d, t his
br oade r  concep t ion  of good  fa i th  manda tes  t ha t  cou r t s i nt e rpre t
writ ten  agreements  “in  a  man ner  cons is tent  with  the
rea sona ble expecta tion s of the  pa rt ies in  th e ligh t  of the
commer cial condition s exist ing in  th e cont ext  unde r
scru t iny.”195 To the  ex ten t  tha t  th i s s t anda rd obliga tes  the cou r t
to iden t ify t he u nexp res se d r ea son able expecta t ions  of the
part ies, how should  we  exp ect  cour t s t o ar t icu la te t hose
expecta t ions in t he cont ext of a cre dit or’s decision  to a cceler a t e
a m ort gage d ebt  following a n objective de fau lt?
One appr oach would be t o concept ua lize good fait h in  a
na r row fash ion  tha t  perhaps  would come closest  to the
“ra t iona li t y” sta nda rd of the S erv it udes R estat em ent. Under
th i s view, a creditor would be a ctin g in good faith  in
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196. Neither  th e comme nt s nor  th e rep orte rs’ note expr essly a rt iculat e th is
formula t ion of th e “bad  fait h” st an da rd . In  our  nu me rou s di scu ssi ons  on  thi s sub ject ,
however , Pr ofessor Nels on ha s ar ticula ted t ha t h e believes a credit or would a ct in
good faith  if the cr editor  acted  for an y busin ess ju stifica tion, unless th at st ated
business jus ti ficat ion  viola te d ex ist in g fed er al  or s ta te  la w (e. g., a nt idis cri m ina tion
laws, an ti tr us t l aw s, u nfa ir  or  de cep ti ve t ra de  pr act ices  st at ut es ).
197. S ee supra  Part  I.
acce le ra t ing a m ortgage debt  for br e a ch  of an  objective defau lt
as lon g a s t he cr ed it or  makes  tha t  de cis ion  for any busin ess-
relat ed  rea son . Th is  view, h eld  by P rofessor  Ne lson (the
pr incipa l dra fter of section 8.1)196 a s sumes tha t  t he mor t g a gor
and mortgagee have a shar ed un der st an din g th at  objective
defau lt  provisions rat ionally serve to protect t he m or t g a gee
against  all potential busin ess r isks that th e mortgagee believes it
m igh t face if it  were t o con tinu e th e mort gagor-mortgagee
relationship unchan ged.
Return ing to t he in t roductory hypotheticals,197 un der  th is
approach  the Ban k la wfu lly  could  ca ll in  Ra ndolph ’s l in e of
credit  i n Examples One th rough  Four . In  Exa mp le On e, of
course, in which Randolph is insolvent, the Bank’s decis ion  is
defen sible  un der  an y view of good fait h. I n E xamp le Two, th e
Bank mis ta ken ly (if negligen t ly) beli eve s t ha t  it s p rosp ect  for
repayment  is threaten ed; in Example Three, the Bank seeks a
higher  i nt e res t  r a t e t han  wha t  p reva il ed  a t  the t ime of the
origina l loan  agreement ; in  Example Four ,  the Bank  has made
a  policy judgment  to no longer s eek or ma inta in lend ing
relationships wit h s ma ll borr owers . In  ea ch exa mp le, th e
Bank’s mot iva t ion  is  bu sines s-r ela ted , a s i t  se ek s t o pr omote
t h e Ba nk’s gener a l econ omic in ter es t . Th us,  ea ch of th ose
accelera tion  decision s wou ld wit hs ta nd  cha llen ge un der  section
8.1. Un der  th is view, t he Ba nk  legally could n ot a ccelerat e only
in  Exa mp le Five , w h ere  the Bank  offi ce r  act s  ou t  of an imus
toward Randolph. This conduct  would cons tit ut e ba d fait h
enforcement  by the Bank, as the reasonable par t ies  to the
mor tgage t r ansact ion  wou ld not  expect  t ha t  th e Ban k wou ld
enforce th at  pr ovision for r ea sons  complet ely u n r e la t ed  to the
Bank’s business interests.
At  t he  oppos it e extrem e, one m ight  conceptu alize good fait h
so broadly as to adopt a  s t anda rd  comparable to tha t  of
AVE MCO , th er eby pe rm itt ing a  cr edit or t o accelera te on ly
when  ther e exis t s a  th rea t  to the cr ed it or ’s s ecu r it y or  pr osp ect
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198. S ee supra  note s 98-118 an d accompa nyin g text .
199. Of particular concern is the likelihood that su ch litigation often would arise
in  adversar y proceedings in the bank rupt cy courts, wher e the pr esence of a cred i tor ’s
deep pocket (an d th e poten tia l recovery for u nse cure d credit ors in  a lender  l iab il it y
a ction  or an  equit able su bordin at ion claim) m ight  caus e th e ban kr upt cy judge t o
enga ge in m ore  crit ical  or s ea rch ing  re view  of th e cr edi tor ’s decis ion  than  a  cour t
would  have given tha t sam e decision at  the t ime it was m ade.
of r epaymen t .198 Th is  view s upp ose s t ha t  the m or tga gor  and
mort gagee have a shar ed u n ders ta nd ing t ha t objective d efau lt
provisions se rve  to p rotect  the  mor tgagee aga ins t  the r i sk  tha t
the mor tgagor  cannot  repay  the loan  and  tha t  the mor tgagee’s
secu r ity may be  in su fficien t  to pe rmit  full sa tis fact ion  of th e
mor tgage debt . Un der  th is view, t hen , th e mor tga gor would
exp ect  the mortgagee to exercise its r emedies  on ly when  the
mort gagee’s s ecu r ity  or  p rospects for  payment  a re actua l ly
thr eatened; absen t  t ha t  thr ea t ,  t he  mor tgagee’s  act ion  to
acce le ra t e the mortgage debt would const itu te b ad  fait h
en forcemen t . Un der  th is concept ion of bad fa i th , the  Bank  cou ld
not  law fully call in Ran dolph’s line of credit in Exam ples Two
thr ough  Five. In  Exa mp le Two, th e Ba nk ’s belief in it s
ins ecur ity  i s unfounded  (and per ha ps n egligent ), and  its
p rospect s for  r epaymen t  a re  not  t h reat ened . In  Example  Three
(Bank  seeks higher interest r a te ) and  Example  Four  (Bank
changes its  lend ing policy), th e Ban k’s actions a re m otivated by
business rea sons  complet ely un rela ted  to Ra nd olph’s a bilit y to
pay and t h e  va lue  of the  collate ra l re lat ive t o th e m ort gage
deb t . Likewise, in Exam ple Five, t h e  Ba nk’s  act ion  a r is es  from
animus toward Randolph and h is  family , n ot  from concer ns
rega rd ing t he loa n it self.
If those wer e th e only t wo options , I would concu r wit h
Professor  Nels on t ha t t he “an y-busin ess-r eas on” sta nd ar d is
pla inly prefera ble. The AVE MCO  conception of bad fait h does
not  comport  wit h t he t enor of the comment s to section 8.1,
wh ich  r e ject  t he  not ion  tha t  t he mor tgagee mus t  s h ow
impai rment  of secur it y t o en force a n  accele ra t ion  ba se d u pon  an
objective event  of default . The AVE MCO  view would  not
produce th e certa inty a nd pr edictability in m ortgage r emedies
tha t  section 8.1 seeks to a t ta in, a s it  would in vite p oten tia l
second-guess ing of the  lend er ’s bu sin ess  judgm en t .199 Second,
the AVE MCO  s t anda rd  comes close to establi sh in g a  du ty of
ca re on th e par t of the lender  in  making enforcement decisions,
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200. S ee supra  note s 124-130 an d accompa nyin g text .
fu r the r blurr ing th e line between  tor t  and  con t ract .  Th i rd,  and
most sign ifica n t ly,  “good fait h” is pr oper ly inform ed by t he
com m ercia l con text  su r rounding  the t r ansact ion  in  quest ion ,
a n d AVE MCO  simply fa ils  to take  accoun t  of th ose
con text s—such  as t he en forcemen t of due-on-sa le clau ses—in
which  rea sonable pa rt ies clearly und erst an d th at  th e lender
ma y accelera te r egard less of securit y impair men t. 200
Upon re flection, h owever , I do n ot belie ve either  of th ese two
views pr ovid es  a  sa t is factory explana t ion  for  how s ect ion
8.1(d)(3) sh ould s erve  to const ra in  a  cr edi tor ’s  en forcemen t  of
its  re me dies . To say t ha t t he “an y-busin ess-r eas on” sta nd ar d is
bett er  t han  AVE MCO  is  not  to su ggest  tha t  it  is  the cor rect
stan dard.  The “any-bus ines s-rea son” sta nd ar d of bad fa ith
ass um es tha t  the  reasonable mort gagor an d mort gagee
unders tand  when  they  en te r  the mor tgage t r ansact ion  tha t  any
business rea son will p erm it th e mort gagee to enforce any
object ive defau lt p rovision—even  if the  rea son a nd  th e defa ult
pr ovision bear  no app aren t  or  im pl icit  rela t ion sh ip  to ea ch
othe r . In  other  wor ds , t he “any-bu sines s-r ea son ” concept ion  of
bad fa i th  appears  to requ i re the  assumpt ion  tha t  in the
commer cial context , a  mor tga gor  can have no unexpressed , yet
rea son ab le,  exp ecta ti ons r ega rd ing the  mor tgagee’s  power  to
exercise its objective default  rem edies.
On th e ma rgin, th at  assu mpt ion seems im plau sible.
Suppose (in  another  va r ian t  on  the  in t roductory  hypothe tica l)
tha t  the Bank t hreat ens to call in Randolph’s  cr e di t  line, based
upon a s ix-d a y delay in providing finan cial statem ents, unless
Randolph  agrees  to buy ou t  his  brother -in -law (who does  own a
20% st ak e in  th e business, but who makes no day-to-day
management decisions and h as no contr ol over compan y funds),
who Smith  and other  bank officers b eli eve  has a n  a lcoh ol
p rob lem. Is it  clear that  a reasonable borrower in Randolph’s
posit ion cou ld or  shou ld have  an t icipat ed th at  th e Ba nk  would
att empt  to ca ll in  h is  loa n , a t  a  t ime when  the re was  no
apparen t  thr eat to the Bank’s security or its p r ospects for
r epaymen t , in  orde r  to in flu en ce t he  compos it ion  of the
ownersh ip of the bu sin ess ? I th ink  th e corr ect a ns wer  is “no,”
and cour t s ha ve used th e rhet oric of good faith  to str ike down
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201. S ee, e.g., In re Martin Specialty Vehicles, Inc.,  87 B.R. 752 (Bankr. D. Mass.
198 8),  rev ’d  on ju ris di ction al gr oun ds , 97 B.R. 721 (D. Mass. 1989) (striking down
cr edi tor  en force me nt  decis ion w he re  acce ler at ion m otiv at ed b y de sir e t o force ou t
borrower’s sh ar eh olde r w ho  ha d t ies  to o rg an ize d cr im e); cf. S t a t e  Na t ’l Ban k v.
Farah  Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 66, 685-861 (Tex. App. 1984) (strik ing dow n cr edi tor
e n fo r cemen t decision wher e thr eat of accelerat ion motivated by desire to prevent
former  CEO from  res um ing cont rol of the bor rower ’s bus iness  opera tions). Helen
Davis  Ch ai tm an , on e of t he  lea din g com me nt at or s in  th e le nd er  lia bil it y field ,
a r ticulated  th i s a s  Commandmen t  IV  in  T he T en C om m an dm ent s for  Av oid in g L end er
Liabili ty: “Thou  Sha lt  Not  Run Thy Borrower’s Business.” Helen Davis  Cha itm an , The
T en  Com m an dm ent s for  Av oid in g L end er L iab ili ty  (An not at ed)  (7t h e d. 1 988 ),
available in  WESTLAW at 468 P LI/Comm 783, 818. T hes e decisions a nd wa rn ing
re flect  an  unde rs t and ing  tha t  t he lender will n ot exer cise defau lt r emed ies in a
fash ion tha t  const i t u t es  an  unwar ran ted in t er f er ence with t he borrower ’s own
business j udgmen t—ye t  t h is  under s t and ing wou ld be “unexp res sed” in th e lan gua ge
of the t ypical mortgage or security agreem ent.
202. Cour t s ha ve r ecogn ized  as  mu ch i n  compa ra ble sit ua tion s. S ee, e.g.,  First
Na t ’l Ban k v. Sylve ste r, 554  N.E .2d 1063, 1 068-70 (Ill. Ct . App. 1990) (denying
summary judgment  to lender th at r efused to extend credit to ena ble bor row er  to
pe r for m  p r of it a ble construction job; decision not in  good faith  if lender’s decision was
based  up on  poli cy de cisi on  to n o lon ger  ma ke  con st ru cti on  loa ns ).
203. S ee PEB  COM ME NT ARY NO . 10, supra  not e 90 ; RICHARD A. P O S N E R, E CONOMIC
ANALYSIS O F  LAW  91-9 3 (4t h e d. 1 992 ).
such  credit or en forcemen t d ecisions in  compa ra ble m ar gina l
circumstan ces.201
Likewise, consider  Exa mp le Fou r, in  wh ich  th e Ban k called
Randolph’s loan  to fu r the r  implement  i t s change in len din g
policy. It  seem s du bious t o sugges t t ha t Ra nd olph r eas ona bly
cou l d have  an ticipa te d t ha t Loca l Ban k wou ld be a cquir ed by a
larger  financia l inst i tu t ion  like Mega Ban k; th at  MegaBa nk
would  decide to no longer en ter  bus iness r elat ionsh ips wit h
small borrowers ; and t ha t Mega Ban k would d irect  its  officials
to exe rcise t ech nica l defa ult s t o ext ract  Mega Ba nk from
exist ing rela t ionsh ips w it h  sm all b or rowe rs l ik e Randolph . As
such , the  fact  tha t  Randolph  d id  not  an ticipa te  su ch a  cha nge  in
Ba nk lending policy—and t hu s did not ba rgain  for a n expr ess
cons t ra in t  on th e Ban k’s au th ority to exercise its rem edies
un der  those circumstances—does not  sugges t  tha t  Randolph
and th e Ba nk  posses s a  sh ar ed u nd ers ta nd ing  th a t  Ban k could
ca l l in Ran dolph’s credit line u nder  th ose circums ta nces.202 The
cour t ’s task in such a case is to ascertain what Ran dolph and
the Bank  would  have agreed  to had th ey anticipated those
circum st an ces.203
Fur t h e r more, it  seems even more dubious to suggest th at
Randolph  rea sonab ly could h ave a nt icipated t he Ba nk ’s conduct
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204. Big Horn Coal Co. v. Com monwea lth E dison Co., 852 F.2d 1259, 1268 (10th
Cir . 198 8) (qu oti ng  Tym sh ar e, I nc.  v. C ovel l, 7 27 F .2d  114 5, 1 153 -54 (D .C.  Cir . 19 84)).
205. S ee supra  note s 124-30 an d accompa nyin g text .
206. Kend all  v. E rn es t P es ta na , In c., 7 09 P .2d  837  (Ca l. 1 985 ).
207. Sch oolcr aft  v. R oss , 14 6 Ca l. R pt r.  57 (C t.  App . 19 78).
if the Ba nk  had not  exer cised t hose  sa me  defa ult  re me dies  (i.e.,
accelera tion  based upon  fa i lu re  to provide financial statements)
on  other commercial loans for which the pr ospect for  repayment
rem ained  secure . In  other wor ds, even if Randolph a ppr eciated
t he risk  of th is scenar io, he r easona bly could ha ve expected  t he
Bank to t r ea t  h is  loan  in  a fa s h ion  cons is tent  with  the
t rea tment  customarily extended to other  Bank customers. In
m y view, a  decis ion  to up hold t he enforce men t  of th e
accelera tion  decision  in E xample Fou r wou ld be t o “virt ua lly
‘read th e doctr ine of good fa i th  (or  of impl ied con t ractua l
obliga t ion s and  limita t i on s) out  of existence’”204—a view that
one can not  reconcile wit h PEB Com m entary N o. 10. I would
t hus cha ra cter ize th e Ba nk ’s decision  to call in  Ran dolph ’s line
of credit  in E xa m p le  F our  as  bad  fait h en forcemen t of its
reserved rights.
I  am less ce r ta in  abou t  the app lica t ion  of the “any-business-
reason” s t anda rd  to Example Thr ee, in which t he Ba nk
threa tens to call in Randolph’s credit line u nless he  agrees  to
a n  increa se  in  in ter es t  ra tes . On  the on e h and,  one ca n  a r gue
with  g rea t  force  tha t  the Gar n  Act ’s  p reempt ion  of s t a t e
res t r ict ions upon  the enforceability of due-on-sale claus es205 has
resh aped  r easonab le  commercia l expectat ions of the par ties to
m or t ga ge tr an sactions, su ch th at  now all rea sonable pa rt ies
unders tand tha t  the  mor tgagee  m a y exercise  objective defau lt
p r ov isions to protect itself against th e economic risks posed by
interest  rat e fluctuations. Under  tha t  view, t he Bank’s d ecis ion
to exercise its r emedies in  Exam ple Thr ee would const itut e a
good faith en forcemen t of its default r emedies.  Were I  th e jud ge
in  Exam ple Thr ee, I would conclude t ha t t he Ban k a cted in
good faith an d uphold the Bank’s decision on this basis.
On th e oth er h an d, it is  n ot  neces sa rily se lf-evident  th at  all
commer cial bor rowers w ould equa te t he consequen ces of a due-
on-sa le clause (which motivated the Garn  Act) and a
requ i rement to provide fina ncial sta tem ent s. Fu rt her , ca ses
such  as Kendall 206 and S choolcraft207 demons t ra te the  h is tor ica l
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208. There ar e, of cour se, well-founde d compet ing views on  th is point . S ee, e.g.,
DENNIS  M. P ATTERSON , GOOD F AITH AND LENDER LIABILITY 155 (1989) (“Argumen t s
over mean ing  a re no t  reducibl e t o qu est ions  of Pa re to op tim ali ty,  wea lth  ma xim iza tion
or  efficiency. In ter pret ive ar gum e n t s are dia logical contesta tions over th e point of law.
The point  of law is a  funct ion of ques tion s ab out  rea sons  (e.g., ‘Wh y does th is ru le
exis t?’; ‘Wha t is t he pu rpose of th is regu lat ion?’). The falla cy of economic models  of
ar gu me nt at ion  is t he  bel ief of t he ir  pr opon en ts  th at  qu es ti on s of m ean ing ( and  t ru th )
a re susceptible of solution by resort to methodological means. Truth  is n ot  t he
p roduct  of me th od. Tr ut h is  a s ocial ly-cr ea te d a rt ifact . Lle well yn  un der st ood t his. H is
unde r st and ing is i n t he  Cod e. W e s ho ul d n ot i gn ore t hi s t ru th .”).
willingness of cour t s t o u s e t he  rhetor ic of good fa i th  to s t r ike
down a t t empt s to exe rcise con t ract  rights for “una nticipated” or
“oppor tun is t ic” economic advan tage.  If the  fu tu re brings a
re tu rn of sha rply r i sing int e res t  r a t es, I exp ect t ha t we  will
exp er ien ce an other  cycle of “du e-on” litiga tion —an d if pas t is
prologue, the r het or ic of good  fa it h  wil l p rodu ce ju dicia l d ivision
over  the a pp ropr ia ten es s of t hose  accele ra t ion  decis ion s.
As a  p roponen t of th e “any-business -reason” s tandard of bad
fa i th , Professor Nelson doubtless wou ld tu rn  th is  unce r t a in ty
against  me . To the  ex ten t  t hat  mor tga ges la w valu es cer ta int y
and pred ict abili ty, h ow ca n  mor tga ges  la w s ubject  the
m or t g a gee t o t h e  r is k  of s u ch  a d  hoc judicia l
decisionm ak ing—esp ecially when  we know some  cour t s
(witness AVE MCO  and Cerm ack ) wil l a pp ly t he d u ty of good
fait h  to reach incorrect decisions tha t accord in s u fficient
resp ect to th e lender ’s busin ess judgm ent ? If we assu me t ha t
int erp ret at ion of th e par ties’ agreem ent  should be informed  by
efficie ncy concern s,208 I  am sympa the t ic; bu t  I am a l so
unconvin ced  th at  a les s a bsolut e an d m ore m odera te “bad  fait h”
s t anda rd will produce great er inefficiency t han  the m ore
absolu te “any-busines s -r eason” s t anda rd . In  fact ,  t o some
extent , the  ve ry ce r ta in ty  and predicta bilit y of the  “an y-
business -reason” st anda rd i s i t s m ost  sign ifica n t  sh or tcoming .
While  a  les s a bs olu te ba d fa it h  s t anda rd  in t roduces some
measure of unpr ed ict abil it y, t ha t  unpr ed ict abil it y does  not  have
only n ega t ive  effect s.
At  th e ma rgin, un certa inty can  ha ve positive effects by
meaningfu lly tem perin g creditor enforcement  decisions. The
overwh elmin g major it y of a ccelera t ion  deci sions  a re “no-
brainers” based upon serious monetary defau l t s,  insolven t
borrowers, an d/or obvious  t hreat s to the lender’s security. In
the cont ext of those decisions, the  cons t ra in ing e ffect  tha t
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209. F o r exam ple, consider  wha t t ra nsp ired following the d ecision in Ke nda ll v.
Ernest  Pestan a, Inc., 709 P.2d 837 (Cal. 1985), discussed supra  i n  note s  139-41  and
accompany ing t ext .  The  lea se in  Kendall  was silent a s to the q u e st i on  of  whe the r  the
land lo rd could  wit hh old con sen t t o an  as sign me nt  or s ub lea se i n or der  to ca p t u re
unce r t a in ty wil l h ave on  cred it or  en forcem en t  de cis ion s is
negligible  or non exist ent . For  exam ple, t he  ris k of a ch alle nge
to th e Ban k’s decision t o call in Ran dolph’s line of credit  in
Example One (wher e Ran dolph is insolvent) would not r egister
on  th e Ba nk ’s de cisionm ak ing s cale—or, eve n  if it  d id  r eg is t er ,
it  would not chan ge the Ba nk ’s decision. The pr uden ce of the
Bank’s de cis ion , a nd t he fa ct  tha t  the d ecis ion  compor t s  wi th
t h e r ea son able  exp ect a t ion s of each cont ract in g pa r ty, is  se lf-
evident.
At  th e ma rgin, however, th e pru dence of a n  accelera tion
de cis ion —or  whethe r  the decision comp ort s wit h t he lik ely
exp ect a t ion s of the bor rower —ma y not b e self-eviden t. As in
Example Two, ther e m ay ex is t  rea di ly d iscover able  evide nce
tha t  th e creditor’s securit y is not impa ired  and i ts  p rospect  of
repayment  is n ot t hr ea te ne d. As in  Exa mp le Fou r, t he
circumstan ces under which the lender is exer cising it s reser ved
rem edies may be ones tha t  cou l d n ot h ave be en r eas ona bly
an ticipated  by t h e bor rower  a t  the t im e of t he or igina l loa n
agreemen t . As  with  any  colle ct ion  effor t , t he cr ed it or ’s d ecis ion
to accelera te in  th ese m ar gina l cases  will impose sign ifica n t
consequ ences on the borr ower in  ter ms  of its  abilit y to ma int ain
opera t ions both  in  the  sh ort a nd long terms. In close
cases—cases whe re a  neu tr al observer  might  choose not  t o
acce le ra t e based  upon  a  lack  of s ecu r ity impairment, or because
the borrower likely would not ha ve ant icipat ed enforcement
un der  the cir cumst ances —a more m ode ra te con cep t ion  of good
fait h  will pr obably pr oduce som e judicia l mis ta kes (i.e., cases
like  AVE MCO  in w hich  th e cour t in corre ctly a sce r ta ins  the
part ies’ r eason able  exp ect a t ion s),  bu t  t he u ncer t a in ty
ass ociated  with t hose mist ak es should a lso have an  in terrorem
effect up on cre dit or de cisionm ak ing.
In  tu rn , t h is  shou ld have  two beneficial effects . Fir st ,
cr ed it ors wil l r es pon d a t  the le vel  of docu men t in g t r ansa ct ions,
by bar gaining t o obta in grea t e r  enforcem ent  lat itu de in
inst an ces wh er e t ha t  la t it ude  is  necess a ry t o protect t heir
legitim at e bus iness concerns.209 To the  ex ten t  tha t  th i s r educes
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lease bonus  va lue .  As  a  result , t he cour t conclude d th at  th e ten an t would  not h ave
rea sona bly expected the landlord t o withhold consent  in order to ren egotiate the
stat ed rent  or to capture t he bonus value i n h e r e n t i n  th e leas e. Following Kendall ,
landlords inserted  clauses into their  leases specifically authorizing the l andl o rd to
with hold cons en t u nle ss t he  te na nt  agr eed  to p ay s ome  or a ll of the i ncreased  ren ta l
va lue of the pr emises to the la ndlord. Courts uph eld those prov ision s in  th e fa ce of
challenges by tenants, as they should have—clearly, no tenant signing such a lease
could legitimately claim unfair surprise or disappointed expectations if t he  land lo rd
used  th e pr ovision a s a m ean s to r ecapt ur e bonu s valu e. S ee C a r m a  De vel ope rs  (Ca l.),
Inc. v. Marat hon Dev. Cal., Inc., 826 P.2d 710, 72 7-29  (Ca l . 1992)  (s t a t ing  tha t  a
l andlord did not breach duty of good faith and fa ir d ea lin g in  en forci ng  sp ecific,
ba rg ain ed-for  pr ovis ion  al loca ti ng  lea se  bon us  va lu e).
210. Indeed, th is is pre cisely how the lending indust ry responded t o the “lender
liabilit y boomlet ,” as re flected by t he p rolifera tion  of books, ma nu als, a nd
presen ta t ions design ed to h elp len ders  plan  for avoiding len der lia bility claim s. S ee,
e.g., GE RALD L. BLANCHARD, LENDER LIABILITY: LAW , P RACTICE AND P REVENTION
(198 9); MA R K E. BUDNITZ , TH E  LA W  OF  LENDER LIABILITY (re v. e d. 1 994 ); P ETER M.
E DELSTEIN , TH E  LENDER LIABI LIT Y DESKBOOK  (199 2).
the likelihood that  legitim at e expectations rema in unexpressed,
it  s h ou ld reduce the risk of court s imposing unwarra nted costs
by overexte nd ing th e du ty of good fait h. Se cond, cred itor s will
r espond a t  the le vel  of en forcin g a gr eemen ts b y m akin g m ore
carefu l de cis ion s; t he p rude nt  cred it or  will exe rcise m ore
carefu l judgmen t  in  eva lu a t in g it s s ecu red  pos it ion  and will
ens u r e th at  its en forcemen t decisions tr eat  similar ly situa ted
bor rowers in  simila r  fash ion .210 On t he m ar gin, t his
cir cumsp ect ion  sh ould p rodu ce bet te r d ecisions . In  t h i s regard,
a  br oade r  concep t ion  of good  fa i th—and the occas iona l  damage
a ward against th e AVEMCOs of the world—should serve t o
improve lend er  decision ma kin g abou t t he  mon itor ing a nd
enforcement  of l oans  to a  grea t er  extent  th an  might  be expected
un der  a  pu re “freedom -of-cont ract” or “any-bu sines s-r ea son ”
view.
Wh ich  view is  actua lly  more efficie n t , of cou rse, is  an
em pi r ica l quest ion for which ther e is no clear a nswer . Unt il we
have tha t  cl ea r  an swer, we can  expect the d ebat e over the
proper  app lica t ion  of the du ty of good  fa i th  to continue—and we
can  expect  less  cert ain ty a nd  pr edict ab ility t han  sect ion 8.1
may have  hoped  for .
